Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal最新文献

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The Omega Man or The Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law 欧米茄人或美国反垄断法的孤立
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-12-04 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3295988
S. Waller
{"title":"The Omega Man or The Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law","authors":"S. Waller","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3295988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3295988","url":null,"abstract":"There is a classic science fiction novel and film that present a metaphor for the isolation of United States antitrust law in the current global context. Richard Mathiesson’s 1954 classic science fiction novel I am Legend, and the later 1971 film released under the name of The Omega Man starring Charleton Heston, both deal with the fate of Robert Neville, a survivor of a world-wide pandemic who believes he is the last man on Earth. \u0000 \u0000While I am Legend and The Omega Man are obviously works of fantasy, it nonetheless has resonance for contemporary antitrust debate and discourse. United States antitrust law and policy divergences significantly from the rest of the global antitrust community in important areas of scope, philosophy, doctrine, procedure, remedies, and institutions. Much of this divergence in world view is the product of history and path dependence that is largely unique to the United States experience. At the same time, some of the divergence is the result of ideological choices over the past forty years that improbably have remained in place in the United States, while other politics, economics, values, and policy choices have come into prominence throughout the rest of the world. \u0000 \u0000Unlike The Omega Man, there is no plague and there are no monsters. But there are major fault lines in competition law and policy where the United States is the outlier and in danger of becoming The Omega Man. While there are also many issues of agreement where the United States has been a thought leader, there are a significant number of the most salient and controversial issues in modern competition law where the United States is choosing to go it alone or nearly so. \u0000 \u0000There are some important caveats to this tale of antitrust exceptionalism. Some of the United States antitrust exceptionalism means more enforcement than elsewhere in the world. In most of the areas discussed in this article, it means less enforcement that is seen elsewhere, particularly than in the European Union and the numerous jurisdictions whose competition law is modeled on EU principles. Nor does going it alone, or being in the minority, mean that the United States position necessarily is in error, but it does caution against demonizing foreign approaches or relentlessly searching to transplant U.S. approaches into very different societies. \u0000 \u0000This article surveys several significant areas of antitrust law and policy where United States law, procedure, institutions, and remedies differ significantly from the rest of the world. The basic thesis of the article that the growing isolation of U.S. antitrust law is more than just a transatlantic divide. Rather, much of the global community understands U.S. antitrust law and policy, but has rejected its current narrow form in favor of a broader vision of what competition law means, what legal rules are appropriate, and how they should be enforced. Even in areas such as mergers and cartels, outward convergence often masks critically diff","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"274 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114372563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Lamentable Rise of an Expanded Essential Facilities Doctrine in Canada: The Troubling Economic Foundations of the Toronto Real Estate Board Decision 加拿大扩大基本设施原则的可悲崛起:多伦多房地产委员会决定的令人不安的经济基础
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3293028
Jeffrey Church
{"title":"The Lamentable Rise of an Expanded Essential Facilities Doctrine in Canada: The Troubling Economic Foundations of the Toronto Real Estate Board Decision","authors":"Jeffrey Church","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3293028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3293028","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents the successful, if lamentable, rise of a made-in-Canada essential facilities doctrine. This made-in-Canada essential facilities doctrine is a consequence of recent enforcement of the abuse of dominance provisions of the Competition Act in the Toronto Real Estate Board case. The analysis in this paper finds that the rise of the made-in-Canada essential facilities doctrine is one implication of the developing jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Competition Tribunal with respect to all three of the elements required for a finding of abuse of dominance: control, practice of anticompetitive acts, and a substantial prevention or lessening of competition. This paper explains the error made in the Toronto Real Estate Board case for all three of these required elements and how they combine to result in the made-in-Canada essential facilities case. The policy and economic incoherence of this made-in-Canada essential facilities doctrine are fully manifested in the current abuse of dominance case against the Vancouver Airport Authority. This paper explains that this made-in-Canada essential facilities doctrine is inconsistent with the economics of vertical foreclosure and the economic foundations of the abuse of dominance provisions in the Competition Act. The problem in both of these cases is not conduct that creates, enhances, or maintains market power, but instead exclusion downstream is possible because of market power upstream and it may enhance efficiency.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129457165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two-Sided Pickled Rollmops 双面泡卷糕
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3292535
Adriaan ten Kate
{"title":"Two-Sided Pickled Rollmops","authors":"Adriaan ten Kate","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3292535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3292535","url":null,"abstract":"This brief note is a reply to the paper Two-sided Red Herrrings by Evans and Schmalensee (E&S), in which they denounce attempts by commentators in the American Express case to marginalize the findings of the literature on multi-sided platforms. In my view E&S are right in most of their judgements, but at least two of the five red herrings identified in the paper are somewhat less red than E&S make them out to be. Rephrasing the herrings in a slightly different way is enough to turn them into pickled rollmops.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"90 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123172918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Regulation of Personalised Pricing in the Digital Era 数字时代的个性化定价调控
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3312158
M. Bourreau, Alexandre de Streel
{"title":"The Regulation of Personalised Pricing in the Digital Era","authors":"M. Bourreau, Alexandre de Streel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3312158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3312158","url":null,"abstract":"The paper reviews the different legal tools to regulate the personalised pricing and provide some policy recommendations in that regard. Section 1 provides a definition of the personalsied prices and analyses to which extend firms are currently personalising their practices. Section 2 deals with the impacts of personalised pricing on firms’ profits and economic welfare. Section 3 reviews and compares the different legal tools which regulate at the EU level the personalised pricing: consumer protection, data protection, competition policy and anti-discrimination rules. Finally section 4 concludes with policy recommendations to improve the relevance and the effectiveness of those legal tools.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114193038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Quantitative Agreements in After Sales Services Market – A Hot Topic Once Again 售后服务市场的定量协议——再一次成为热门话题
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3285136
