Journal of Cybersecurity最新文献

Narrow windows of opportunity: the limited utility of cyber operations in war 狭窄的机会之窗：网络行动在战争中的作用有限

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-08-05 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae014

Frederik A H Pedersen, Jeppe T Jacobsen

{"title":"Narrow windows of opportunity: the limited utility of cyber operations in war","authors":"Frederik A H Pedersen, Jeppe T Jacobsen","doi":"10.1093/cybsec/tyae014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae014","url":null,"abstract":"The use of offensive cyber operations in war is no longer theoretical conjecture. Still, as we witness their use, important questions remain. How are offensive cyber operations employed in conventional warfighting, and what is their utility for the warfighting? This article answers these questions by analyzing new empirical evidence from the Russo–Ukrainian War, drawing on the novel TECI-model built for systematically analyzing and understanding offensive cyber operations in war through the model’s four constituent variables: target, effect, complexity, and integration. The article finds the utility of cyber operations in war is limited owing to an unsuitability for physical destruction, high risks of failure, high costs of complex operations that are more likely to attain successful and destructive effects, and a dichotomy between the tempi of conventional and cyber operations leading to cross-domain integration difficulties. Still, two narrow windows for achieving utility exist. Cumulative strategic utility is achievable by targeting critical infrastructure and governments in a persistent barrage of less complex cyber operations. Operational and tactical utility is achievable in the beginning of warfighting where the temporal dichotomy is less pronounced because cross-domain integration can be planned before warfighting commences. Filling a gap in the literature, TECI provides a common and operationalized model for future research systematically analyzing cyber operations, allowing for comparisons on the evolving role of cyberspace in war.","PeriodicalId":44310,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cybersecurity","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141940833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

‘There was a bit of PTSD every time I walked through the office door’: Ransomware harms and the factors that influence the victim organization’s experience 每次走进办公室的门，我都有点创伤后应激障碍"：勒索软件的危害和影响受害组织经历的因素

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae013

Gareth Mott, Sarah Turner, Jason R C Nurse, Nandita Pattnaik, Jamie MacColl, Pia Huesch, James Sullivan

{"title":"‘There was a bit of PTSD every time I walked through the office door’: Ransomware harms and the factors that influence the victim organization’s experience","authors":"Gareth Mott, Sarah Turner, Jason R C Nurse, Nandita Pattnaik, Jamie MacColl, Pia Huesch, James Sullivan","doi":"10.1093/cybsec/tyae013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae013","url":null,"abstract":"Ransomware is a pernicious contemporary cyber threat for organizations, with ransomware operators intentionally leveraging a range of harms against their victims in order to solicit increasingly significant ransom payments. This article advances current research by engaging in a topical analysis into the depth and breadth of harms experienced by victim organizations and their members of staff. We, therefore, enhance the understanding of the negative experiences from ransomware attacks, particularly looking beyond the financial impact which dominates current narratives. Having conducted an interview or workshop with 83 professionals including ransomware victims, incident responders, ransom negotiators, law enforcement, and government, we identify a wide array of severe harms. For organizations, the risk of business interruption and/or data exposure presents potentially highly impactful financial and reputational harm(s). The victim organization’s staff can also experience a range of under-reported harms, which include physiological and physical harms that may be acute. We also identify factors that can either alleviate or aggravate the experiencing of harms at the organizational and employee level; including ransomware preparedness, leadership culture, and crisis communication. Given the scale and scope of the identified harms, the paper provides significant new empirical evidence to emphasize ransomware’s positioning as a whole-of-organization crisis phenomenon, as opposed to an ‘IT problem’. We argue that the wider discourse surrounding ransomware harms and impacts should be reflective of the nature of the real-term experience(s) of victims. This, in turn, could help guide efforts to alleviate ransomware harms, through improved organizational ransomware preparedness and tailored post-ransomware mitigation.","PeriodicalId":44310,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cybersecurity","volume":"145 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141866680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

It is not only about having good attitudes: factor exploration of the attitudes toward security recommendations 不仅要有良好的态度：对安全建议态度的因素探讨

