THEORIA最新文献

{"title":"Prolegomena for the concept of constructionism in architecture","authors":"Aleksa Ciganovic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303157c","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303157c","url":null,"abstract":"This prolegomena initially consolidates ?meta-architectural constructionism? as a conceptual label for the operationalization of the architectural modalities of the philosophy of synthesis. After the heuristic definition of its key aspects was carried out through four key terms - reconstruction, relationism, processualism and projectivism, the second part of the article initiates a proposal of understanding and chronology according to the changing ontology of modernity, following Berthelot?s (Jean- Michel Berthelot) thesis about the three poles of the contemporary program of historical epistemology - the naturalistic, intentional and symbolic poles. His metatheoretical form of constructivism applies a version of the familiar scientific hypothetico-deductive model to cognition in general. As a kind of general vector of time, appropriation of epochal consciousness or a kind of sensibility in architecture, this post-positivist dogma deviates from theoretically too stabilized paradigms, categorical schemes or even less norms, but functions as a variable form of discursive, transdisciplinary, phenomenological and metaphysical identifications. Naturalistic metaarchitectural constructs indicate the core presence of the aspectuality of reconstruction and relationism, intentional constructs indicate the strong presence of metaarchitectural procedurality and projectivism, while the symbolic metaarchitectural pole is based on a complex combination of all heuristically recognized aspectualities as a modality of complex and combinatorial thinking and a methodology that is essentially postmodern scripture. The ontological vocations of metatheory of synthesis in the first two historical epistemologies of metaarchitectural constructionism are directed towards analytical constructs, while the third pole is directed towards the descriptive nature of constructs, but in all aspects of meta-architectural constructionism the role of some kind of structure or system appears. The intention is to theoretically standardize the ambiguity of constructionism in architecture as a text of culture, the consequences of which are rationalistic shaping of relativistic phenomena, as a meta-architectural procedure, protocol or a specific, simultaneously ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically based platform of thought.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135649740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Husserl’s understanding of temporality as a reflection of active subject","authors":"Anastasija Filipovic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303039f","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303039f","url":null,"abstract":"Objects and events from the outside world are represented in our consciousness through the structure of time. Temporality and consciousness are closely related phenomena and in this paper I intend to explore their relationship by referring to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. I will try to provide an adequate contemporary interpretation of Husserl?s understanding of temporality, as well as the relationship between the internal structure of time and consciousness, through the conceptual framework of dynamic systems theory and enactivist theory of cognition.. In order to succeed in my intention, I will rely on a special ability of the subject: activity.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135650048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ecumenical expressivism: The Frege-Geach problem and the open question argument","authors":"Voin Milevski","doi":"10.2298/theo2303091m","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303091m","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the position of ecumenical expressivism, a metaethical theory according to which moral judgments simultaneously express an individual?s sentiment of (dis)approval towards objects, actions, and practices instantiating certain properties, as well as their belief that these objects, actions, and practices instantiate the mentioned properties. After a detailed exposition of the central tenets of this philosophical position, we will analyze how successfully it can address the threat posed by the modified version of the open-question argument and whether it can resolve the famous Frege-Geach problem, which is rightly considered the most serious obstacle to adopting any form of expressivism. The conclusion of this analysis is that the claim that ecumenical expressivism can be considered a superior position compared to non-ecumenical forms of expressivist and cognitivist views is unjustified. This contrasts with the case of ecumenical cognitivism, where such a claim finds stronger support.