{"title":"Sovereign and Banking Sector Debt: Interconnections through Guarantees","authors":"A. Estrella, Sebastian Schich","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0SFXT","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0SFXT","url":null,"abstract":"Sovereigns effectively provided the function of guarantor-of-last resort in response to the 2008/09 banking crisis, and recent bank funding challenges have led to renewed calls for explicit sovereign bank debt guarantees. The present paper focuses on the interconnections between the values of sovereign and bank debt that arise through sovereign guarantees for banks. We develop a valuation framework based on concepts of contingent claims analysis. In particular, we investigate the value of insurance of risky bank debt when the sovereign providing the guarantee can itself be risky. The framework is in principle applicable both to explicit and implicit guarantees and it is applied here to a measure of implicit external (mostly from the sovereign) support for the debt of a crosssection of 100 large European banks. Consistent with the model, the implicit support is higher, the lower the bank’s stand-alone creditworthiness and the higher the sovereign’s creditworthiness. These results have implications for pricing sovereign bank debt guarantees, be they provided individually by each sovereign for its domestic banks or by several sovereigns jointly. In the former case, stronger sovereigns should charge higher premiums for their bank debt guarantees for a given bank risk if the aim is to avoid creating distortions to competition. In the latter, they should receive greater allotments of premium incomes even where the share of the guarantees provided are identical among sovereigns.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127672456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Financial Industry in the New Regulatory Landscape","authors":"Gert D. Wehinger","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZQP7D","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZQP7D","url":null,"abstract":"The financial market outlook and risks as well as the impact of regulatory reforms on the financial sector were the topics discussed at the October 2011 OECD Financial Roundtable. Concerns about the current situation in financial markets were centred on the sovereign debt and banking crisis in Europe and its repercussions in other parts of the world. Many participants felt that policy makers had not been doing enough to address the crisis and that bold action and ‘circuit breakers’ to stop the negative feedback loops were needed to restore market confidence. Regarding regulation, while the financial industry broadly expressed support for Basel III reforms, some elements like the SIFI surcharge were criticised. The industry was also sceptical regarding the benefits of separation of banks’ businesses (Volcker rule, Vickers proposal) and broadly rejected the EU proposal of a financial transaction tax. While policy makers regarded some of the industry’s regulatory concerns as valid, they stressed the aim of regulatory reforms to make the financial sector safer, thus making downsizing of a certain kind of financial intermediation unavoidable. But the right balance needs to be found in terms of the extent and the timing of regulatory reforms; downsizing in the current situation should perhaps be encouraged less quickly in some cases.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134495336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Fault Lines in Cross-Border Banking: Lessons from the Icelandic Case","authors":"Már Guðmundsson","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0LLJJ","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0LLJJ","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the fault lines in cross-border banking, both at the global level and at the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) level, using the case of the three Icelandic cross-border banks as an example. Cross-currency liquidity risk built up prior to the crisis, especially maturity mismatches in foreign currency. This risk tended to be grossly underestimated at the time. There was a run on banks’ FX liabilities after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The Icelandic banks were highly vulnerable to such a run and lacked a credible lender of last resort (LOLR) in terms of foreign currency. The crisis also exposed serious flaws in the EU and EEA framework for cross-border banking, including deposit insurance. One of the main lessons of the Icelandic experience is that sizeable cross-border banking operations in small countries with their own currency come with very significant risks. The Icelandic experience suggests that further reforms are needed for cross-border banking activities in the Single Market, where the key issue is to match the European passport for banks with pan- European supervision, deposit insurance and LOLR. Domestic banks could remain in the domestic system.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133396087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Macro-Prudential Authority: Powers, Scope and Accountability","authors":"C. Goodhart","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0JRR1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0JRR1","url":null,"abstract":"Neither the achievement of price stability, via the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), nor the application of micro-prudential oversight, via the Financial Services Authority (FSA), led to overall financial stability. There is a gap that needs to be filled by a macro-prudential authority (M-PA), the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the United Kingdom. The only macro-prudential instrument used heretofore has been the publication of Financial Stability Reviews (FSR). While worthy, these have been ineffective. The M-PA should have the following powers: First, the power to alter the composition of Central Bank (CB) assets, by adding to (subtracting from) its holdings of claims on the private sector. The argument that such actions are ‘quasi-fiscal’, and should therefore not be undertaken, is not supported. Second, the power to adjust margins (Capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, loan-to-value ratios, etc.) to influence the conduct of financial intermediation. The argument that the use of such powers puts the FPC in a difficult conflict with the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is not supported...","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128832843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Future of Debt Markets","authors":"H. Blommestein, Alison Harwood, Allison Holland","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZLTG6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZLTG6","url":null,"abstract":"Discussions at the 12th OECD-WBG-IMF Global Bond Market Forum focused on three key areas related to the future of debt markets: i) the challenges facing new and infrequent sovereign issuers in assuring durable market access in frontier and emerging markets; ii) the future prospects for the securitisation and covered bond markets; and iii) the future role of large bond investors.