{"title":"New Institutional Economics","authors":"Barak D Richman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3482192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3482192","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses New Institutional Economics (NIE). It begins by describing the author’s own understanding of the New Private Law (NPL). The chapter then provides a brief introduction to NIE and its intersection with the study of legal doctrines and institutions. NIE’s roots extend—at least—to Ronald Coase’s famous 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm,” and more likely to the writings of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century political economists. These intellectual traditions have shaped what is now known as NIE into two distinct branches. The first branch examines institutions as “humanly designed constraints that structure political, social, and economic interactions.” The second branch of NIE focuses on more micro-level behavior. Called “the governance branch” and operationalized by transaction cost economics, the foundational idea is to describe firms not in neoclassical terms as production functions, but in organizational terms as governance structures. The chapter explains how both NPL and NIE exhibit the hallmarks of interdisciplinary, scholarly pluralism, and an inquisitive focus on real-world, tractable problems. It concludes with some thoughts about the future of NPL and, in particular, the lessons it can take from NIE’s successes.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125675843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Antitrust Reform: Interim Possibilities in a Void of Legislative and Regulatory Action","authors":"Maia Livengood","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3478841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3478841","url":null,"abstract":"Rather than serving as the intended translational vehicle between industrial economics research and competition law, antitrust scholarship has become a morass of complexity, parroting the jargon and computational elements of the former while obscuring relevance to the latter. Though sound empirical support is unquestionably critical to the scholarship, accessibility barriers have caused doctrinal stagnation: as has been repeatedly documented in retrospectives, superior economics research did not supplant the long-outdated neoclassical frameworks relied on by advocates and the judiciary. It is a failure of pedagogy, not evidence. The gap in understanding is most apparent in antitrust jurisprudence concerning two-sided markets—particularly so in markets that rely on semi-novel assets, such as Big Data. This paper aims to bridge that translational gap. I provide a conceptual framework for understanding the role of data as an economic asset and map consumer data abuses to existing causes of action.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131615923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Testimony on 'Competition in Digital Technology Markets: Examining Acquisitions of Nascent or Potential Competitors by Digital Platform' before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Antitrust Subcommittee","authors":"John M. Yun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3459660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3459660","url":null,"abstract":"Is there a problem with large technology firms, or platforms, purchasing nascent competitors and suppressing competition before they can mature into vibrant competitors? Further, if there is a problem, are the current antitrust laws and the enforcement of those laws sufficient to combat the problem? If not, is there a legislative solution? These are all critical questions given that innovation and incentives to innovate are at the heart of all vibrant modern economies. This testimony explores these questions.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130839945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition Law for the Digital Era: A Complex Systems’ Perspective","authors":"I. Lianos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3492730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3492730","url":null,"abstract":"As the global economy incurs a process of transformation by the ongoing ‘fourth industrial revolution’, competition law is traversing a ‘liminal’ moment, a period of transition during which the normal limits to thought, self-understanding and behaviour are relaxed, opening the way to novelty and imagination, construction and destruction. There is need for the discussion over the role of competition law in the digital era to be integrated to the broader debate over the new processes of value generation and capture in the era of digital capitalism and the complex economy to which it has given rise to. This complex digital economy is formed by a spider web of economic links, but also their underpinning societal relations, between different agents. However, competition law still lives in the simple world of neo-classical price theory (NPT) economics, which may not provide adequate tools in order to fully comprehend the various dimensions of the competition game. The emphasis put recently by competition authorities on multi-sided markets in order to analyse restrictions of competition in the data economy illustrates the agents’ changing roles and the complexity of their interactions, as the same agents can be at the same time consumers and producers while their personal data raw material for the value generation process. \u0000 \u0000It becomes therefore essential to uncover the new value capture and value generation processes in operation in the digital economy, and draw lessons for the optimal design and enforcement of competition law, rather than take the established competition law framework as a given and try to stretch within it a quite complex reality that may not fit this Procrustean iron bed. These approaches should engage with the complex economics of digital capitalism, and in particular the role of futurity and financialisation, personalisation and cybernetics. \u0000 \u0000These new developments, first, call for a re-conceptualisation of the goals of competition law in the digital era, as competition law moves from the calm and predictable waters of ‘consumer welfare’, narrowly defined, to integrate considerations of income/wealth distribution, privacy and complex equality. \u0000 \u0000Second, it also requires a revision of the current understanding of the nature of the competitive game, which only focuses on horizontal rivalry in product and eventually technology markets. This is of course an important dimension of competition, but hardly the most significant one in the current process of value generation and capture in the digital economy. Firms do not only compete on the product market dimension, but in the today’s financialised economy, probably the most important locus of competition is capital markets. The process of financialisation has important implications for the development of digital capitalism, an issue that the paper explores in detail for the first time in competition law and economics scholarship. Financial markets evaluate companies in view of expec","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134525269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multisided Markets and Platform Dominance","authors":"James Alleman, E. Baranes, Paul N. Rappoport","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3426831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3426831","url":null,"abstract":"The internet giants - Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google, among others - have transformed society with both positive and negative effects. The negative effects have been stark. There have been huge disruptions caused by e-commerce. More recently, subtler, but even more serious negative effects are only now being recognized: threats to democracy, violations of privacy, and monopolistic behavior. By traditional measures Facebook and Google are highly concentrated. Each has obtained de facto monopolistic or oligopolistic power with little concern on the part of government. Facebook and Google and other internet giants are multisided markets (MSM); their economic rents are \"hidden\" from the public. On the user-side of the market, prices are zero - \"free.