{"title":"The Costs of Policy Legitimation: A Test of the Political Capital Hypothesis","authors":"D. Fontana, Christopher N. Krewson","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.13","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We test the political capital hypothesis that Supreme Court decisions simultaneously legitimate policy and harm support for the Court, at least under certain conditions. Our data suggest that the Court’s “legitimacy-conferring” capacity is weak. Learning that the Supreme Court upheld an affirmative action policy increased public support for the constitutionality and desirability of that policy, but only among Democrats pre-disposed towards that reaction. Furthermore, Democrats did not develop more favorable views of the Court. Consistent with the political capital hypothesis, Republicans developed more negative views of the Court when the Court associated itself with affirmative action policy.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45613273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nathaniel T. W. Carrington, Thomas M. Keck, Claire Sigsworth
{"title":"Minority Rights, Governing Regimes, or Secular Elites: Who Benefits from the Protection of Religious and Anti-Religious Speech by the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court of Human Rights?","authors":"Nathaniel T. W. Carrington, Thomas M. Keck, Claire Sigsworth","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.11","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper draws on new data regarding judicial decisions involving religious and anti-religious expression to map the political beneficiaries of judicial empowerment. In particular, the paper assesses the extent to which free-expression decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court of Human Rights have favored claimants who are religious majorities, religious minorities, or secular elites. We find the U.S. doctrine relatively more libertarian and the European Court of Human Rights doctrine relatively more secularist, but both bodies of case law extend regular and substantial rights protection to religious minorities.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48481981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ideological Determinants of Citations to Supreme Court Precedent Across the Federal Judiciary","authors":"Amna Salam","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.5","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do ideological factors explain the citation patterns of federal courts? Current literature uses citation data in myriad ways but leaves open the question of how ideological factors may influence citation from each level of the judicial hierarchy differently. Combining original data on citations to Supreme Court opinions by district courts from 1969 to 2005 with existing data on citations by the courts of appeals and Supreme Court, I present a more complete portrait of the scope of a precedent across the federal judiciary. I find that ideological factors are associated with differences in citing behavior on the federal courts. Both the appellate and district courts are responsive to Supreme Court precedent, but district courts are not equally responsive to liberal and conservative updates to doctrine. Further, as the Supreme Court ideology changes from the time of setting precedent, appellate courts are less likely to cite the precedent, but district courts cite it more. These results suggest that the relationship between ideology and precedent adherence is complicated by the distinct institutional features of the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and district courts.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45395925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Binders Full of Judges: A Model of the Interdependency of Appointments to the United States Federal Judiciary","authors":"A. Uribe-McGuire","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.9","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, I create a simulation model that predicts the portfolio of judges the president chooses to fill vacancies in the judiciary. I find that the president’s strategy in terms of appointments depends on constraint from the Senate, the talent pool of possible judges to appoint, the ideology of the courts in the judiciary, and the number of vacancies to be filled. The model is successful in replicating results that have been found in previous research, while also generating new hypotheses about previously unexplored aspects of the appointment process.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42742622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Separation of Powers and Obfuscation in US Supreme Court Opinions","authors":"D. Lempert","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.7","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A longstanding debate in American judicial politics concerns whether the US Supreme Court anticipates or responds to the possibility that Congress will override its decisions. A recent theory proposes that opinions that are relatively hard to read are more costly for Congress to review, and that as a result, the Court can decrease the likelihood of override from a hostile Congress by obfuscating its opinions (i.e., writing opinions that are less readable when congressional review is a threat). I derive a straightforward but novel empirical implication of this theory; I then show that the implication does not in fact hold. This casts serious doubt on the claim that justices strategically obfuscate opinion language to avoid congressional override. I also discuss sentence tokenization as a source of measurement error in readability statistics for judicial opinions.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41626786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assessing the Credibility of Constitutional Experts","authors":"Eileen Braman","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.4","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study investigates how citizens assess the credibility of constitutional experts on matters of government authority. Analyses of data from two similarly designed experiments, conducted with national samples, reveal that partisanship, race, and level of education are significant predictors of survey respondents’ willingness to extend credibility to constitutional experts. The compatibility of the views expressed by experts with respondents’ own policy views on issues that are the subject of proposed government action is also important. Evidence shows that this consistency is more important in the decision that experts are credible than in decisions that they are not credible, suggesting that esteem motives are relevant in the decision to credit experts who express views congenial to our own that are distinct from social-identity motives scholars have theorized to be important in partisan resistance to expertise. The implications of findings for holding government officials accountable to constitutional limits on government authority are considered.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56922553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judicial Ideology in the Absence of Rights","authors":"Zoe Robinson, P. Leslie, Jill Sheppard","doi":"10.1086/716187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/716187","url":null,"abstract":"Research on judicial behavior has yet to systematically examine the extent to which ideology affects voting behavior outside of rights-based issues. This study explores the predictive effect of judicial ideology on judicial votes in a country without a bill of rights: Australia. We develop an ex ante measure of judicial ideology and use original data on every Australian High Court decision between 1995 and 2019 to test whether, and in which types of cases, votes of Australia’s justices align with their ideology. The results show that ex ante ideology is predictive of voting behavior, regardless of policy area.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"239 - 264"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44887466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Supreme Court, the President, and Congress","authors":"P. Collins, Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha","doi":"10.1086/715694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/715694","url":null,"abstract":"Presidents may react to Supreme Court decisions by supporting or opposing them in their public rhetoric and by calling on Congress to take action to alter or implement the Court’s decisions. We investigate this unique form of lawmaking using an original database of presidential calls to Congress and congressional reactions. We find that presidents call for congressional action to pursue their policy goals and enhance the power of the presidency; we also find that Congress reacts when it is asked to do so by both the Court and the president, as well as when presidents support the implementation of the Court’s decisions.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"213 - 237"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47452616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Delegation, Compliance, and Judicial Decision Making in the Court of Justice of the European Union","authors":"Sivaram Cheruvu, Jay N. Krehbiel","doi":"10.1086/718496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718496","url":null,"abstract":"Courts regularly delegate tasks to individual or small subsets of judges. While a substantial literature addresses delegation in the context of American courts, less is known about why and how courts delegate from a comparative perspective. With many of the world’s high courts using panel systems (also known as “chambers”) by which the court delegates cases to subsets of judges, this limitation of the extant literature leaves a number of empirical and theoretical questions unanswered. We argue that the threat of noncompliance presents one factor influencing a court’s delegation of cases to panels. From our expectation that a court will not delegate cases with a greater risk for noncompliance to panels, we then derive empirical implications for case disposition and a court’s willingness to rule contrary to the legal merits in a case. We analyze panel usage at the Court of Justice of the European Union to support our account.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"10 1","pages":"113 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44503463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How the Chamber System at the CJEU Undermines the Consistency of the Court's Application of EU Law","authors":"Joshua C. Fjelstul","doi":"10.1086/717422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/717422","url":null,"abstract":"The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) uses a chamber system to more efficiently decide cases. To what extent, and under what conditions, does the CJEU ’ s chamber system undermine the consistency of the Court ’ s application of EU law? This paper contributes to the literature on the internal organization of collegial courts by presenting a computational formal model that predicts (a) that hearing cases in smaller chambers undermines the consistency of the Court ’ s application of EU law and (b) that the magnitude of this effect is larger when judges ’ preferences are more heterogeneous and smaller when plaintiffs strategically bring cases. Based on these findings, I use machine learning and empirical data on CJEU judgments in infringement cases to estimate the degree to which we should expect the chamber system to undermine the consistency of the CJEU ’ s application of EU law in practice.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43400149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}