Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal最新文献

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Why Sound Law and Economics Should Guide Competition Policy in the Digital Economy 为什么数字经济中的竞争政策应该由健全的法律和经济学来指导
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3384405
Dirk Auer, Geoffrey A. Manne, Aurélien Portuese, Thibault Schrepel
{"title":"Why Sound Law and Economics Should Guide Competition Policy in the Digital Economy","authors":"Dirk Auer, Geoffrey A. Manne, Aurélien Portuese, Thibault Schrepel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3384405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3384405","url":null,"abstract":"In our submission, we argue that competition policy in the digital economy should be based on sound, theoretical underpinnings and rigorous, evidence-based analysis, best encapsulated in the “law and economics” approach. Despite many expressed fears to the contrary, digital markets are not inherently prone to anti-competitive behavior, and the weight of economic theory and evidence offer little support for the asserted risk of harm. We thus argue that competition intervention should take into account the uncertainty of harm, the presence of countervailing benefits and the problems of devising an effective remedy.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"177 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114096123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Co-opetition Among Digital Platforms and Consumer Welfare 数字平台的合作竞争与消费者福利
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3403629
Florence Thépot
{"title":"Co-opetition Among Digital Platforms and Consumer Welfare","authors":"Florence Thépot","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3403629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3403629","url":null,"abstract":"This note provides some comments on the nature of competition among digital platforms (mainly the GAFA), which will be qualified as ‘co-opetition’, to reflect the complementarity of services offered and fierce rivalry among the platforms in their strategies of vertical integration. The main question is the extent to which co-opetition among digital platforms, and the associated race for innovation serves consumer welfare both in a static and dynamic perspective.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122408814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Patent Hold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust Law 为什么专利持有不违反反垄断法
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-09-04 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3244425
G. Werden, Luke M. Froeb
{"title":"Why Patent Hold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust Law","authors":"G. Werden, Luke M. Froeb","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3244425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3244425","url":null,"abstract":"Owners of standard essential patents (SEPs) are cast as villains for engaging in “patent hold-up,” i.e., taking advantage of the fact that they negotiate royalties with implementer-licensees that already have made sunk investments in the standard. In contrast to “patent ambush,” patent hold-up involves no standard-setting misconduct or harm to any competitive process, and thus cannot violate antitrust law. Commentators taking a contrary positions confuse the ends of antitrust law with its means. Antitrust law promotes consumer welfare only by protecting competition. Casting aside this core principle would expose business decisions, including ordinary price setting, to judicial oversight. Commitments made by SEP owners in the standard-setting process, however, should be enforced, and they are enforced. Without an antitrust cause of action, implementers invoke the powers of the courts to resolve royalty disputes over SEPs.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122010597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Re-Conceptualizing ‘Object’ Analysis Under Article 101 TFEU: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives 第101条TFEU下“对象”分析的再概念:理论与比较视角
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-09-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY014
K. Kwok
{"title":"Re-Conceptualizing ‘Object’ Analysis Under Article 101 TFEU: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives","authors":"K. Kwok","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHY014","url":null,"abstract":"Recent expansive applications of the ‘object’ prohibition under Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union have left the scope of ‘object’ restrictions in a state of uncertainty and incoherence. This article undertakes an unprecedented theoretical study of the ‘object’ test in comparison with U.S. antitrust law. It re-conceptualizes ‘object’ analysis as a form of preliminary enquiry that serves a similar classificatory function as a U.S. ‘quick look’ analysis, namely to distinguish naked restrictions from non-naked ones in order to determine whether summary condemnation or an effect-based analysis is called for. This normative theory rests on the important conceptual distinction between proximate and ultimate objects, and a detailed comparison of the methods of antitrust analysis under E.U. and U.S. law. The article constructs a ‘quick look’ framework for ‘object’ analysis that combines both theoretical and comparative insights, and applies this framework to critically analyze joint venture restrictions, regulatory restrictions, vertical restrictions, and industry restructuring arrangements.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117181105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Modernisierung der Missbrauchsaufsicht für marktmächtige Unternehmen: Gutachten für das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (Modernising the Law on Abuse of Market Power Report for the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy) 使具有市场力量的企业现代化:联邦经济和能源经济力量报告
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3262210
H. Schweitzer, Justus Haucap, Wolfgang Kerber, Robert Welker
