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Prawitz's completeness conjecture: A reassessment 普拉维茨的完备性猜想：重新评估
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12541
Peter Schroeder‐Heister
{"title":"Prawitz's completeness conjecture: A reassessment","authors":"Peter Schroeder‐Heister","doi":"10.1111/theo.12541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12541","url":null,"abstract":"In 1973, Dag Prawitz conjectured that the calculus of intuitionistic logic is complete with respect to his notion of validity of arguments. On the background of the recent disproof of this conjecture by Piecha, de Campos Sanz and Schroeder‐Heister, we discuss possible strategies of saving Prawitz's intentions. We argue that Prawitz's original semantics, which is based on the principal frame of all atomic systems, should be replaced with a general semantics, which also takes into account restricted frames of atomic systems. We discard the option of not considering extensions of atomic systems, but acknowledge the need to incorporate definitional atomic bases in the semantic framework. It turns out that ideas and results by Westerståhl on the Carnap categoricity of intuitionistic logic can be applied to Prawitz semantics. This implies that Prawitz semantics has a status of its own as a genuine, though incomplete, semantics of intuitionstic logic. An interesting side result is the fact that every formula satisfiable in general semantics is satisfiable in an axioms‐only frame (a frame whose atomic systems do not contain proper rules). We draw a parallel between this seemingly paradoxical result and Skolem's paradox in first‐order model theory.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142251710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Validity of inferences and validity of demonstrations 推论的有效性和演示的有效性
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12542
Göran Sundholm
{"title":"Validity of inferences and validity of demonstrations","authors":"Göran Sundholm","doi":"10.1111/theo.12542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12542","url":null,"abstract":"The lecture spells out the difference between the validity of inference (‐figure)s and validity applied to demonstrations (‘proof acts’). The latter notion is not an ordinary characterizing one; in Brentano's terminology it is a <jats:italic>modifying</jats:italic> one. A demonstration lacking validity is not a real demonstration, just as a <jats:italic>false</jats:italic> friend is no true friend. Throughout, the treatment makes crucial use of an epistemological perspective that is cast in the <jats:italic>first</jats:italic> person. Furthermore, the difference between (logical) consequence among propositions and the validity of inference from judgement to judgement is explained. Particular attention is paid to alleged issues of circularity in the definition of the validity of inference, and to the ‘explosion’ validity of inference from contradictory premisses. Drawing upon a version of the dialogical framework of Per Martin‐Löf, namely, ‘When I say <jats:italic>Therefore</jats:italic>, I give others my permission to assert the conclusion’, while stressing also the importance of the first person perspective, both difficulties can be neutralized.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142251709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On certainty, Left Wittgensteinianism and conceptual change 论确定性、维特根斯坦左派和概念变化
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-09-13 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12558
W. J. T. Mollema
{"title":"On certainty, Left Wittgensteinianism and conceptual change","authors":"W. J. T. Mollema","doi":"10.1111/theo.12558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12558","url":null,"abstract":"What are the limits of Left Wittgensteinianism's point‐ and need‐based account of conceptual change? Based upon Wittgenstein's account of certainty and the riverbed analogy for conceptual change in <jats:italic>On Certainty</jats:italic>, the question is raised whether Queloz and Cueni's redevelopment of Left Wittgensteinianism can account for the multiplicitous forms of change these concepts are subject to. I argue that Left Wittgensteinianism can only partially do so, because it overemphasises the role of criticism‐driven conceptual change, due to its focus on the reason‐based contingency of the practices of a local ‘we’. In response, it is argued that Left Wittgensteinianism should be fortified with (i) gradual changes to concepts' sociocultural constraints that concept‐users are unaware of and (ii) evolutionary and environmental changes to the biological determinants of natural constraints of conceptual cores. In the end, there are conceptual practices like holding for certain that are generally, and fully contingent, but simultaneously inevitable not only for ‘us’ but also for many other delimitations of ‘we’. Subsequently, the compatibility of this Wittgensteinian account of conceptual change with pragmatic genealogy is discussed. It is concluded that thinking about conceptual changes to practices cannot be about the possibility of criticism alone nor succeed without the inclusion thereof.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142251711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Counterfactual power and genuine choice 反事实权力和真正的选择
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-08-28 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12555
Adrian Kuźniar
{"title":"Counterfactual power and genuine choice","authors":"Adrian Kuźniar","doi":"10.1111/theo.12555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12555","url":null,"abstract":"The article introduces a distinction between weak and strong counterfactual power and shows that as far as the metaphysical aspect of choice is concerned, T. Merricks's examples do not undermine the proposition that strong counterfactual power over a fact suffices for having a genuine choice about that fact. This is relevant to debates about logical fatalism, theological incompatibilism and nomological (determinism) incompatibilism. If strong counterfactual power is sufficient for having a choice, then in each of the main arguments for the mentioned stances, the negation of the argument's conclusion entails the negation of its key premise. It is further argued that those key premises cannot be justified by the fixity of the past because the latter holds only to the extent warranted by the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence between the past and the future. Therefore, the pastness of such facts as that propositions about our acts were true before we were born, and that God believed then that we would perform those acts, does not provide any reason to believe that we do not have a choice about those facts. Fatalists and incompatibilists assume in their arguments something that has yet to be justified.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142222222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ethics committees are not enough 仅有伦理委员会是不够的
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12553
Sven Ove Hansson
