{"title":"FRAND and Antitrust","authors":"Herbert Hovenkamp","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3420925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3420925","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers when a patentee’s violation of a FRAND commitment also violates the antitrust laws. It warns against two extremes. First is thinking that any violation of a FRAND obligation is an antitrust violation as well. FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate antitrust law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust violation. \u0000 \u0000As the Supreme Court has made clear many times, every antitrust case must consider the market environment in which conduct is evaluated. SSOs operated by multiple firms are joint ventures. Antitrust’s role is to evaluate how challenged restraints operate within the venture and condemn unreasonably anticompetitive practices. The district court and Ninth Circuit’s approaches in the Qualcomm litigation illustrate one court that did that and one that did not. \u0000 \u0000The Ninth Circuit also held that conduct should be tested by its harm to rivals, not to consumers. That conclusion conflicts with decades of antitrust jurisprudence. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires an agreement that threatens to reduce market output, thereby raising prices. For exclusionary practices the immediate target of anticompetitive conduct is rivals, but the ultimate harm is suffered by consumers. \u0000 \u0000The antitrust issue of unilateral refusals to deal is too often confused with the essential facility doctrine. The essential facility doctrine is based on the idea that some assets are so essential to commerce that the owner has a duty to share them. By contrast, the refusal to deal rule is rooted in a specific prior contractual obligation, reliance and path dependence, and subsequent repudiation. Many joint ventures involve a significant sunk investment in assets that are dedicated to the venture. If one firm can later extract itself and commandeer the relevant technology, it can leave the remaining firms at a significant competitive disadvantage, with the effect of transferring market share, reducing output, raising prices, and ultimately undermining the competitive promise of such ventures. While the essential facility doctrine is conducive to competitor passivity, the Aspen refusal to deal rule facilitates competitor investment. \u0000 \u0000The debate over “holdup” or “holdout” in standard setting organizations has occasional antitrust relevance. Holdout occurs when implementers conspire to exclude patentees or suppress royalties. But the structure and membership of the SSOs that employ FRAND make that explanation highly unlikely. Standard essential patents are largely self-declared and significantly over declared, so the holdout story posits victims flocking to a cartel rather than seeking to avoid it. In addition, “holdout” hypothesizes agreements to force patentees to accept infra-market royalties, but FRAND royalties are determined post-commitment by independent tribunals, and there is no evidence of systematic undercompensation. \u0000 \u0000Fi","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114429770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy - And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It","authors":"E. Elhauge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3293822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3293822","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical evidence that horizontal shareholding has created anticompetitive effects in airline and banking markets have produced calls for antitrust enforcement. In response, others have critiqued the airline and banking studies and argued that antitrust law cannot tackle any anticompetitive effects from horizontal shareholding. I show that new economic proofs and empirical evidence, ranging far beyond the airline and banking studies, show that horizontal shareholding in concentrated markets often has anticompetitive effects. I also provide new analysis demonstrating that critiques of the airline and banking market-level studies either conflict with the evidence or, when taken into account, increase the estimated adverse price effects from horizontal shareholding. Finally, I provide new legal theories for tackling the problem of horizontal shareholding. I show that when horizontal shareholding has anticompetitive effects, it is illegal not only under Clayton Act §7, but also under Sherman Act §1. In fact, the historic trusts that were the core target of antitrust law were horizontal shareholders. I further show that anticompetitive horizontal shareholding also constitutes an illegal agreement or concerted practice under EU Treaty Article 101, as well as an abuse of collective dominance under Article 102. I conclude by showing that horizontal shareholding not only lessens the market concentration that traditional merger law can tolerate, but also means that what otherwise seem like non-horizontal mergers should often be treated as horizontal. Those implications for traditional merger analysis become even stronger if we fail to tackle horizontal shareholding directly.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133070103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Возможности и риски международной антимонопольной политики на современном этапе (Opportunities and Risks of International Antitrust Policy at the Present Stage)","authors":"Alexander Kurdin, A. Morozov, Anastasia Shpakova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3619109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3619109","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В работе оцениваются перспективы развития международной антимонопольной политики в условиях растущей важности глобальных рынков при сохранении неизбежного перераспределительного конфликта между участниками этих рынков, усугубляющегося серьезными противоречиями между ведущими государствами и новыми технологическими вызовами цифровой экономики. Работа содержит анализ конкретных антимонопольных дел, требующих рассмотрения в международном контексте, а также исследование имеющейся практики наднационального антитраста с точки зрения распределения полномочий между национальными и наднациональными органами. Авторы предлагают новую классификацию режимов международного антитраста с учетом интересов и институциональных ограничений национальных и наднациональных регуляторов.