Journal of Law and Courts最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Judicial Guardians: Court-Curbing Bills, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review 司法监护人:法院遏制法案、最高法院和司法审查
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2023.22
Lisa Hager, A. Uribe-McGuire
{"title":"Judicial Guardians: Court-Curbing Bills, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review","authors":"Lisa Hager, A. Uribe-McGuire","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.22","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Previous studies show that Supreme Court justices defer to congressional preferences by striking down fewer Acts of Congress to restore the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy following the introduction of court-curbing bills. This assumes the Supreme Court acts as a guardian of the entire judiciary, but prior work has not explicitly tested this. We create a theory of “guardian” behavior and test the likelihood that the Court engages in this behavior following the introduction of court-curbing bills. We find that the Supreme Court actively corrects lower court instances of judicial review, a stronger response than previously suggested.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140487475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quality in Measurement Matters: Adjusted American Bar Association Ratings and Circuit Court Confirmation Hearing Word Choice 测量质量很重要:调整后的美国律师协会评级和巡回法院确认听证会的词语选择
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2023.19
James A. Sieja
{"title":"Quality in Measurement Matters: Adjusted American Bar Association Ratings and Circuit Court Confirmation Hearing Word Choice","authors":"James A. Sieja","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.19","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Though widely used in studies of judicial politics, American Bar Association (ABA) ratings have a partisan bias. As a result, when researchers include ABA ratings and ideology in a model together, the results may be biased toward non-findings with respect to the effect of ideology, qualifications, or both. This study leverages new data on the ABA rating process to create a valid and reliable new measure for the qualifications of nominees to the US Courts of Appeals. In an empirical example, I test the new measure against alternative specifications to demonstrate its potential. The empirical example also presents a new data set on circuit court confirmation hearing speech. The findings contrast with well-established conclusions from previous studies.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139440307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lower Court Influence on High Courts: Evidence from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 下级法院对高等法院的影响:来自英国最高法院的证据
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2023-09-04 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2023.18
Jennifer Bowie, Ali S. Masood, Elisha C. Savchak, Natalie Smith, Bianca Wieck, Cameron Abrams, Meghna Melkote
{"title":"Lower Court Influence on High Courts: Evidence from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom","authors":"Jennifer Bowie, Ali S. Masood, Elisha C. Savchak, Natalie Smith, Bianca Wieck, Cameron Abrams, Meghna Melkote","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.18","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do lower court judges influence the content of Supreme Court opinions in the United Kingdom? Leveraging original data, we analyze opinion language adoption practices of the UK Supreme Court. We advance a theory where the justices’ choices to adopt language from lower court opinions are influenced by Supreme Court-level attributes and Court of Appeal case characteristics. We uncover compelling evidence that UK Supreme Court justices incorporate language extensively from the written opinions of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. Our findings have significant implications for opinion formulation, doctrinal development, and higher and lower court interactions within comparative courts.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44444550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political Competition and Judicial Independence: How Courts Fill the Void When Legislatures Are Ineffective 政治竞争与司法独立:立法机构失效时法院如何填补空白
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2023.16
Joshua Boston, David Carlson, JBrandon Duck-Mayr, Greg Sasso
{"title":"Political Competition and Judicial Independence: How Courts Fill the Void When Legislatures Are Ineffective","authors":"Joshua Boston, David Carlson, JBrandon Duck-Mayr, Greg Sasso","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.16","url":null,"abstract":"What effect does political competition have in generating de facto judicial independence? We argue that competition in a legislature can drive increases in de facto judicial independence. Our game-theoretic model reveals that increased competition for seats impedes legislators’ ability to enact their platforms, regardless of government turnover probability, and increased legislative fractionalization also makes court intervention more likely. Utilizing a sample of democratic states, empirical evidence suggests when a country’s legislature is increasingly fractionalized among parties or has increasing seat turnover, we observe increases in de facto independence. This research provides new perspectives on the link between independence and competition.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49629750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Impact of Oral Argument Attendance 口头辩论出席率的影响
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2023.14
Damon M. Cann, Greg Goelzhauser
{"title":"The Impact of Oral Argument Attendance","authors":"Damon M. Cann, Greg Goelzhauser","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.14","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How does oral argument attendance impact public perceptions of the judiciary? Judicial independence is partly contingent on public support, but the conditions that generate institutional good will are not well understood. We examine how judicial outreach and court exposure inform public attitudes. Leveraging a field-experiment randomizing in-person attendance at oral arguments conducted by a federal circuit court of appeals on a university campus, we find that exposure increases perceptions of institutional legitimacy and the extent to which judicial decisions are motivated by law versus politics. The results have important implications for judicial politics and policy debates concerning reform initiatives involving circuit riding, courtroom cameras, and public outreach.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46884496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Vulnerable to Intense Appointment Politics? Democrats’ Changed Views Around Justice Ginsburg’s Death – CORRIGENDUM 最高法院的合法性易受激烈任命政治的影响吗?民主党人对金斯伯格大法官之死的看法发生了变化——腐败
