International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

{"title":"Local farsightedness in network formation","authors":"Pierre de Callataÿ, A. Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12396","url":null,"abstract":"We propose the concept of local‐ farsighted consistent network for analyzing network formation games where players only consider a limited number of feasible networks. A network is said to be local‐ farsightedly consistent if, for any network within the distance‐ neighborhood of , either is not defeated by , or defeats . We show that if the utility function is (componentwise) egalitarian or satisfies reversibility or excludes externalities across components, then local‐ farsightedness is more likely to be a good proxy for what would happen when players have full knowledge of all feasible networks.","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"31 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139779645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Local farsightedness in network formation","authors":"Pierre de Callataÿ,&nbsp;Ana Mauleon,&nbsp;Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12396","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12396","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose the concept of local-<span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>k</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $k$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> farsighted consistent network for analyzing network formation games where players only consider a limited number of feasible networks. A network <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> is said to be local-<span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>k</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $k$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> farsightedly consistent if, for any network <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mo>′</mo>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g^{prime} $</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> within the distance-<span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>k</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $k$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> neighborhood of <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, either <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> is not defeated by <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 \u0000 <mo>′</mo>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g^{prime} $</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, or <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation> $g$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> defeats <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 \u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>g</mi>\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 2","pages":"199-226"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139839533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wars of attrition with spending constraints","authors":"Sung‐Ha Hwang, Youngwoo Koh","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12397","url":null,"abstract":"We study wars of attrition with spending constraints. Specifically, there are two players with different values of the prize and costs of continuing wars, and they are endowed with limited budgets that can be used during the war. Two players compete by choosing the time at which they intend to give up within the constraints. We find the constrained mixed strategy equilibrium for this model and provide a full characterization of equilibrium depending on whether each player's constraint is binding or nonbinding.","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"198 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139839537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 1/2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12377","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12377","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139676454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards a welfare model of trade and multinational firms with oligopolistic competition","authors":"Bingxue Wang","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12393","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12393","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper constructs a general equilibrium model in a world with two-symmetric countries. It explains welfare gains from international trade and horizontal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the economy with firm heterogeneity and variable markups stemming from oligopolistic competition. My model shows that the pro-competitive effects of trade and horizontal FDI happen because trade openness induces an increase in product market competition that reduces markups and toughens selection, increasing aggregate productivity. The most significant contribution of the paper is that multinational firms, via horizontal FDI, produce the most significant welfare gains through the toughest selection and lowest markups.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"120-155"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ijet.12393","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139439124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Submodularity and supermodularity in contest games","authors":"Emin Karagözoğlu,&nbsp;Kerim Keskin,&nbsp;Çağrı Sağlam","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12395","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12395","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper presents various examples of two-player submodular or supermodular contest games. Emphasizing the three main elements of a contest model, our examples revolve around situations where (i) contest success function allows for a draw, (ii) winning prize is not exogenously given but rather jointly produced, or (iii) individual effort cost also depends on the rival's effort. We then illustrate how submodularity and supermodularity can be used to study the existence of equilibrium, the order structure of the equilibrium set, and monotone comparative statics in such contest game examples.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 2","pages":"182-198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically","authors":"Shraman Banerjee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12394","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12394","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate a finite-horizon dynamic pricing problem of a seller under limited commitment. Even when the buyers are ex ante symmetric to the seller, the seller can charge different prices to different buyers. We show that under the class of posted-price mechanisms this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers strictly revenue-dominates symmetric treatment. The seller implements this by using a priority-based deterministic tie-breaking rule instead of using a random tie-breaking rule. The effect of asymmetric treatment on revenue increment increases monotonically as we increase the time horizon of the game.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 2","pages":"159-181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139065833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A theoretical analysis on two-sided duopoly platforms and tax regimes","authors":"Sangita Poddar,&nbsp;Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee),&nbsp;Swapnendu Banerjee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12392","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12392","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the effects of three forms of taxation—a tax levied on the platform's revenue, an ad valorem tax on consumers' access fees and tax imposed on per-transaction fees of sellers, in vertically differentiated two-sided duopoly platforms with cross-side network effects. The level of informative advertising which increases the probability of finding sellers by buyers, declines with taxes for each platform. Analytical comparison between tax regimes has been made. Additionally, for an increased degree of cross-group externality, platforms raise the level of informative advertising irrespective of tax structures.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"88-119"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Issue Information: International Journal of Economic Theory 4/2023","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12354","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 4","pages":"765-766"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71936933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Irresolute choice behavior","authors":"Edi Karni","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12391","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ijet.12391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper proposes a model of irresolute choice rationalizing random choice behavior and examines its applications to decision making under certainty, uncertainty, and risk. Depending on the context, the representations feature canonical signal spaces. Decisions are governed by random draws of signals generating stochastic choice functions. Application to portfolio selection and experimental testing are discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":"70-87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135216022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}