2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)最新文献

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CYCON 2021 Sponsors CYCON 2021赞助商
2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) Pub Date : 2021-05-25 DOI: 10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468297
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引用次数: 0
Limiting Viral Spread: Automated Cyber Operations and the Principles of Distinction and Discrimination in the Grey Zone 限制病毒传播:自动化网络操作和灰色地带的区分和歧视原则
2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) Pub Date : 2021-05-25 DOI: 10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468290
Monica Kaminska, Dennis Broeders, F. Cristiano
{"title":"Limiting Viral Spread: Automated Cyber Operations and the Principles of Distinction and Discrimination in the Grey Zone","authors":"Monica Kaminska, Dennis Broeders, F. Cristiano","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468290","url":null,"abstract":"The fact that States resort to automated cyber operations like NotPetya, which spread virally and have indiscriminate effects, raises the question of how the use of these might be regulated. As automated operations have thus far fallen below the threshold of the use of force, the letter of international humanitarian law (IHL) does not provide such regulation. In IHL, the principles of distinction and discrimination hold that attacks should in their targeting distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks must not be indiscriminate, and operations that might foreseeably spread to affect civilian objects are prohibited. This paper draws inspiration from the legal principles of distinction and discrimination to suggest a non-binding norm for responsible State behaviour with regard to automated operations that fall below the threshold of the use of force: the norm proposes that States should design cyber operations so as to prevent them from indiscriminately inflicting damage. The paper finds that in the case of automatedcyber operations, a distinction between the nature of the operation and the use of the operation does not make sense because the design (nature) of the malware defines the use. In order to conform with the norm, responsible States should conduct a review of cyber operations prior to their execution. Finally, as the paper illustrates with a comparative analysis of NotPetya and Stuxnet, the post-incident forensic analysis of an operation can allow third parties and victims to determine whether the operation's designer conformed with the norm. This can help set a normative benchmark by providing a basis upon which States may call out unacceptable behaviour.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129077280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Threat Actor Type Inference and Characterization within Cyber Threat Intelligence 网络威胁情报中的威胁行为者类型推断和表征
2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) Pub Date : 2021-03-03 DOI: 10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468305
Vasileios Mavroeidis, R. Hohimer, Timothy Casey, A. Jøsang
{"title":"Threat Actor Type Inference and Characterization within Cyber Threat Intelligence","authors":"Vasileios Mavroeidis, R. Hohimer, Timothy Casey, A. Jøsang","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468305","url":null,"abstract":"As the cyber threat landscape is constantly becoming increasingly complex and polymorphic, the more critical it becomes to understand the enemy and its modus operandi for anticipatory threat reduction. Even though the cyber security community has developed a certain maturity in describing and sharing technical indicators for informing defense components, we still struggle with non-uniform, unstructured, and ambiguous higher-level information, such as the threat actor context, thereby limiting our ability to correlate with different sources to derive more contextual, accurate, and relevant intelligence. We see the need to overcome this limitation in order to increase our ability to produce and better operationalize cyber threat intelligence. Our research demonstrates how commonly agreed-upon controlled vocabularies for characterizing threat actors and their operations can be used to enrich cyber threat intelligence and infer new information at a higher contextual level that is explicable and queryable. In particular, we present an ontological approach to automatically inferring the types of threat actors based on their personas, understanding their nature, and capturing polymorphism and changes in their behavior and characteristics over time. Such an approach not only enables interoperability by providing a structured way and means for sharing highly contextual cyber threat intelligence but also derives new information atmachine speed and minimizes cognitive biases that manual classification approaches entail.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125006361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Epidemic? The Attack Surface of German Hospitals during the COVID-19 Pandemic 流行吗?新冠肺炎大流行期间德国医院的攻击面
2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) Pub Date : 2021-01-20 DOI: 10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468304
Johannes Klick, R. Koch, Thomas Brandstetter
{"title":"Epidemic? The Attack Surface of German Hospitals during the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"Johannes Klick, R. Koch, Thomas Brandstetter","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468304","url":null,"abstract":"In our paper, we analyze the attack surface of German hospitals and healthcare providers in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. A primary analysis found that 32 percent of the analyzed services were vulnerable to various degrees and that 36 percent of all hospitals showed numerous vulnerabilities. Further resulting vulnerability statistics were mapped against the size of organization and hospital bed count. The analysis looked at the publicly visible attack surface utilizing a Distributed Cyber Recon System, through distributed Internet scanning, Big Data methods, and scan data of almost 1.5 TB from more than 89 different global Internet scans. From the 1,555 identified German hospitals and clinical entities, analysis of the external attack surface was conducted by looking at more than 13,000 service banners for version identification and subsequent CVE-based vulnerability identification.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129468526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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