{"title":"Modernisierung der Missbrauchsaufsicht für marktmächtige Unternehmen: Gutachten für das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (Modernising the Law on Abuse of Market Power Report for the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy)","authors":"H. Schweitzer, Justus Haucap, Wolfgang Kerber, Robert Welker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3262210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3262210","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: Die Entwicklungen in der digitalen Wirtschaft – insbesondere die zunehmende Bedeutung von (a) Daten als kritische Inputressource in Produktions- und Distributionsprozessen und (b) digitalen Platt- formen auf teils sehr konzentrierten Markten – werfen die Frage auf, ob das geltende Kartellrecht hinreichend gewappnet ist, neuartigen Wettbewerbsgefahrdungen wirksam und rechtzeitig zu be- gegnen. Konkret stellt sich etwa die Frage, ob die Schwelle fur ein Eingreifen der kartellrechtlichen Missbrauchsaufsicht – allgemein oder auch nur in bestimmten Fallgruppen – zu hoch angesiedelt ist und ein rechtzeitiges Eingreifen verhindert. Weiterhin ist zu klaren, ob Wettbewerbsgefahrdungen, wie sie mit zum Teil neuartigen unternehmerischen Strategien von marktmachtigen Unternehmen der Digitalwirtschaft einhergehen konnen, mit den geltenden Vorschriften der Missbrauchsaufsicht effektiv erfasst werden konnen, ganz unabhangig vom Schwellenwert fur ein Eingreifen. Besondere Bedeutung kann dabei moglicherweise wettbewerbswidrigen Verdrangungsstrategien vertikal inte- grierter Unternehmen, dem wettbewerbsbehindernden Einsatz von Portfolio- und Verbundvorteilen und dem Zugriff auf Daten bzw. der Verweigerung eines Zugangs zu Daten beigemessen werden. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: Digitization has transformed – and continues to transform – the economy. Among the characteristic features of digitization are the increasing importance of (a) data as a critical input resource in production and distribution processes and of (b) digital platforms as new players in the markets. The changes in the structure of markets – some of which have become highly concentrated – and in business strategies raise the question whether EU competition law and German competition law are able to deal with the new challenges of the digital economy. Our report for the German Economic Ministry looks at whether a modernization of the (European and German) rules on the abuse of market power is needed. For this purpose, we look at Article 102 TFEU and their (rough) equivalents in German competition law, namely in §§ 18, 19 GWB. In addition, we pay particular attention to the question of whether § 20 GWB – a specificity of German competition law which prohibits exclusionary abuses of relative market power (§ 20 para. 1 – “economic dependence”) and superior market power vis-a-vis small and medium sized competitors (§ 20 para. 3) – can become an effective instrument for closing persisting gaps in controlling abusive behaviour in view of the special challenges facing the digital economy.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130366004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
ICLE Comments, FTC's Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century 美国联邦贸易委员会关于21世纪竞争与消费者保护的听证会
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3384794
Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris, J. Hurwitz, Kristian Stout
{"title":"ICLE Comments, FTC's Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century","authors":"Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris, J. Hurwitz, Kristian Stout","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3384794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3384794","url":null,"abstract":"In this comment, we primarily address the first question asked by the Commission (“The state of antitrust and consumer protection law and enforcement, and their development, since the Pitofsky hearings”). However, our comments also speak to several other questions. We do so in part through the lens of history, in part through the lens of contemporary economic analysis. In section I, we look at the history and evolution of antitrust policy. In Section II, we consider the continued vitality of the consumer welfare standard. In Section III, we discuss the importance of economically grounded, evidence based antitrust. In Section IV, we address consumer protection issues.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114946276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Establishment of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice 美国司法部反垄断司成立
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3226941
G. Werden
{"title":"Establishment of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice","authors":"G. Werden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3226941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3226941","url":null,"abstract":"Official sources state that the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice was created by Attorney General Homer S. Cummings in 1933, but no corroboration is provided. This note carefully examines the events of 1933 as well prior history, and it discovers that the Antitrust Division actually was established by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in 1919.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127343820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
An Antitrust Analysis of NCAA Amateurism as an Unlawful Tying Restraint: Market Power, Surplus Extraction, and Foreclosure 作为非法捆绑约束的NCAA业余主义的反垄断分析:市场力量、盈余提取和止赎
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-07-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3287163
Ted Tatos
