{"title":"The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Kinetic Targeting from the Perspective of International Humanitarian Law","authors":"Anastasia Roberts, A. Venables","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468301","url":null,"abstract":"The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in kinetic targeting is an emotive issue. Human Rights Watch (HRW) is a prominent campaigner against Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and has expressed concern these systems are fundamentally at odds with the international humanitarian law (IHL) framework for armed conflict. This framework places human control over the use of lethal force at the very heart of the targeting process. HRW asserts that the ceding of human control to AI-enabled capabilities may undermine and gradually erode the IHL framework, leaving the battlespace legally ungoverned and civilians unprotected. Concerns about the military use of AI have been exacerbated by the actions and narratives of some nations that are perceived as competing in an Al arms race. However, the debate about AI has been clouded by the fact that it focuses excessively on LAWS and human control. As a result, very little consideration is given to other potentially positive uses of AI technology in targeting. These include AI's role in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Information Operations. This paper seeks to present a more nuanced examination of the role of AI in kinetic targeting and how it may affect compliance with IHL. The legal, ethical and technical arguments against and in favour of the use of AI will be examined. Finally, a way forward on this complex and emotive issue is proposed that offers a means to reinforce IHL whilst accepting that advances in technology will continue.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127526950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Global Spread of Cyber Forces, 2000–2018","authors":"Jason A. Blessing","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467807","url":null,"abstract":"Although militaries have been building cyber capabilities since the late 1980s, formalized military organizations for these capabilities have only recently emerged. These cyber forces-active-duty military organizations that possess the capability and authority to direct and control cyberspace operations for strategic ends-have spread rapidly across the international system since the first few years of the 21 st century. This article catalogues the development of cyber forces across the globe and assesses the various force structures. Existing research has largely been confined to examinations of cyber forces in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. This article provides a broader view of global developments by introducing new data on the worldwide spread of cyber forces from 2000 to 2018. It also offers a typology for assessing cyber force structure based on both organizational model (branch, service, or joint model) and the scale of command (subordinated, sub-unified, or unified). As a result, this article identifies nine distinct cyber force structures. Empirical analysis reveals that 61 United Nations member states had created a cyber force by 2018. Contrary to conventional expectations, this analysis shows increasing variation in cyber force structure over time; no dominant organizational model or force structure has emerged.11Position funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). 22This article was supported by a U.S. Institute of Peace-Minerva Peace Scholar Award from USIP. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Institute of Peace.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126776681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quantum Communication for Post-Pandemic Cybersecurity","authors":"Martin C. Libicki, D. Gompert","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468295","url":null,"abstract":"Current approaches to cybersecurity will become increasingly inadequate as the use of networks grows and hacking becomes more skilled. One response to this problem lies in quantum technologies. In particular, the extreme sensitivity of quantum communication makes interference readily detectable and can provide secure encryption-key distribution. However, this is likely to benefit primarily high-value networks that use encryption, leaving insecure the growing use of mass networks for distributed work. The options to approaching this conundrum are (1) to accept where quantum technology leads, (2) to accelerate the technology in general without regard to how it is used, or (3) to push the technology to include mass use. We recommend a public-private strategy for the United States and its allies to effect both high-end and mass use.11The authors would especially like to acknowledge Professor Nathalie de Leon of the Princeton Quantum Initiative, Princeton University, whose input on quantum science has been invaluable. Errors in this paper are, of course, ours.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131461203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Possibilities and Limitations of Cyber Threat Intelligence in Energy Systems","authors":"Csaba Krasznay, Gergö Gyebnár","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468289","url":null,"abstract":"The national energy system is the most critical of the critical infrastructures, and one which has become surprisingly vulnerable to cyberattacks in the last couple of years. Both unexpected technical design flaws and targeted attacks carried out by state-sponsored actors have raised challenges for the operators of essential services. Although this infrastructure is the subject of many regulations, and national security agencies pay special attention to such critical information infrastructures, gathering cyber threat intelligence is not straightforward for several reasons. First, special protocols in industrial control systems and operational technology (ICS/ OT) systems are difficult to monitor. Second, information sharing does not really work, neither between states nor domestically. Third, due to the lack of thorough technical