{"title":"Explainable AI for Classifying Devices on the Internet","authors":"Arturs Lavrenovs, Roman Graf","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467804","url":null,"abstract":"Devices reachable on the Internet pose varying levels of risk to their owners and the wider public, depending on their role and functionality, which can be considered their class. Discussing the security implications of these devices without knowing their classes is impractical. There are multiple AI methods to solve the challenge of classifying devices. Since the number of significant features in device HTTP response was determined to be low in the existing word-embedding neural network, we elected to employ an alternative method of Naive Bayes classification. The Naive Bayes method demonstrated high accuracy, but we recognise the need to explain classification results to improve classification accuracy. The black-box implementation of Artificial Neural Networks has been a serious concern when evaluating the classification results produced in most fields. While devices on the Internet have historically been classified manually or using trivial fingerprinting to match major vendors, these are not feasible anymore because of an ever-increasing variety of devices on the Internet. In the last few years, device classification using Neural Networks has emerged as a new research direction. These research results often claim high accuracy through the validation employed, but through random sampling there always occur devices that cannot be easily classified, that an expert intuitively would classify differently. Addressing this issue is critical for establishing trust in classification results and can be achieved by employing explainable AI. To better understand the models for classifying devices reachable on the Internet and to improve classification accuracy, we developed a novel explainable AI method, which returns the features that are most significant for classification decisions. We employed a Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME) framework toexplain Naive Bayes model classification results, and using this method were able to further improve accuracy with a better understanding of the results.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"59 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120851975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
James Pavur, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, I. Martinovic
{"title":"In the Same Boat: On Small Satellites, Big Rockets, and Cyber Trust","authors":"James Pavur, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, I. Martinovic","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468300","url":null,"abstract":"Launch vehicle “ridesharing” has redefined access to and use of outer space. Today, rockets carry satellites from dozens of countries on shared journeys towards the stars. To ensure that these diverse payloads pose no threat to the overall space mission, safety controls have emerged to protect against mechanical and electrical failure. While these protections were designed to mitigate the risk of probabilistic physical effects, they also have implications for cyber attackers seeking to abuse the trusted status of secondary payloads to harm launch missions. This paper considers such dynamics through a multidisciplinary lens. It begins by drawing on the perspective of security studies and international relations to characterize what motivates an attacker to target satellite launches. This is combined with a technical analysis which leverages model-based engineering techniques to assess the threat of electronic warfare (EW) and radio frequency interference (RFI) attacks against missile range safety technologies on modern launch vehicles. Through dynamic physical simulation, we demonstrate that even inexpensive nanosatellite platforms have the potential to threaten shared launch vehicles in the hands of motivated cyber adversaries. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of these findings for both policymakers and technical researchers interested in cyber-physical threats in orbit.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126082951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Building a National Cyber Strategy: The Process and Implications of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report","authors":"B. Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467806","url":null,"abstract":"Crafting a national cyber strategy is an enormous undertaking. In this article we review the process by which the Cyberspace Solarium Commission generated the Solarium Commission Report, developed the strategy of layered cyber deterrence, and strategized for legislative success in implementing its recommendations. This is an article about the development of a whole-of-nation strategy. Once the production of the strategy of layered cyber deterrence is explained, the article goes on to elaborate on implementation strategies, the challenge of escalation management, and future efforts to ensure that the work of the Solarium Commission becomes entrenched in U.S. national cyber strategy and behavior. We review the work left undone by the Solarium Commission, highlighting the enormous effort that went into the process of building out a strategy to defend a nation.11It takes a village; we thank the entire Solarium Commission team, as their efforts generated the final Commission Report and the legislative successes that followed. In some ways, this article seeks to chronicle the process of building a strategy that was developed through the efforts of hundreds of people. This work reflects the process that we went through to construct the Solarium Commission report, which is particular to our experience; others may have had different recollections of the events under consideration. Brandon Valeriano is also a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a Senior Advisor to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Benjamin Jensen