\" On the other side of the market, Facebook's and Google's revenues are derived from advertising which appears when the users click on advertiser's web sites. Facebook and Google can extract exorbitant prices for ads, since they are virtually the only source that can target ads directly to potential customers. This is where the economic rents are not so obvious. This paper addresses the monopolistic/monopsony aspect of the internet giants. In the singlesided market, monopoly pricing is well defined - as well as tests for predatory behavior; not so with multisided markets. Since the definition of markets is central to the legal enforcement of antitrust statutes, the paper examines non-transactional multisided markets for their potential for determining consumers' harm and welfare effects, as well as defining monopoly and predatory pricing in this context. Initial estimates of Google's and Facebook's social cost in terms of consumers' welfare loss are $54 and $33 billion, respectively and increasing cost to consumers at least $87 billion dollars. It demonstrates and quantifies that dominate internet platforms can create three major harms to consumers: - Increasing prices to consumers via added costs to the products being advertised, - Elimination (or non-emergence) of competition in markets to the products being advertised, - Increasing prices to consumers beyond the cost of advertising via the market power of the remaining firms in the market of the products being advertised The paper outlines potential remedies to ameliorate the problems.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116226275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, Cathrin Heller, P. Hanspach
{"title":"Zur Weiterwälzung von Preisaufschlägen (On the Pass-On of Overcharges)","authors":"Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, Cathrin Heller, P. Hanspach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3426049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3426049","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: Unter Weiterwalzung wird die Veranderung des Preises eines Gutes oder einer Dienstleistung aufgrund einer Kostenanderung in der Produktion dieses Gutes oder Dienstleistung verstanden. Im Zusammenhang mit Kartellschadensersatzklagen ist die Ermittlung der Weiterwalzungsrate von zentraler Bedeutung. Liegt ein Preisaufschlag vor, ist die Bestimmung der Weiterwalzungsrate sub specie der Vorteilsausgleichung fur eine korrekte Ermittlung des Umfangs eines moglichen Schadensersatzanspruchs unerlasslich. Dennoch werden gerade in der Analyse von Weiterwalzungsraten oftmals bedeutsame, fur die Schadensquantifizierung zentrale, Fehler gemacht. In diesem Aufsatz werden wesentliche konzeptionelle Missverstandnisse zur Interpretation und Bestimmung von Weiterwalzungsraten diskutiert, sowie entsprechende Irrtumer richtiggestellt. English Abstract: Pass-on refers to the change of a price of a product or service resulting from a change in the cost of producing the product or service. The determination of the pass-on rate is crucial in cartel damages claims. If an overcharge is found, determining the pass-on rate is essential to estimate the correct amount of damage. Nevertheless, the analysis of pass-on is often incorrect with important repercussions on the overall damage quantification. In this paper, we will discuss conceptional misunderstandings regarding the interpretation and determination of pass-on rates. Moreover, we analyse and correct several common errors relating to pass-on.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130309398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Antitrust Enforcement and Privacy Standards","authors":"Renato Nazzini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3473158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3473158","url":null,"abstract":"The current prominence of digital platforms that compete for customers’ attention by offering them free services and generate revenue by monetising the data obtained from customers on different markets, for example on online advertising markets, has brought to the forefront of the antitrust debate the question as to whether privacy standards are a parameter of antitrust enforcement. This paper asks what role, if any, the standard of privacy protection offered by online platforms to consumers plays in antitrust enforcement. \u0000 \u0000In the author’s view, the answer to this question is that privacy standards are relevant to competition analysis as qualitative parameters of competition and can, and should, play a role in the assessment of mergers, agreements and unilateral conduct. When a breach of the data protection rules is either a form of exercise of market power or an element of an exclusionary strategy, competition law can and should intervene. But, as data protection issues become more and more prominent in digital markets, care should be exercised not to blur the line between competition policy and data protection. This would weaken both competition and data protection enforcement, which should instead work in tandem to achieve their common, ultimate objective of maximising societal welfare based on a democratically shared set of values, including a high standard of data protection.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"201202 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123357490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interrogating an Implicit Instance of Abuse of Dominance As Embedded in Unilateral Standard Contracts In the Kenyan Markets","authors":"Jasper Lubeto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3414536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3414536","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses unilateral standard contracts with a competition law lens. It seeks to demonstrate that, left unchecked, dominant players with market power may invite unsuspecting consumers into unfair and anti-consumer contracts. This calls for a proactive interventionist approach by the Competition Authority of Kenya to interrogate unilateral standard contracts by major dominant players in the market.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124098002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Standing, Causation, and Remedies Under the Cartwright Act","authors":"J. Elias","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3411763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3411763","url":null,"abstract":"This work of legal scholarship analyzes complex issues arising under California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act. Topics addressed include antitrust standing, antitrust injury, proximate cause, damages, injunctions, and joint and several liability.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"223 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128617340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Logic of Market Definition","authors":"David Glasner, Sean Patrick Sullivan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3223025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223025","url":null,"abstract":"Despite all the commentary that the topic has attracted in recent years, confusion still surrounds the proper definition of relevant markets in antitrust. This paper addresses that confusion and attempts to explain the underlying logic of market definition. It does so largely by way of exclusion. The paper identifies and explains three common errors in the way that courts and advocates approach market definition. The first error is what we call the natural market fallacy. This is the mistake of assuming that relevant markets are identifiable constructs and features of competition in the world, rather than the purely conceptual analytic devices that they actually are. The second error is what we call the independent market fallacy. This is the failure to appreciate that relevant markets do not exist independent of any theory of harm but must always be customized to reflect the specific details of a given theory of harm. The third error is what we call the single market fallacy. This is the tendency to seek some single, best relevant market, when in reality there will typically be many relevant markets that could be helpfully and appropriately drawn to aid in the analysis of a given case or investigation. In the course of identifying and debunking these fallacies, the paper clarifies the appropriate framework for understanding and conducting market definition.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"75 11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131166764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}