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135650040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Kant’s maxim ‘ought-implies-can’ apply if the principle of alternate possibilities does not?","authors":"Nedzib Prasevic","doi":"10.2298/theo2303075p","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2303075p","url":null,"abstract":"Frankfurt?s critique of the principle of alternate possibilities led to a reexamining of many of the conditions that were rooted in the principle. One of these includes Kant?s famed maxim ?Ought-implies-can?. Since the alternate possibilities principle underscores the condition that is required for the subject to be morally responsible (could have done otherwise condition), the maxim also implies the condition?s validity also in situations where it is met and provides the basis for the attributiveness of morally relevant qualities. Although Frankfurt?s example showed that the presence of moral responsibility does not require the validity of the alternate possibilities principle - the condition of the possibility of acting differently need not be met - then even the attributiveness of moral qualities, in the way that the maxim implies, cannot be applied in situations where the subject is responsible, even though they could not have done otherwise. Frankfurt, however, refuses to draw this conclusion and believes that even under the conditions set forth, the maxim can apply. The provocative claim challenges Frankfurt-type compatibilists, and the paper examines whether it is founded, in addition to what consequences can be drawn pertaining to Kant?s maxim?s validity. The conclusion - contrary to Frankfurt?s initial optimism - is that in a world where causal determinism applies and where the alternate possibilities principle does not, although the subject may be morally responsible, their responsibility cannot be grounded in deontological reasoning.","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135649743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Freedom's values: The good and the right.","authors":"Pietro Intropi","doi":"10.1111/theo.12431","DOIUrl":"10.1111/theo.12431","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>How is freedom valuable? And how should we go about defining freedom? In this essay, I discuss a distinction between two general ways of valuing freedom: one appeals to the good (e.g., to freedom's contribution to well-being); the other appeals to how persons have reason to treat one another in virtue of their status as purposive beings (to the right). The analysis of these two values has many relevant implications and it is preliminary to a better understanding of the relationships between freedom and justice. First, it contributes to shed light on the relationship between trust and the value of freedom, and on two attitudes towards freedom - promoting and respecting freedom. Second, it disambiguates between two versions of the claim that freedom has non-specific/content-independent value: one appeals to the good, the other to the right. And third, I show that certain implications concerning the definition of freedom follow from assuming an account of the value of freedom that exclusively appeals to the right, illustrating how the value of freedom can shape what freedom <i>is</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"88 6","pages":"1144-1162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10087774/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9309939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From Magnitudes to Geometry and Back: De Zolt's Postulate.","authors":"Eduardo N Giovannini, Abel Lassalle-Casanave","doi":"10.1111/theo.12385","DOIUrl":"10.1111/theo.12385","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A crucial trend of nineteenth-century mathematics was the search for <i>pure</i> foundations of specific mathematical domains by avoiding the obscure concept of magnitude. In this paper, we examine this trend by considering the \"fundamental theorem\" of the theory of plane area: \"If a polygon is decomposed into polygonal parts in any given way, then the union of all but one of these parts is not equivalent to the given polygon.\" This proposition, known as De Zolt's postulate, was conceived as a strictly geometrical expression of the general principle of magnitudes \"the whole is greater than the part.\" On the one hand, we illustrate this striving for purity in the foundations of geometry by analysing David Hilbert's classical proof of De Zolt's postulate. On the other hand, we connect this geometrical problem with the first axiomatizations of the concept of magnitude by the end of the nineteenth century. In particular, we argue that a recent result in the logical analysis of the concept of magnitude casts new light on Hilbert's proof. We also outline an alternative development of a theory of magnitude that includes a proof of De Zolt's postulate in an abstract setting.</p>","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"88 3","pages":"629-652"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9305878/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40672882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: What Are the Fundamental Epistemological Principles?","authors":"Philipp Berghofer","doi":"10.1111/theo.12394","DOIUrl":"10.1111/theo.12394","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Evidentialism and mentalism enjoy much popularity. In fact, mentalist evidentialism is often considered the most plausible internalist approach towards epistemic justification. However, mentalist evidentialism does not amount to a comprehensive theory of epistemic justification. In their attempt to complete their epistemological system and to answer the question of <i>why</i> experiences are justifiers, Conee and Feldman supplement mentalist evidentialism with <i>explanationism</i>. They take <i>principles of best explanation</i> to be the fundamental epistemic principles. In this paper, I show that explanationist mentalist evidentialism is plagued by severe shortcomings. What is more, I argue for an alternative in the spirit of Conee and Feldman's internalism that avoids the problems of explanationism, offering a straightforward commonsense account of epistemic justification. The fundamental epistemological principles are <i>phenomenological</i> principles.</p>","PeriodicalId":44638,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA","volume":"88 3","pages":"679-700"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9303896/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40672883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}