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae011

Miguel A Toro-Jarrin, Pilar Pazos, Miguel A Padilla

{"title":"It is not only about having good attitudes: factor exploration of the attitudes toward security recommendations","authors":"Miguel A Toro-Jarrin, Pilar Pazos, Miguel A Padilla","doi":"10.1093/cybsec/tyae011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae011","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous factors determine information security-related actions (IS-actions) in the workplace. Attitudes toward following security rules and recommendations and attitudes toward specific IS actions determine intentions associated with those actions. IS research has examined the role of the instrumental aspect of attitudes. However, authors argue that attitudes toward a behavioral object are a multidimensional construct. We examined the dimensionality of attitudes toward security recommendations, hypothesized its multidimensional nature, and developed a new scale [attitudes toward security recommendations (ASR scale)]. The results indicated the multidimensional nature of attitudes toward security recommendations supporting our hypothesis. The results revealed two dimensions corresponding to the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of security recommendations and its perceived rigor. The new ASR scale showed good psychometric properties. This work contributes to the IS research at suggesting that attitudes are a multidimensional construct in the IS context. These findings imply that the employee’s evaluation of information security policy can be examined considering their instrumentality (security recommendations are important) and rigor (security recommendations are strict). Different effects of the dimensions of attitudes over IS-action suggest different interventions. Additionally, this study offers the ASR scale as a new instrument to capture employees’ evaluation of security recommendations.","PeriodicalId":44310,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cybersecurity","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141547245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Interdependent security games in the Stackelberg style: how first-mover advantage impacts free riding and security (under-)investment 斯塔克尔伯格式相互依存的安全博弈：先行者优势如何影响搭便车和安全（投资不足）问题

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-06-28 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae009

Ziyuan Huang, Parinaz Naghizadeh, Mingyan Liu

{"title":"Interdependent security games in the Stackelberg style: how first-mover advantage impacts free riding and security (under-)investment","authors":"Ziyuan Huang, Parinaz Naghizadeh, Mingyan Liu","doi":"10.1093/cybsec/tyae009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae009","url":null,"abstract":"Network games are commonly used to capture the strategic interactions among interconnected agents in simultaneous moves. The agents’ actions in a Nash equilibrium must take into account the mutual dependencies connecting them, which is typically obtained by solving a set of fixed point equations. Stackelberg games, on the other hand, model the sequential moves between agents that are categorized as leaders and followers. The corresponding solution concept, the subgame perfect equilibrium, is typically obtained using backward induction. Both game forms enjoy very wide use in the (cyber)security literature, the network game often as a template to study security investment and externality—also referred to as the interdependent security games—and the Stackelberg game as a formalism to model a variety of attacker–defender scenarios. In this study, we examine a model that combines both types of strategic reasoning: the interdependency as well as sequential moves. Specifically, we consider a scenario with a network of interconnected first movers (firms or defenders, whose security efforts and practices collectively determine the security posture of the eco-system) and one or more second movers, the attacker(s), who determine how much effort to exert on attacking the many potential targets. This gives rise to an equilibrium concept that embodies both types of equilibria mentioned above. We will examine how its existence and uniqueness conditions differ from that for a standard network game. Of particular interest are comparisons between the two game forms in terms of effort exerted by the defender(s) and the attacker(s), respectively, and the free-riding behavior among the defenders.","PeriodicalId":44310,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cybersecurity","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

‘The trivial tickets build the trust’: a co-design approach to understanding security support interactions in a large university 琐碎的门票建立信任"：了解一所大型大学中安全支持互动的共同设计方法

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae007

Albesë Demjaha, David Pym, Tristan Caulfield, Simon Parkin

{"title":"‘The trivial tickets build the trust’: a co-design approach to understanding security support interactions in a large university","authors":"Albesë Demjaha, David Pym, Tristan Caulfield, Simon Parkin","doi":"10.1093/cybsec/tyae007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae007","url":null,"abstract":"Increasingly, organizations are acknowledging the importance of human factors in the management of security in workplaces. There are challenges in managing security infrastructures in which there may be centrally mandated and locally managed initiatives to promote secure behaviours. We apply a co-design methodology to harmonize employee behaviour and centralized security management in a large university. This involves iterative rounds of interviews connected by the co-design methodology: 14 employees working with high-value data with specific security needs; seven support staff across both local and central IT and IT-security support teams; and two senior security decision-makers in the organization. We find that employees prefer local support together with assurances that they are behaving securely, rather than precise instructions that lack local context. Trust in support teams that understand local needs also improves engagement, especially for employees who are unsure what to do. Policy is understood by employees through their interactions with support staff and when they see colleagues enacting secure behaviours in the workplace. The iterative co-design approach brings together the viewpoints of a range of employee groups and security decision-makers that capture key influences that drive secure working practices. We provide recommendations for improvements to workplace security, including recognizing that communication of the policy is as important as what is in the policy.","PeriodicalId":44310,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cybersecurity","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The simple economics of an external shock to a bug bounty platform 外部冲击对漏洞悬赏平台的简单经济学影响