is also a Scholar in Residence at American University and the Research Director for the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122471725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Vulnerability of the Financial System to a Systemic Cyberattack","authors":"Bobby Vedral","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468291","url":null,"abstract":"The financial industry is a prime target of cybercriminal activity, mainly due to the nature of its underlying business (‘that's where the money is’11This was the reply of 1930s US bank robber Willie Sutton when asked why he robbed banks. He later coauthored a book titled Where the Money Was. See FBI History of Famous Cases & Criminals, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases [accessed 1 March 2021]., the sector's global interconnectedness, and its high level of digitalization. In response, the private sector has invested vast sums into cybersecurity, and regulators have started to worry about systemic risk. The latter comes in two forms. The first is the risk of a successful cyberattack against a specific financial institution ‘spilling over’ into the broader financial system, hence unintentionally becoming systemic. The second is the national security concern of a systemic cyberattack launched specifically to disrupt the target's financial ecosystem and therefore the real economy. In both cases, the historic evidence is clear: neither type of event has been recorded thus far. Those who consider warnings of systemic cyberattacks to be little more than threat inflation see that as vindication. This paper takes the opposite view and argues that the probability of a systemic cyberattack is significant enough to warrant a higher degree of crossdisciplinary research and preparedness. To support its main argument, this paper proposes a conceptual framework that focuses on answering two key questions. First, are there sufficient known structural vulnerabilities in the financial ecosystem that could be exploited by a willing adversary? And second, are there plausible scenarios that could see an adversarial nation-state launch such an attack? The answer to both is positive. Given the lack of data, this analysis is largely qualitative, based on discussions with regulators, chief risk officers, academic experts, and the author's own multi-decade experience as an active participant in the financial market.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127552829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Windmills of the Mind: Higher-Order Forms of Disinformation in International Politics","authors":"James Shires","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468292","url":null,"abstract":"Disinformation - the organised and deliberate circulation of verifiably false information - poses a clear danger to democratic processes and crisis response, including the current coronavirus pandemic. This paper argues for a conceptual step forward in disinformation studies, continuing a trend from the identification of specific pieces of disinformation to the investigation of wider influence campaigns and strategic narrative contestation. However, current work does not conceptually separate first-order forms of disinformation from higher-order forms of disinformation: essentially, the difference between disinformation about political or other events, and disinformation about disinformation itself. This paper argues that this distinction is crucial to understanding the extent and consequences (or lack thereof) of disinformation in international politics. The paper first highlights how political disinformation is often sparked by leaks - the release of secret or confidential information into the public domain. It suggests that disinformation and leaks intersect with conventional cybersecurity threats through the increasingly common phenomenon of hack-and-leak operations. The paper then introduces the concept of higher-order disinformation. This discussion is followed by an empirical example: the case of US intelligence assessments of Russian hack-and-leak operations during the US presidential election campaign in 2016. The paper concludes with offensive and defensive policy implications, arguing that the relevance of second, third, and higher orders of disinformation will only increase as more experienced actors draw on the material, successes, and lessons of previous campaigns.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134402289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Roland Meier, Arturs Lavrenovs, Kimmo Heinäaro, L. Gambazzi, Vincent Lenders
{"title":"Towards an AI-powered Player in Cyber Defence Exercises","authors":"Roland Meier, Arturs Lavrenovs, Kimmo Heinäaro, L. Gambazzi, Vincent Lenders","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467801","url":null,"abstract":"Cyber attacks are becoming increasingly frequent, sophisticated, and stealthy. This makes it harder for cyber defence teams to keep up, forcing them to automate their defence capabilities in order to improve their reactivity and efficiency. Therefore, we propose a fully automated cyber defence framework that no longer needs support from humans to detect and mitigate attacks within a complex infrastructure. We design our framework based on a real-world case - Locked Shields - the world's largest cyber defence exercise. In this exercise, teams have to defend their networked infrastructure against attacks, while maintaining operational services for their users. Our framework architecture connects various cyber sensors with network, device, application, and user actuators through an artificial intelligence (AI)-powered automated team in order to dynamically secure the cyber environment. To the best of our knowledge, our framework is the first attempt towards a fully automated cyber defence team that aims at protecting complex environments from sophisticated attacks.