Narrow windows of opportunity: the limited utility of cyber operations in war

The use of offensive cyber operations in war is no longer theoretical conjecture. Still, as we witness their use, important questions remain. How are offensive cyber operations employed in conventional warfighting, and what is their utility for the warfighting? This article answers these questions by analyzing new empirical evidence from the Russo–Ukrainian War, drawing on the novel TECI-model built for systematically analyzing and understanding offensive cyber operations in war through the model’s four constituent variables: target, effect, complexity, and integration. The article finds the utility of cyber operations in war is limited owing to an unsuitability for physical destruction, high risks of failure, high costs of complex operations that are more likely to attain successful and destructive effects, and a dichotomy between the tempi of conventional and cyber operations leading to cross-domain integration difficulties. Still, two narrow windows for achieving utility exist. Cumulative strategic utility is achievable by targeting critical infrastructure and governments in a persistent barrage of less complex cyber operations. Operational and tactical utility is achievable in the beginning of warfighting where the temporal dichotomy is less pronounced because cross-domain integration can be planned before warfighting commences. Filling a gap in the literature, TECI provides a common and operationalized model for future research systematically analyzing cyber operations, allowing for comparisons on the evolving role of cyberspace in war.