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128773738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Highlights from the OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2012","authors":"H. Blommestein, Ahmet Keskinler, P. Flores","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5KG0NW45MQZV","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5KG0NW45MQZV","url":null,"abstract":"OECD governments are facing unprecedented challenges in the markets for government securities as a result of continued strong borrowing amid a highly uncertain environment with growing concerns about the pace of recovery, surging borrowing costs, sovereign risk and contagion pressures.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"300 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114581881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation in Germany: From Rescuing to Restructuring","authors":"Christopher Pleister","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZXCBP","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZXCBP","url":null,"abstract":"One important element of the response to the crisis in Germany was the establishment of a new institution, the Bundesanstalt fur Finanzmarktstabilisierung (Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation, henceforth FMSA). The aim was to supplement the range of tasks performed by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority). Neither one of these two institutions nor the legal framework, including especially the insolvency laws, were adequate for rescuing and restructuring stressed banks. While the FMSA was initially conceived as a temporary undertaking, the new German Restructuring Act implies that the FMSA is now a permanent part of the German banking landscape.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128644213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Potential Impact of Banking Crises on Public Finances: An Assessment of Selected EU Countries Using SYMBOL","authors":"F. Campolongo, M. Marchesi, R. Lisa","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0NHBR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0NHBR","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an application of the SYMBOL model, which was recently developed by the European Commission. In this application, we assess the potential impact of a crisis in the banking sector on public finances in four EU Member States chosen as examples. Results show that two Member States have a relatively higher probability of being in a situation where government finances have to cover losses generated in the banking system.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124023714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lessons from the Last Financial Crisis and the Future Role of Institutional Investors","authors":"L. Rohde","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5KG55QW1T335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5KG55QW1T335","url":null,"abstract":"The dynamics of the financial crisis were driven by underpricing of risk and lack of transparency, which led to a loss of confidence when the bubble finally burst. Crisis resolution involved massive government interventions that caused a permanent transfer of losses to the public sector as well as sovereign-debt crises that may involve painful solutions. Letting banks fail is a necessary disciplinary factor, but this requires a well-defined “game plan” which did not exist in the crisis. Regulatory reforms underway aim at restoring confidence, but they may hamper the long-term potential of institutional investors. Nevertheless, institutional investors should still be able to provide risk capital – except for perhaps pension funds, which have been weakened by demographic developments. Finally, improving governance and reducing excessive risk-taking are important but challenging tasks. More active and involved shareholders could further these goals, but such participation will be hard to achieve. Therefore, transparent bonus and remuneration plans are perhaps the most important initiatives for preventing future systemic financial crises.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127078285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investing in Infrastructure: Getting the Conditions Right","authors":"M. Stanley","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5KG55QW11GR1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5KG55QW11GR1","url":null,"abstract":"Maintaining and building new infrastructure that delivers agglomerative benefits is crucial for promoting sustainable economic growth. Capital needs for infrastructure investment are massive. This capital could be sourced especially from pension funds and other institutional investors for whom infrastructure funds are attractive investment vehicles. But in order to mobilise such private capital, the public sector needs to provide the right framework, e.g. by promoting a “Regulated Asset Base” model to improve capital expenditure, by avoiding undue solvency rules and other regulatory obstacles to long-term investment, and by closing the knowledge gap with regard to infrastructure investments. Governments should also avoid crowding out private sector investment, confining interventions to projects where public risk sharing is necessary, and refrain from making frequent short-term changes to the regulatory framework.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125289530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}