recommendations, there is no common understanding between responsible authorities and critical information infrastructure operators. In Hungary, key stakeholders of the national electricity system have realized that although some local and European legislation deals with the question of the cybersecurity of critical information infrastructure, many open questions remain in practice, both from policy and technology perspectives. In 2018, Hungarian manufacturers, energy service providers and responsible authorities started a discussion on what should be improved in legislation and technology, as well as in information sharing and how. This paper aims to describe the framework of this collaboration for information sharing and the initial results. Specifically, we present the current technical capabilities for gathering cyber threat intelligence in ICS/OT systems and propose some legislative actions that could support further technical solutions that are feasible in these special systems. We also present Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and the goals of threat actors in energy systems that can be seen from the current data sets of our honeypots. Moreover, we will also make some recommendations as to how the national and EU-wide legislation should be built up and what kinds of actions should be required from the key players in compliance with the Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (NIS Directive).","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"163 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123134792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Baroni, F. Cerutti, D. Fogli, M. Giacomin, F. Gringoli, G. Guida, Paul Sullivan
{"title":"Self-Aware Effective Identification and Response to Viral Cyber Threats","authors":"P. Baroni, F. Cerutti, D. Fogli, M. Giacomin, F. Gringoli, G. Guida, Paul Sullivan","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468294","url":null,"abstract":"Artificial intelligence (AI) techniques can significantly improve cyber security operations if tasks and responsibilities are effectively shared between human and machine. AI techniques excel in some situational understanding tasks; for instance, classifying intrusions. However, existing AI systems are often overconfident in their classification: this reduces the trust of human analysts. Furthermore, sophisticated intrusions span across long time periods to reduce their footprint, and each decision to respond to a (suspected) attack can have unintended side effects. In this position paper we show how advanced AI systems handling uncertainty and encompassing expert knowledge can lessen the burden on human analysts. In detail: (1) Effective interaction with the analyst is a key issue for the success of an intelligence support system. This involves two issues: a clear and unambiguous system-analyst communication, only possible if both share the same domain ontology and conceptual framework, and effective interaction, allowing the analyst to query the system for justifications of the reasoning path followed and the results obtained. (2) Uncertainty-aware machine learning and reasoning is an effective method for anomaly detection, which can provide human operators with alternative interpretations of data with an accurate assessment of their confidence. This can contribute to reducing misunderstandings and building trust. (3) An event-processing algorithm including both a neural and a symbolic layer can help identify attacks spanning long intervals of time, that would remain undetected via a pure neural approach. (4) Such a symbolic layer is crucial for the human operator to estimate the appropriateness of possible responses to a suspected attack by considering both the probability that an attack is actually occurring and the impact (intended and unintended) of a given response.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126321372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Neal Kushwaha, K. Giles, Tassilo Singer, B. Watson
{"title":"Cyber Personhood","authors":"Neal Kushwaha, K. Giles, Tassilo Singer, B. Watson","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468299","url":null,"abstract":"In early 2020, the rapid adoption of remote working and communications tools by governments, companies, and individuals around the world increased dependency on cyber infrastructure for the normal functioning of States, businesses, and societies. For some, the urgent need to communicate whilst safeguarding human life took priority over ensuring that these communications tools were secure and resilient. But as these tools become firmly embedded in everyday life worldwide, the question arises whether they should be considered as critical infrastructure, or perhaps even something more important. In a number of States, the critical importance of the environment for preservation of human life has been recognised by extending legal personhood - and thus, legal rights - to environmental entities. Countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, New Zealand, and India have granted legal rights to various rivers, lakes, parks, and nature in general. This paper explores the future possibility and cases where States may consider granting legal rights to other non-sentient but critically important entities. Looking into a future where human life becomes increasingly dependent upon highly interdependent systems in cyberspace, is there a possibility that these systems are granted personhood? Remote work and its cybersecurity implications could lead to an entirely new recognition of the importance of cyberspace dependencies and, consequently, a newlegal treatment. Against the backdrop of extended debate on the legal regulation of cyberspace, including the law of armed conflict, this would raise even more complex legal considerations, especially in the light of cross-border dependencies and systems that affect multiple jurisdictions. By way of cyber biomimicry, this paper adopts a blue-sky conceptual approach to studying policy considerations and potential implications if highly interdependent cyber systems in the distant future are granted the same protections as elements of the environment.