{"title":"Ethics committees are not enough","authors":"Sven Ove Hansson","doi":"10.1111/theo.12553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12553","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142222235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Whisper words of wisdom: Asides and appositives in Kaplan's logic of demonstratives 悄悄话的智慧卡普兰示范词逻辑中的旁白和附言
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12545
Stefano Predelli
{"title":"Whisper words of wisdom: Asides and appositives in Kaplan's logic of demonstratives","authors":"Stefano Predelli","doi":"10.1111/theo.12545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12545","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is grounded on an <jats:italic>exegetically creative</jats:italic> reading of Kaplan's late approach to <jats:italic>dthat‐terms</jats:italic>. I do have a few exegetic pretensions. In particular, I simply <jats:italic>assume</jats:italic> what I take to be the central tenets of Kaplan's theory of demonstratives between 1977 and 1989, and I develop them according to ideas suggested by certain passages in <jats:italic>Afterthoughts</jats:italic>. But my developments are also unashamedly <jats:italic>creative</jats:italic>. I recognize that I may overemphasize a few carefully chosen snippets and that, in doing so, I may end up ignoring other important junctures. But I happily trade textual faithfulness for theoretical insight: if on the right track, my results hopefully cast a new light not only on Kaplan's take on ‘dthat’ but also on the fundamental ideas in his philosophical and semantic framework.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142222233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On epistemic black holes: How self‐sealing belief systems develop and evolve 关于认识论黑洞：自我封闭的信念系统是如何发展和演变的
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-08-18 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12554
Maarten Boudry, Steije Hofhuis
{"title":"On epistemic black holes: How self‐sealing belief systems develop and evolve","authors":"Maarten Boudry, Steije Hofhuis","doi":"10.1111/theo.12554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12554","url":null,"abstract":"Many pseudosciences, conspiracy theories and other unfounded belief systems have a self‐sealing nature, being equipped with defence mechanisms and immunizing strategies that protect them against counterevidence and criticism. In this article, we discuss the existence of ‘epistemic black holes’, belief systems which posit intelligent agents that are deliberately evading detection and thus sabotaging any investigation into their existence. These belief systems have the remarkable feature that they predict an absence of evidence in their favour, and even the discovery of counterevidence. The most obvious instances of such epistemic black holes are unfounded conspiracy theories, but examples crop up in other domains as well. We outline the development and cultural evolution of epistemic black holes, drawing from a number of case studies. Most importantly, because of their self‐sealing character and resilience to counterevidence, epistemic black holes suffer from a recurring problem of arbitrariness and proliferating alternatives. Shedding light on how epistemic black holes function can help to inoculate people against their enduring allure.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142222234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Supervenient fixity and agential possibilities 监督固定性和代理可能性
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-08-14 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12551
Maria Sekatskaya, Alexander Gebharter
{"title":"Supervenient fixity and agential possibilities","authors":"Maria Sekatskaya, Alexander Gebharter","doi":"10.1111/theo.12551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12551","url":null,"abstract":"One of the central problems within the free will debate lies in the apparent incompatibility of an agent's ability to do otherwise and determinism. Recently, compatibilist libertarianism was proposed as an actualist position intended to finally reconcile both. In this article, we argue that in order to maintain consistency, this position must be understood as a variant of classical compatibilism rather than a version of libertarianism. Though this seems to be an undesired consequence for proponents of compatibilist libertarianism, we think that it is not that bad. We show that recent objections to this position can be avoided by embracing its compatibilist nature and argue that a modified version of compatibilist libertarianism might very well be as close to an actualist account of free will in a deterministic world as one can hope for.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142222236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the (un)suitability of literature for moral education 论文学（不）适合道德教育
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12552
Iris Vidmar Jovanović
{"title":"On the (un)suitability of literature for moral education","authors":"Iris Vidmar Jovanović","doi":"10.1111/theo.12552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12552","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I defend moral aesthetic cognitivism, the view that literature is a valuable source of insights related to morally relevant aspects of our world and that it can significantly contribute to our moral education. I am in particular concerned with counterarguments to this view voiced by Greg Currie, who trashes epistemological foundations of literature and emphasizes the lack of empirical corroboration of cognitivism, and by Peter Lamarque, who dismisses educative potential of literature on the account of readers' incapacity to extract morally relevant judgements about the world from literary works. I rely on examples from literary tradition to rebuild the epistemological framework underlying cognitivism and on contemporary insights from moral psychology to show that our engagements with literature are permeated with moral reflections that are valuable for our moral education.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141948911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aspects of a logical theory of assertion and inference 断言和推理逻辑理论的各个方面
IF 0.5 3区 哲学
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-07-29 DOI: 10.1111/theo.12539
Ansten Klev
{"title":"Aspects of a logical theory of assertion and inference","authors":"Ansten Klev","doi":"10.1111/theo.12539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12539","url":null,"abstract":"The aim here is to investigate assertion and inference as notions of logic. Assertion will be explained in terms of its purpose, which is to give interlocutors the right to request the assertor to do a certain task. The assertion is correct if, and only if, the assertor knows how to do this task. Inference will be explained as an assertion equipped with what I shall call a justification profile, a strategy for making good on the assertion. The inference is valid if, and only if, correctness is preserved from the premiss assertions to the conclusion assertion. Most of this is a spelling out of views on assertion and inference presented by Per Martin‐Löf in lectures since 2015.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141867578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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