Possibilities and Limitations of Cyber Threat Intelligence in Energy Systems

Csaba Krasznay, Gergö Gyebnár
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The national energy system is the most critical of the critical infrastructures, and one which has become surprisingly vulnerable to cyberattacks in the last couple of years. Both unexpected technical design flaws and targeted attacks carried out by state-sponsored actors have raised challenges for the operators of essential services. Although this infrastructure is the subject of many regulations, and national security agencies pay special attention to such critical information infrastructures, gathering cyber threat intelligence is not straightforward for several reasons. First, special protocols in industrial control systems and operational technology (ICS/ OT) systems are difficult to monitor. Second, information sharing does not really work, neither between states nor domestically. Third, due to the lack of thorough technical recommendations, there is no common understanding between responsible authorities and critical information infrastructure operators. In Hungary, key stakeholders of the national electricity system have realized that although some local and European legislation deals with the question of the cybersecurity of critical information infrastructure, many open questions remain in practice, both from policy and technology perspectives. In 2018, Hungarian manufacturers, energy service providers and responsible authorities started a discussion on what should be improved in legislation and technology, as well as in information sharing and how. This paper aims to describe the framework of this collaboration for information sharing and the initial results. Specifically, we present the current technical capabilities for gathering cyber threat intelligence in ICS/OT systems and propose some legislative actions that could support further technical solutions that are feasible in these special systems. We also present Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and the goals of threat actors in energy systems that can be seen from the current data sets of our honeypots. Moreover, we will also make some recommendations as to how the national and EU-wide legislation should be built up and what kinds of actions should be required from the key players in compliance with the Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (NIS Directive).
能源系统中网络威胁情报的可能性和局限性
国家能源系统是关键基础设施中最关键的,在过去几年里,它变得非常容易受到网络攻击。意想不到的技术设计缺陷和由政府支持的行为者实施的有针对性的攻击,都给基本服务运营商带来了挑战。尽管这些基础设施是许多法规的主题,而且国家安全机构特别关注这些关键的信息基础设施,但由于以下几个原因,收集网络威胁情报并不简单。首先,工业控制系统和操作技术(ICS/ OT)系统中的特殊协议难以监控。其次,无论是国家之间还是国内,信息共享都没有真正发挥作用。第三,由于缺乏彻底的技术建议,责任部门和关键信息基础设施运营商之间没有共识。在匈牙利,国家电力系统的主要利益相关者已经意识到,尽管一些地方和欧洲立法处理关键信息基础设施的网络安全问题,但从政策和技术的角度来看,许多悬而未决的问题仍然存在于实践中。2018年,匈牙利制造商、能源服务提供商和主管部门开始讨论在立法和技术方面应该改进的地方,以及信息共享和如何改进。本文旨在描述这种信息共享合作的框架和初步成果。具体而言,我们介绍了当前在ICS/OT系统中收集网络威胁情报的技术能力,并提出了一些立法行动,以支持在这些特殊系统中可行的进一步技术解决方案。我们还介绍了战术、技术和程序(TTPs)以及能源系统中威胁行为者的目标,这些目标可以从我们蜜罐的当前数据集中看到。此外,我们还将就如何建立国家和欧盟范围的立法提出一些建议,以及根据2016年7月6日欧洲议会和理事会关于整个联盟网络和信息系统的高共同安全水平措施的指令(EU) 2016/1148,关键参与者应该采取何种行动(NIS指令)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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