{"title":"Banking in a challenging environment: Business models, ethics and approaches towards risks","authors":"","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2012-5K4BWNPKVK6F","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2012-5K4BWNPKVK6F","url":null,"abstract":"The current crisis with its on-going banking sector problems has brought to the fore various cases of financial fraud and banking scandals that have additionally undermined the already low confidence in the sector. This has raised concerns about structural flaws in the way banks operate and are being regulated and supervised. Restoring investor confidence may require new approaches to redesign the incentives, rules and regulations for the financial sector. This was the backdrop for the discussions at the October 2012 OECD Financial Roundtable that this article summarises. Topics covered the current outlook and risks for banks as well as banking business models, ethics and approaches towards risks. Participants pointed out that, while downsizing and adjusting their business models, banks had already made improvements in their risk management. At the same time, the now observed renationalisation of assets could worsen the situation particularly in the European periphery. This could be attenuated by a European Banking Union that would also help to break the detrimental link between banks and sovereigns. As banks are deleveraging, non-banks are substituting for part of the reduced bank lending, but to do so would need regulatory support – while the shadow banking sector more generally will come under closer regulatory and supervisory scrutiny. Consumer groups in particular regard financial consumer protection as important to help improve the social value of financial activities that had often been unproductive, if not destructive. Bank representatives opposed regulatory separation of bank business on the grounds that it is insufficient to address problems of risk taking and control. Finally, it was pointed out that regulatory reforms need to be targeted and harness market forces by balancing penalties and rewards. Governance of regulation should also be enhanced, and regulation should be proactive and be complemented by strong macro and micro-supervision. Co-ordinating reforms should ensure a level playing field, but a one-size-fits-all approach should be avoided.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133686003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Business models of banks, leverage and the distance-to-default","authors":"A. Blundell-Wignall, Caroline Roulet","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2012-5K4BXLXBD646","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2012-5K4BXLXBD646","url":null,"abstract":"This study models the distance-to-default (DTD) of a large sample of banks with the aim of shedding light on policy and regulatory issues. The determinants of the distance-to-default in a panel sample of 94 banks over the period 2004 to 2011, controlling for the market beta of each bank, includes house prices, relative size, simple leverage, derivatives gross market value of exposure, trading assets, wholesale funding and cross-border revenue. The Basel Tier 1 ratio finds no support as a predictor of default risk. The un-weighted leverage ratio, on the other hand, finds strong support. At the macro level house prices are a powerful predictor of the DTD. At the business model level, the results appear to be consistent with an approach to policy that focuses on the apparent importance of the “size-derivativesleverage- wholesale funding nexus” in influencing the DTD of banks. While these results are preliminary, it is encouraging that the out-of-sample predictive power of the model improves systematically as each year of new observations is added. The results are also consistent with some central bank involvement in the supervision process, given the importance of the asset price cycle, identified in this study.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133112043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deleveraging, Traditional versus Capital Markets Banking and the Urgent Need to Separate and Recapitalise G-SIFI Banks","authors":"A. Blundell-Wignall, P. Atkinson","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2012-5K91HBVGFQ20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2012-5K91HBVGFQ20","url":null,"abstract":"Since the crisis, even with massive support from governments and central banks, widespread regulatory changes and promises from bank executives to improve the governance of risk, the world continues to see failures of Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs, like Dexia), and huge losses (most recently from JP Morgan). Banks refuse to lend to each other, the central banks have become the interbank market and ‘bad deleveraging’ bears down on the economy forcing job losses in small- and medium-sized companies. ‘Good deleveraging’ occurs via building capital, and in this respect the US approach to dealing with the crisis provides something of a lesson that policy makers in Europe should take note of. With respect to regulations, the paper shows that capital and liquidity rules create a bias against lending to the enterprise sector (that drives jobs and economic growth). With respect to G-SIFIs, the paper shows how movements in their balance sheets are dominated by derivatives, the exposure to which varies with the cycle in risk. Netting of derivatives provides no protection against market risk, and the collateral and margin calls associated with these swings is both pro-cyclical and dangerous. The paper argues the OECD case that the best way to deal with all of these issues – both materially reducing the risk that arises from too-big-to fail while encouraging well-capitalised retail banks get on with the job of lending to create jobs – is to separate retail banking from securities business and ensure the former is (particularly in Europe) well capitalised. In this respect the paper argues that the non-operating holding company approach with ring-fenced subsidiaries (close to the Vickers proposal in the UK) is perhaps a better model than the US Volcker rule.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129605259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank deleveraging, the move from bank to market-based financing, and SME financing","authors":"Gert D. Wehinger","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2012-5K91HBVFH9G3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2012-5K91HBVFH9G3","url":null,"abstract":"Banks have been lowering their high pre-crisis leverage levels and are preparing for stricter regulatory capital requirements, and in the process have been reducing their lending. With the banking sector expected to shrink considerably, other actors, especially institutional investors, and new forms of financial intermediation will have to meet the credit needs of the economy. This may not only require enhancing and enlarging the perimeter of regulatory oversight, but may also need policy incentives to encourage new forms of market based lending, especially as it concerns financing long-term investment, including infrastructure, and SMEs. This was the background for the discussions at the April 2012 OECD Financial Roundtable that this note summarises. On the current outlook, participants agreed that recent policy actions in Europe have had a positive impact but more and longer-term policy actions will be needed to restore confidence among market participants and set the basis for recovery. Deleveraging is necessary but only about half-way completed. Regulatory reforms should support this process in a balanced way, avoid unintended consequences and help the transition towards increased non-bank intermediation by not imposing bank-like regulation on, e.g., insurance companies and hedge funds. Securitisation should be revitalised – perhaps with some (initial) government and regulatory support – to close the bank lending gap, especially for SME lending. Covered bonds can contribute in this, too, but their benefits may be limited, i.a. due to asset encumbrance. Mezzanine financing instruments could be useful for SME financing, and informal forms of equity financing could help small dynamic start-up companies.