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae006

Aviram Zrahia, Neil Gandal, Sarit Markovich, Michael Riordan

{"title":"The simple economics of an external shock to a bug bounty platform","authors":"Aviram Zrahia, Neil Gandal, Sarit Markovich, Michael Riordan","doi":"10.1093/cybsec/tyae006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae006","url":null,"abstract":"We first provide background on the “nuts and bolts” of a bug bounty platform: a two-sided marketplace that connects firms and individual security researchers (“ethical” hackers) to facilitate the discovery of software vulnerabilities. Researchers get acknowledged for valid submissions, but only the first submission of a distinct vulnerability is rewarded money in this tournament-like setting. We then empirically examine the effect of an exogenous external shock (COVID-19) on Bugcrowd, one of the leading platforms. The shock presumably reduced the opportunity set for many security researchers who might have lost their jobs or been placed on a leave of absence. We show that the exogenous shock led to a huge rightward shift in the supply curve and increased the number of submissions and new researchers on the platform. During the COVID period, there was a significant growth in duplicate (already known) valid submissions, leading to a lower probability of winning a monetary reward. The supply increase resulted in a significant decline in the equilibrium price of valid submissions, mostly due to this duplicate submission supply-side effect. The results suggest that had there been a larger increase in the number of firms and bug bounty programs on the platform, many more unique software vulnerabilities could have been discovered.","PeriodicalId":44310,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cybersecurity","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140928704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

DoWNet—classification of Denial-of-Wallet attacks on serverless application traffic DoWNet 对无服务器应用程序流量中的拒绝钱包攻击进行分类

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-03-23 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae004

Daniel Kelly, Frank G Glavin, Enda Barrett

引用次数: 0

The barriers to sustainable risk transfer in the cyber-insurance market 网络保险市场可持续风险转移的障碍

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae003

Henry R K Skeoch, Christos Ioannidis

引用次数: 0

Behind the curve: technology challenges facing the homeland intelligence and counterterrorism workforce 曲线背后：国土情报和反恐工作人员面临的技术挑战

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae002

Michelle Black, Lana Obradovic, Deanna House

引用次数: 0

Cybersecurity when working from home during COVID-19: considering the human factors COVID-19 期间在家工作时的网络安全：考虑人为因素

IF 3.9

Journal of Cybersecurity Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1093/cybsec/tyae001

Monica T Whitty, Nour Moustafa, Marthie Grobler

{"title":"Cybersecurity when working from home during COVID-19: considering the human factors","authors":"Monica T Whitty, Nour Moustafa, Marthie Grobler","doi":"10.1093/cybsec/tyae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae001","url":null,"abstract":"This research examined the lives of Australian employees who moved to work from home during COVID-19. Taking a unique approach to cybersecurity, we sought to gain insights into the intermingling of individuals’ personal lives and technology to inform policies and educational programmes. The study employed interpretative phenomenological analysis to understand 27 participants’ lived experiences under lockdown. We found that psychological (e.g. stress, anxiety, confidence, motivation) and sociological (e.g. sharing physical spaces, digital divide) factors impacted employees’ likelihood and ability to engage in effective cybersecurity practices. So did new ways of using technology (e.g. teaching via Zoom), which elucidated unexpected but significant security concerns (e.g. naked children in virtual classrooms). We suggest that cyber educators and policymakers take a Vygotskian approach, which considers that social interaction is central to learning. This assumption means that personal factors must be considered instead of a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’. We argue that organizations should think about approaches that consider the employees’ psychological state before training (and perhaps find ways to reduce anxiety), helping employees redesign their home workspaces to ensure privacy and concentration, and updating employees’ digital devices. Practitioners and scholars can also apply these results post-COVID-19, especially if the ‘new working normal’ provides options for employees to work from home.","PeriodicalId":44310,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cybersecurity","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139583452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0