Şahin Ardıyok, Evren Sesli
{"title":"Quantitative Agreements in After Sales Services Market – A Hot Topic Once Again","authors":"Şahin Ardıyok, Evren Sesli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3285136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3285136","url":null,"abstract":"With the introduction of the Regulation on Vertical Agreements in the Motor Vehicle Sector (Regulation no 2017/3) in February 2017, the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) differentiated its approach to the distribution agreements in relation to new motor vehicle sales markets and after sales services markets. Different from the previous regulation, the TCA adopted a more flexible attitude in the assessment of distribution agreements in the new motor vehicle sales market, while preserving its relatively strict point of view in the after sales services market in accordance with EU regulations. Moreover, the TCA declared a single 30 percent market share threshold for both the sales market and the after sales services markets in Regulation no 2017/3, which abandoned the separate thresholds system implemented during the previous regulation period.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129274630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly Strategy 合作企业作为一种反垄断战略
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-06 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3279629
Sandeep Vaheesan, Nathan Schneider
{"title":"Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly Strategy","authors":"Sandeep Vaheesan, Nathan Schneider","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3279629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3279629","url":null,"abstract":"After decades of neglect, antitrust is once again a topic of public debate. Proponents of reviving antitrust have called for abandoning the narrow consumer welfare model and embracing a broader set of objectives. One essential element that has been overlooked thus far is the ownership structure of the firm itself. The dominant model of investor-owned business and associated philosophy of shareholder wealth maximization exacerbate the pernicious effects of market power. In contrast, cooperative ownership models can mitigate the effects of monopoly and oligopoly and advance the interests of consumers, workers, small business owners, and citizens. The promotion of competition among large firms should be paired with support for democratic cooperation within firms. \u0000 \u0000Antitrust law has had a complicated history and relationship with cooperative enterprise. Corporations threatened by cooperatives have used the antitrust laws to frustrate the growth of these alternative businesses. To insulate cooperatives from the antitrust threat, Congress has enacted exemptions to protect cooperative entities, notably a general immunity for farm cooperatives in the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act. As part of an agenda to tame corporate monopoly, all three branches of the federal government and the states should revisit these ideas and seek to protect and enable the cooperative model across the economy. While protections that farmers fought for a century ago may seem obsolete in an era of big-box retail and online platforms, matters of ownership design have at least as much relevance today and should be a part of the antimonopoly arsenal.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125961921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Relevance of Supply-Side Substitutability for ‘Big Data’ 供给侧可替代性与“大数据”的相关性
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3254088
Georg Clemens, Mutlu Özcan
{"title":"The Relevance of Supply-Side Substitutability for ‘Big Data’","authors":"Georg Clemens, Mutlu Özcan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3254088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3254088","url":null,"abstract":"Cet article souligne l'importance de prendre en consideration la substitution du cote de l'offre dans l'evaluation des fusions sur les marches axes sur les donnees. Notre analyse de trois decisions de…","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133651318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Variation in Bid-Rigging Cartels’ Overcharges: An Exploratory Study 串通投标卡特尔超额收费的变异:一个探索性研究
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-10-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3273988
J. Connor, Dan Werner
{"title":"Variation in Bid-Rigging Cartels’ Overcharges: An Exploratory Study","authors":"J. Connor, Dan Werner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3273988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3273988","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical examinations into the determinants of cartel overcharges are limited in the economic literature on collusion. We review the literature and perform a meta-analysis model of overcharges using data on 112 contemporary, penalized bid-rigging episodes over 27 years. We find that the price effects of bidding rings, controlling for industry fixed effects, are affected by buyer market concentration, seller industry concentration, and two temporal features (episodic duration and recessions during collusion).","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129817212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Competition Policy, Trade and the Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges and Issues for Reflection 竞争政策、贸易与全球经济:现有WTO要素、区域贸易协定中的承诺、当前挑战与反思问题
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-10-21 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3321116
Robert D. Anderson, William E. Kovacic, Anna Caroline Müller, N. Sporysheva
{"title":"Competition Policy, Trade and the Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges and Issues for Reflection","authors":"Robert D. Anderson, William E. Kovacic, Anna Caroline Müller, N. Sporysheva","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3321116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3321116","url":null,"abstract":"Competition policy, today, is an essential element of the legal and institutional framework for the global economy. Whereas decades ago, anti-competitive practices tended to be viewed mainly as a domestic phenomenon, most facets of competition law enforcement now have an important international dimension. Examples include: the investigation and prosecution of price fixing and market sharing arrangements that often spill across national borders and, in important instances, encircle the globe; multiple recent, prominent cases of abuses of a dominant position in high-tech network industries; important current cases involving transnational energy markets; and major corporate mergers that often need to be simultaneously reviewed by multiple jurisdictions. Beyond competition law enforcement per se, increasingly, major issues of competition policy (e.g., the impact on competition of the structure and scope of intellectual property rights or the role of state-owned enterprises) implicate the interests of multiple jurisdictions. [...]","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133800009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
ICLE Comments, The Regulation of Consumer Data ICLE评论,消费者数据的管理
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2018-10-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3384398
Dirk Auer, J. Hurwitz, Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris, Kristian Stout
{"title":"ICLE Comments, The Regulation of Consumer Data","authors":"Dirk Auer, J. Hurwitz, Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris, Kristian Stout","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3384398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3384398","url":null,"abstract":"These comments were submitted to the FTC as part of its hearings on “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century.” In these comments, we analyze three overarching topics relevant for the regulation of data: (1) The role of privacy as an element of non-price competition; (2) The potential privacy harms that could arise from price discrimination; and (3) How, if at all, data possession could serve as a barrier to entry.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128744524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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