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"2012 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129143863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Implicit guarantees for bank debt: where do we stand?","authors":"Sebastian Schich, S. Lindh","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2012-5K91HBVFKM9V","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2012-5K91HBVFKM9V","url":null,"abstract":"The global financial crisis and the policy response to it have placed a sharp spotlight on the issue of implicit guarantees for bank debt. This report discusses the incidence of implicit government guarantees for bank debt, their determinants, and estimates of their value. It shows i) that the extent of implicit guarantees differs from one banking sector to another and, within a given banking sector, from one bank to another, ii) that implicit guarantees are higher the lower the bank’s stand-alone creditworthiness, the higher the creditworthiness of its sovereign and the relatively bigger the bank in its domestic context, iii) that the incidence of implicit guarantees increased since the beginning of the financial crisis, but has decreased more recently, iv) that this recent decrease can be explained to a large extent by declining sovereign strength and hence a reduced capacity of on the part of many sovereigns to provide for such guarantees, but is also consistent with ongoing efforts in many OECD countries to make bank failure resolution regimes and practices more effective, and v) that implicit guarantees persist. Implicit guarantees imply an undesirably close link between the value of bank and sovereign debt. They also imply significant funding cost advantages for the banks that benefit from them, thus implying competitive distortions and an invitation to beneficiary banks to use them and, perhaps, take on too much risk.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128437620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Global imbalances and the development of capital flows among Asian countries","authors":"N. Yoshino","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2012-5K91HBVFF0XW","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2012-5K91HBVFF0XW","url":null,"abstract":"During the current global crisis, capital inflows into Asian countries have increased, leading to excess liquidity and the risk of potential asset bubbles. A sudden reversal of these inflows would have negative effects on the economies in question. Given the impact of global capital movements on domestic financial systems and thereby on domestic economies, in several Asian countries certain macro-prudential regulations have been put in place, and capital controls and micro-prudential regulations have re-emerged as important tools to handle the issues related to capital inflows from outside of the region. It is important to ensure that global imbalances do not become a source of instability. The issue, thoroughly discussed after the Asian crisis a decade ago, is “using Asian savings for Asian investments” through the development of bond markets and SME’s financial inclusion. Against the backdrop of huge potential demands for infrastructure investment in the Asian region, this note proposes the issuance of “infrastructure revenue bonds” to help develop bond markets in Asia. To facilitate financial inclusion of SMEs, which outnumber other types of business in Asia, this note also proposes creating an SME database and developing regional trust funds.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114859766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The EU Architecture to Avert a Sovereign Debt Crisis","authors":"Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZVBHH","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZVBHH","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses what has been the EU institutional reaction to the Euro-area sovereign debt problems, focusing in particular on the new architecture designed to avert a financial crisis. It analyses i) the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), an EU financial assistance feature available to all 27 member states; ii) the European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF), a temporary credit-enhanced Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with minimal capitalisation created to raise funds from the capital markets (via an investment grade rating) and to provide financial assistance to distressed euroarea Member States (EAMS) at comparatively lower interest rates; and iii) the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), an intergovernmental organisation under public international law. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132538985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managing crises without government guarantees—how do we get there?","authors":"Christine M. Cumming","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0XZKG","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0XZKG","url":null,"abstract":"Experience illustrates that, for successful crisis management, there is no substitute for early intervention and, if possible, a private sector solution in preserving value in the firm and limiting externalities. Early intervention, in turn, calls for strong supervision. Even with a much stronger cross-border resolution process, some type of contingent arrangements in reserve will continue to be necessary. Despite their associated problems, guarantees and market backstops have been an important element in preserving liquidity and restoring market functionality and it would be difficult to manage financial crises without them. Other forms of intervention are likely to be more intrusive.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127640420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Giuseppe Grande, A. Levy, F. Panetta, Andrea Zaghini
{"title":"Public Guarantees on Bank Bonds: Effectiveness and Distortions","authors":"Giuseppe Grande, A. Levy, F. Panetta, Andrea Zaghini","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0QG6L","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWN0QG6L","url":null,"abstract":"The government guarantees on bank bonds adopted in 2008 in many advanced economies to support the banking systems were broadly effective in resuming bank funding and preventing a credit crunch. The guarantees, however, also caused distortions in the cost of bank borrowing. Their reintroduction might help alleviate the current pressures on banks caused by the sovereign debt crisis, but the pricing mechanism should ensure a level playing field. Moreover, given the sharp deterioration in the creditworthiness of sovereign borrowers, it may be envisaged to entrust the provision of the guarantees to a supranational organisation.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115776958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Solving the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe","authors":"A. Blundell-Wignall","doi":"10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZSDWJ","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/FMT-2011-5K9CSWMZSDWJ","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the policies that have been proposed to solve the financial and sovereign debt crisis in Europe, against the backdrop of what the real underlying problems are: extreme differences in competitiveness; the absence of a growth strategy; sovereign, household and corporate debt at high levels in the very countries that are least competitive; and banks that have become too large, driven by dangerous trends in ‘capital markets banking’. The paper explains how counterparty risk spreads between banks and how the sovereign and banking crises are serving to exacerbate each other. Of all the policies proposed, the paper highlights those that are coherent and the magnitudes involved if the euro is not to fracture.","PeriodicalId":444795,"journal":{"name":"Oecd Journal: Financial Market Trends","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123695268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}