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2023-05-25 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2023.13
D. Glick
{"title":"Is the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Vulnerable to Intense Appointment Politics? Democrats’ Changed Views Around Justice Ginsburg’s Death – CORRIGENDUM","authors":"D. Glick","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48756621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Turning on Those Who Turn to the Courts: Experimental Evidence of Backlash Against Personal Injury Litigants 求助于法院的人:针对人身伤害诉讼人的强烈反对的实验证据
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2023-04-25 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2023.9
Jeb Barnes, Elli Menounou, Parker R. Hevron
{"title":"Turning on Those Who Turn to the Courts: Experimental Evidence of Backlash Against Personal Injury Litigants","authors":"Jeb Barnes, Elli Menounou, Parker R. Hevron","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.9","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do people turn on those who turn to the courts? Using a survey experiment, we find people have significantly more negative attitudes toward personal injury litigants than other types of claimants, even when they believe the claimant is injured and mostly not at fault. Moreover, our subjects were not anti-claim, anti-hiring a lawyer, or even anti-government program. Instead, they were distinctively anti-litigant.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49481076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Does Delegation of Drafting Duties to Law Clerks Result in Judgments That Show Lack of Confidence in Terms of Writing Style? A Stylometric Analysis 将起草职责委托给法律助理是否会导致对写作风格缺乏信心的判决?文体计量学分析
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2023-04-03 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2023.10
P. Mascini, N. Holvast
{"title":"Does Delegation of Drafting Duties to Law Clerks Result in Judgments That Show Lack of Confidence in Terms of Writing Style? A Stylometric Analysis","authors":"P. Mascini, N. Holvast","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.10","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Based on an analysis of all administrative court cases published in the Netherlands in 2020 (N = 4,642), we tested the hypothesis that experienced law clerks write judgments with greater confidence than less experienced clerks. A confidently written judgment was defined as being shorter, less standardized, and containing fewer legal references than a less confidently written judgment. In support of this hypothesis, our results showed that law clerks with more experience co-signed judgments that were less standardized and contained fewer legal references. However, contrary to the confidence hypothesis, we established that these judgments were also longer than judgments co-signed by less experienced clerks. Our study contextualizes the concerns expressed in studies on the US Supreme Court about the delegation of drafting duties to inexperienced law clerks. The study challenges the assumption that delegation of drafting duties to law clerks automatically results in judgments with a less confident writing style, due to the clerks’ inexperience. The assumption may hold for the US Supreme Court, where all law clerks are relatively inexperienced. However, the assumption does not hold in jurisdictions in which law clerks can be just as experienced (in terms of years worked in the legal field) as judges. This conclusion suggests that research on the functioning of the US Supreme Court cannot necessarily be generalized to other jurisdictions.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49226033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accountability for Court Packing 法庭包装的责任
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2023-03-24 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2022.14
M. J. Nelson, A. Driscoll
{"title":"Accountability for Court Packing","authors":"M. J. Nelson, A. Driscoll","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.14","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How does the public respond to court-packing attempts? Longstanding accounts of public support for courts suggest voters retaliate against incumbents who seek to manipulate well-respected courts. Yet incumbents might strategically frame their efforts in bureaucratic terms to minimize the public’s outcry or use court-packing proposals to activate a partisan base of support. Drawing on a series of survey experiments, we demonstrate that strategic politicians can minimize electoral backlash by couching court reform proposals in apolitical language, and institutional legitimacy’s shielding effect dissolves in the face of shared partisanship. These results shed new light on how ambitious politicians might avoid electoral consequences for efforts to bend the judiciary to their will.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44779430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Electoral Connection in Court: How Sentencing Responds to Voter Preferences 法庭上的选举联系:量刑如何回应选民的偏好
IF 1.4
Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2023-03-23 DOI: 10.1017/jlc.2022.19
Joshua Boston, Bernardo S. Silveira
{"title":"The Electoral Connection in Court: How Sentencing Responds to Voter Preferences","authors":"Joshua Boston, Bernardo S. Silveira","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.19","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do elected judges tailor criminal sentences to the electorate’s ideology? Utilizing sentencing data from North Carolina’s Superior Courts—which transitioned from statewide to local elections in 1996—we study whether judges are obliging to voters’ preferences. We find some evidence of responsiveness: judges from liberal districts were more lenient, while those from moderately conservative districts assigned harsher sentences. Judges from increasingly conservative districts did not change their sentencing patterns, which leads to lower re-election rates. These findings suggest that judges adapt their behavior to retain office, or else they are held accountable by the public.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45962584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信