{"title":"An Antitrust Analysis of NCAA Amateurism as an Unlawful Tying Restraint: Market Power, Surplus Extraction, and Foreclosure","authors":"Ted Tatos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3287163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3287163","url":null,"abstract":"Economists have long recognized the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) as a monopsonistic cartel that restrains athlete labor compensation below competitive market levels. However, an additional restraint has been heretofore ignored. This article argues that NCAA justifies the restraint on athlete compensation through an anticompetitive tying restraint between two distinct products: intercollegiate athletic participation and post-secondary academic education. Contrary to the unitary “college education�? market definition used in the O’Bannon v. NCAA case and to which parties stipulated in subsequent litigation, this article presents evidence of separate relevant markets for these goods. The NCAA Division I cartel leverages its market power in the intercollegiate athletics market, particularly through dominant autonomy “Power-5�? conference members, to enhance market power in the tying market, extract consumer surplus from both athletes and the general student body and foreclose competition in the tied market. The existence of separate markets, market power in the tying market, and non-trivial foreclosure sales in the tied education market confirm that NCAA’s model of “amateurism�? meets the Supreme Court’s three-pronged per se test for unlawful tying. Further, even in the absence of foreclosure share, the tying arrangement enhances dominant schools’ market power in athletics and achieves surplus extraction by harming competition, which should warrant the imposition of antitrust liability. This article presents an analysis of relevant markets and discusses relevant economic arguments raised by economic experts in the O’Bannon and NCAA Grant-in-Aid litigation, along with a review of the relevant academic literature and legal precedent.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131199365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price Strategies of Independent and Branded Dealers in Retail Gas Market. The Case of a Contract Reform in Spain 汽油零售市场独立经销商和品牌经销商的价格策略。西班牙合同改革案例
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-06-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3200958
Pilar Cuadrado, Aitor Lacuesta, María de los Llanos Matea, F. J. Palencia-González
{"title":"Price Strategies of Independent and Branded Dealers in Retail Gas Market. The Case of a Contract Reform in Spain","authors":"Pilar Cuadrado, Aitor Lacuesta, María de los Llanos Matea, F. J. Palencia-González","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3200958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3200958","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses how the contract structure between gas stations and the wholesale operator affects price strategies. Using daily data on prices of different gas stations the paper finds that independent dealers charge lower margins than other dealers with different contracts. One potential hypothesis is that this is the case because independent stations react more to the number of competitors. We use the introduction of a discretional regional excise duty (IVMDH) on gas stations to check the reaction of markups to changes in marginal costs of the actual number of competitors. Results are consistent with the idea that regardless the type of contract all dealers react notably to the increases in relative marginal costs by decreasing average markups. We use those results to interpret the inexistent reduction in markups that followed a change in the Spanish regulation that took place in 2013 fostering competition in the retail sector. One potential interpretation is that the big increase in independent stations following the reform was not considered an increase in actual competition for most of the incumbent stations.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133425341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 43
Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in Belgium and the Netherlands – Is There a Race to Attract Antitrust Damages Actions? 比利时和荷兰反托拉斯法的私人执行——是否存在吸引反托拉斯损害赔偿诉讼的竞赛?
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-05-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3183428
Simon Vande Walle
{"title":"Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in Belgium and the Netherlands – Is There a Race to Attract Antitrust Damages Actions?","authors":"Simon Vande Walle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3183428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3183428","url":null,"abstract":"Since the Belgian and Dutch legal systems are relatively similar, one would expect similar levels of antitrust litigation. The data gathered for this article shows this is not the case. <br><br>In both countries, claimants and defendants alike regularly invoke antitrust law to obtain injunctive relief and to have contractual clauses declared null and void. But a striking difference exists for a specific type of antitrust litigation - follow-on damages actions. While the Dutch courts have become a hot spot for such actions, very few such actions have been brought in Belgium.<br><br>The article looks at possible explanations for this divergence. It argues that the boom in follow-on damages actions in the Netherlands can be explained by the receptive attitude of Dutch judges and lawyers to follow-on damages actions. The early judgments from Dutch courts were favourable to claimants and have attracted more damages actions. In turn, the large number of damages actions has led to the development of a claimants’ bar for antitrust actions and the proliferation of litigation funders. This developing litigation industry is in turn instrumental in bringing more damages actions before the Dutch courts, creating a virtuous circle for the Netherlands as forum.<br><br>These developments suggest that the Netherlands is competing with other jurisdictions to attract follow-on damages actions, just as it is competing for complex litigation in other areas.<br><br>Belgium, by contrast, is not engaged in the race to attract follow-on damages actions. Belgian courts have been less receptive to follow-on actions, probably because Belgian judges have a higher caseload than Dutch judges. In turn, the reason why judges in Belgium have a higher caseload is not because Belgium has fewer judges per capita than the Netherlands, but because civil and commercial litigation is far more frequent in Belgium. This represents something of a paradox: the Belgian courts are more accessible and attract more regular, run-of-the mill litigation but, precisely because of this, they are less receptive to new types of litigation such as follow-on damages actions, regardless of the benefits that these actions may bring to the economy.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116092938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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