{"title":"Relative deprivation, time preference, and economic growth","authors":"Debajyoti Chakrabarty","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12365","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12365","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the growth process among a large group of economies where consumption relative to a reference group determines the discount factor of the household agents. We characterize all possible balanced growth paths and their stability properties. The model can explain why two economies having similar production technologies, preferences, and total factor productivity growth rates can differ in labor supply behavior and have diverging growth paths depending on their initial conditions. Numerical analysis of the model suggests that growth path divergence is plausible based on cross-country differences in savings rates. History dependence on time preference also generates realistic transitional dynamics.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 3","pages":"489-525"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12365","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43578445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Product design in monopolistic competition","authors":"Burak Dindaroglu","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12363","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12363","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a model of monopolistic competition where producers can manipulate an elasticity parameter at an early stage. We interpret this as a choice of product specialization. Lower marginal costs of production lead to more generic products in all equilibria, which lead to fewer varieties under free-entry. Entry of a new firm increases overall specialization and increases prices, that is, the environment exhibits price-increasing competition. The loss of consumer surplus due to higher prices and lower consumption is compensated by the value of additional variety, hence entry also increases consumer surplus. Therefore, price-increasing competition need not be anticompetitive under endogenous specialization.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 3","pages":"471-488"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43354613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preferential corporate income tax treatment: Valuation in the market portfolio","authors":"Junwook Yoo","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12361","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12361","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the setting of the market portfolio, the impacts of preferential corporate income tax treatments through the valuational reduction for risk are opposite to and offset the impacts through the expected proceeds. This suggests that focusing on the absolute valuation of tax-favored firms results in the undermeasurement of implicit taxes on returns on investments in tax-favored firms and the relative valuation with reference to fully taxed (i.e., tax-disfavored) benchmark firms be used. In addition, corporate income taxes imposed on entities and capital income taxes imposed on investors have opposite valuational effects through the endogenously derived market-aggregate aversion to risk.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 3","pages":"450-470"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49058811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Love for variety,” outside option and extensive margin of demand","authors":"Sovik Mukherjee, Vivekananda Mukherjee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12362","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper models a uniform-price Bertrand-price-competition in a differentiated product oligopoly market, where the buyers' preference shows “love for variety.” The buyers differ from each other in their valuation of the differentiated product with a common outside option available to all. The model endogenously determines both the extensive and intensive margin of demand and the equilibrium number of varieties in the differentiated product market. It shows that in such a framework complementarity exists at the extensive margin of demand even in the presence of demand substitutability between the varieties. The results apply to the competition between brick and mortar shops and malls.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 3","pages":"425-449"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50118494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Love for variety,” outside option and extensive margin of demand","authors":"Sovik Mukherjee, Vivek Mukherjee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12362","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"62684074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic default, multiple installments, and the role of informal moneylender in microcredit contract","authors":"Khan Jahirul Islam","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12360","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12360","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I model the role of strategic defaults and informal moneylenders on multiple-installment loan contracts offered by microfinance institutions (MFIs). The results show that a single-installment loan is not viable due to MFIs' vulnerability to strategic defaults and borrowers' lack of collateral. In contrast, a multiple-installment contract requires borrowers to borrow from the moneylender, who is immune to strategic default, in order to repay the MFI's early installments that are due before the project yields a return. Consequently, both default costs and borrowing costs increase and incentives to commit strategic default decline, making the multiple-installment contract profitable for MFIs.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 2","pages":"204-220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49428420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Efficient regulated entry in competitive markets with demand uncertainty","authors":"Raúl Bajo-Buenestado","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12359","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12359","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is well-known that, in a competitive market, the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium is the efficient one. This paper shows that this textbook result breaks down if firms face demand uncertainty. In this case, entry is excessive relative to the optimum and, therefore, regulation improves market efficiency. This occurs because, in the absence of regulation, entry is motivated by the profits that firms expect to receive if market demand turns out to be high. However, when choosing the optimal regulated entry, the planner also considers that some surplus is lost if demand turns out to be low.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 2","pages":"413-422"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12359","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47287008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 3/2022","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12316","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 3","pages":"217-218"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12316","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137491955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"International environmental agreements under different evolutionary imitation mechanisms","authors":"Hsiao-Chi Chen, Shi-Miin Liu","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12357","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12357","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores how the formation and stability of international environmental agreements vary with two often adopted mechanisms: imitating-the-best-average and imitating-the-best-total rules. We first show that the possible long-run equilibria of two dynamics are the same. They are countries' full participation, no-participation, and the two equilibria combined. However, the occurring conditions of these equilibria under two dynamics may differ. Then, we prove that countries' full participation is more likely to be long-run equilibrium in international environmental agreements when imitating-the-best-average rule is adopted. Moreover, all findings of this study hold whatever the function forms of countries' abnoatement benefits and costs are, and are unaffected by the positive affine transformation of countries' total payoffs.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 2","pages":"248-289"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44950820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anticipation in leisure—Effects on labor-leisure choice","authors":"Bibaswan Chatterjee, Rolando Escobar-Posada, Goncalo Monteiro","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12358","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12358","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper introduces the idea of a forward-looking reference benchmark on both consumption and leisure in the context of a Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans growth model by assuming that in addition to consumption and leisure the household utility also depends on reference benchmarks of future anticipated consumption and leisure. We analyze the macrodynamic equilibrium, contrasting it to the case when the reference benchmarks are backward-looking. We investigate if the presence of anticipation in leisure can lead to smoother jumps in labor under productivity shocks and what effect that has on the consumption adjustment at the time of shock. We present our results using numerical simulations that confirm the existence of parameter spaces where a dual anticipation model leads to smaller jumps in labor, albeit sometimes at the expense of higher consumption jumps.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 2","pages":"384-412"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42483904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}