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123817172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Cyber Effects in Complex Systems: Understanding the US Air Transportation Sector","authors":"Charles Harry, Skanda Vivek","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468293","url":null,"abstract":"US policy-makers have coalesced around the need to develop a risk-based approach for managing strategic effects of cyber attacks. This paper uses graph networks of US air infrastructures from the Department of Transportation to develop the Strategic Disruption Index (SDI), a means to assess the loss of effective transportation network capacity of passengers resulting from various cyber attack scenarios. Dynamic effects are measured using an agent based model to assess the ensuing propagating air passenger delays. Results from this analysis show strategic effects are influenced by airport and airline network structure and induce dynamic effects across the entire sector. We find that the largest national strategic effects are generated through the disruption of key vendor relationships that can potentially affect multiple private operators simultaneously. Policy-makers who are charged with developing means of measuring national risk can apply this approach to evaluate strategic impacts to any number of domestic or international transportation networks. They can also use the approach to compare impacts between disparate infrastructure networks to prioritize resources that best limit the range of strategic risk.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125085630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Going Viral","authors":"","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468302","url":null,"abstract":"13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Going Viral.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128131814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vladimir Radunovic, Jonas Grätz-Hoffmann, M. Maciel
{"title":"Impact of Good Corporate Practices for Security of Digital Products on Global Cyber Stability","authors":"Vladimir Radunovic, Jonas Grätz-Hoffmann, M. Maciel","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467805","url":null,"abstract":"The exploitation of vulnerabilities in digital products and services is an essential component of sophisticated cyberattacks. Well-resourced adversaries increasingly exploit vulnerabilities for economic, political, or military gain, causing effects that destabilise cyberspace. Several multilateral and multi-stakeholder fora develop norms and principles to reduce such vulnerabilities. The main challenge lies in implementation. Under the Geneva Dialogue on Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace11The Geneva Dialogue (https://genevadialogue.ch) is an initiative of the Swiss government and DiploFoundation. Partners of the Geneva Dialogue include Bi. Zone, Cisco, EnSign, FireEye Mandiant, Kaspersky, Huawei, Microsoft, UBS, PNG ICT Cluster, SICPA, Siemens, SwissRe, Tata Consultancy Services, VU, and Wisekey. Good corporate practices regarding the security of digital products and services, discussed in detail in this paper, have been developed through 15 group online meetings and continuous collaboration in the shared document, conducted over 7 months in 2020. 25 (Geneva Dialogue), a dozen leading global companies jointly developed a set of good corporate practices that translate high-level principles into day-to-day operations. This paper argues that these practices make cyberspace less vulnerable, and thus contribute to the implementation of global norms and principles. It further analyses key global norms and principles related to the security of digital products and services and the role of industry. It then presents the most relevant results of the ongoing work of the Geneva Dialogue, particularly good corporate practices related to security by design: threat modelling, supply chain security, development and deployment, and vulnerability processes. It discusses how these measures may reduce vulnerabilities, especially for smaller producers whose importance in the supply chain was elevated by COVID-19. It reflects on the need to turn good practices into baseline requirements to support market newcomers and regulators worldwide.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127432408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Covid-19 and the Cyber Pandemic: A Plea for International Law and the Rule of Sovereignty in Cyberspace","authors":"François Delerue","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468306","url":null,"abstract":"There has been an important increase in threats and attacks in cyberspace during the Covid-19 crisis. Incidentally, States and other actors have condemned this cyber pandemic and highlighted the incompatibility of these behaviours with international law and the framework of responsible State behaviour. From the perspective of international law, the rule of sovereignty appears to have a central role to play in addressing the malicious cyber activities that have taken advantage of the coronavirus pandemic. Indeed, most of these malicious cyber activities may only constitute breaches of sovereignty. Sovereignty is, however, among the most unsettled and contentious parts of international law, even among the so-called ‘like-minded’ States, which have expressed very different interpretations. Building on these observations, the present article investigates the different types of cyber operations that unfolded during the Covid-19 pandemic and questions their characterization in relation to the rules and principles of international law. It assesses the theoretical role of the rule of sovereignty in crisis management during a cyber pandemic as well as its actual use in State practice. Ultimately, it demonstrates the centrality of this rule of international law and how the current sanitary crisis may constitute a plea for its application - or perhaps its rejuvenation - and for its further development in State practice.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126866498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}