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131234799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Going Viral","authors":"","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9467800","url":null,"abstract":"13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Going Viral.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132134055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Cyberspace ‘Great Game’. The Five Eyes, the Sino-Russian Bloc and the Growing Competition to Shape Global Cyberspace Norms","authors":"Nikola Pijović","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468296","url":null,"abstract":"The development of global norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace has, over the past decade, become a significant foreign policy issue and a new battleground between states. The contested and competitive nature of global cyberspace norm building suggests that although there are complicated legal and technical issues at play, the development of cyberspace norms remains primarily a contestation of values, ideologies, and strategic interests. This paper argues that the competition to shape the governance of cyberspace through the development of cyberspace norms represents a continuation of foreign and strategic policy applied to the cyber domain. This has resulted in a growing cyberspace ‘Great Game’ between the Five Eyes alliance countries (the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) and the Sino-Russian bloc (China and Russia). The Five Eyes and the Sino-Russian bloc are key cyber powers and cyberspace norm entrepreneurs whose leadership is instrumental in promoting global cyberspace norm preferences. However, each camp advocates a set of norm preferences inherently at odds with the other's, which has resulted in growing competition for dominance in cyberspace norm prescription and promotion. The paper outlines the key cyberspace norm proposals and initiatives promoted by the Five Eyes and the Sino-Russian bloc, discussing their main differences. It argues that the latest round (2019-2021) of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace (UNGGE) deliberations is unlikely to help bridge these differences in any substantive way. The cyberspace ‘Great Game’ and the increasingly competitivenature of cyberspace norm development will remain a feature of global efforts to govern cyberspace throughout the 2020s.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114877273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adversary Targeting of Civilian Telecommunications Infrastructure","authors":"K. Giles, Kim Hartmann","doi":"10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon51939.2021.9468303","url":null,"abstract":"The response to the pandemic by states, organisations, and individuals in 2020 highlighted critical dependency on communications systems underpinned by cyber infrastructure. Without the benefits of connectivity, governments would have faced greater challenges governing, societies would have found it even harder to maintain cohesion, more companies would have ceased to operate altogether, and personal isolation would have been a vastly more difficult experience. And yet, it is precisely this connectivity within and between NATO states that some adversaries are preparing to attack in time of conflict, including through physical or kinetic means. Russia in particular has long invested in probing vulnerabilities of civilian internet and telecommunications infrastructure, and this programme was urgently ramped up to unprecedented levels of intensity after the seizure of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated the power of total information dominance achieved through targeting critical information assets. Besides Russia, China and a number of other states are also rapidly developing counter-space capabilities that would pose a direct threat to critical civilian communications services. This has obvious implications for crisis management even before overt state-on-state conflict. Vulnerabilities have been sought in all domains: maritime (subsea cables), space (communications satellites), land (fibre optic nodes), and online (targeting specific media sources for neutralisation). The VPNFilter malware exposed in mid-2018, in addition to its cybercrime or cyber-espionage capabilities, demonstrated the ambition to render large numbers of ordinary users in NATO countries simply unable to communicate. Recognising and responding to this emerging disruptive threat and its potential human, societal, and state impact is critical to the defence of NATO states-still more so in the case of disruption to normal life by events such as the pandemic. The threat to cyber-physical systems not ordinarily considered a military target must be recognised, and their defence and security prioritised. This paper outlines the threat and recommends a range of mitigation strategies and measures.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121232561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence","authors":"","doi":"10.1109/cycon.2015.7158459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/cycon.2015.7158459","url":null,"abstract":"The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) is a NATOaccredited cyber defence hub focusing on research, training, and exercises. Experts from most NATO nations and many partners of the Alliance across the globe work at the Centre, which is based in Tallinn, Estonia. The Centre provides a comprehensive cyber defence capability, with expertise in the areas of technology, strategy, operations, and law. At the core of the CCDCOE is a diverse group of international experts including legal scholars, policy, and strategy experts, as well as technology researchers with military, government, and industry backgrounds. The Centre is staffed and financed by the following NATO nations and partners of the Alliance – Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.","PeriodicalId":439295,"journal":{"name":"2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125922607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}