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The paper assesses the prospects for the development of international antitrust policy in the context of the growing importance of global markets while maintaining the inevitable redistributive conflict between participants in these markets, exacerbated by serious contradictions between leading states and the new technological challenges of the digital economy. The work contains an analysis of specific antitrust cases that require consideration in an international context, as well as a study of the existing practice of supranational antitrust in terms of the distribution of powers between national and supranational bodies. The authors propose a new classification of international antitrust regimes, taking into account the interests and institutional limitations of national and supranational regulators.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127369800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Antitrust and the Corporate Tax: A Missed Opportunity?","authors":"R. Avi-Yonah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3549006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3549006","url":null,"abstract":"Big Tech have clearly become for early 21st century America what Standard Oil, U.S. Steel, and the railroads were to early 20th century America: The embodiment of corporate power that enjoys a near monopoly on an important segment of economic activity. In response, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) has proposed to treat the Big Tech as common carriers (forbidding them from selling their own goods and services on their platforms) and force them to dispose of their recent anti-competitive acquisitions. There may, however, be another way of reining in the power of the Big Techs that is less drastic than breaking them up, and may be a helpful complement to antitrust enforcement. This way derives from the other early 20th century innovation that was intended in 1909 to curb the power of the monopolies: The corporate tax. The corporate tax can limit corporate power in three ways. First, even a low rate corporate tax requires corporations to provide the government with detailed information about their activities that is hard to obtain without a corporate tax (e.g., it forces them to calculate profits per taxing jurisdiction, which they may not otherwise do). Second, potentially the corporate tax, like any tax, involves the power to destroy if the rate is high enough. The knowledge that this could happen may limit the aggressiveness of corporate management (i.e., in the case of the Big Techs, their founders). Third and most important, the corporate tax can be used as a regulatory device, with the effective rate being raised or lowered either for specific desirable or undesirable activities (e.g., maintaining or compromising privacy) or in response to an overall corporate social responsibility score. I believe that corporate taxation may be a useful complement to antitrust enforcement in curbing the power of the Big Techs. However, the original corporate tax may no longer have the necessary tools to do so. That is because of changes enacted in the period between the end of World War I and the Great Depression that have gradually weakened the original anti-monopolization power of the corporate tax. This paper suggests that a sharply progressive corporate tax may play a role in limiting monopolization.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132745926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Conundrum of Common Ownership","authors":"Jennifer G. Hill","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3546886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3546886","url":null,"abstract":"The common ownership debate has become one of the most contentious issues in corporate law today. This debate is a by-product of major changes to capital market ownership structure, which have triggered concerns about the rise of institutional investors, the growth of index investing, and the rapid concentration of ownership in major international financial markets. \u0000 \u0000Common ownership theory focuses on concerns about the incentives of large financial institutions holding widely diversified portfolios of shares in competing companies within a particular economic sector. Proponents of the common ownership theory argue that, even where institutional investors have relatively small ownership stakes, their collective holdings in competing companies produce anticompetitive effects. Other scholars, however, have challenged both common ownership theory and its regulatory prescriptions. Although common ownership theory began in the United States, it is now being discussed around the world. \u0000 \u0000This article examines three conflicting narratives that emerge in this literature concerning institutional investors and common ownership theory. The article seeks to position these narratives within the context of the rising influence of institutional investors since the early 1990s and its relation to major international corporate governance developments. It analyzes aspects of common ownership theory in light of these contemporary corporate governance developments, and argues that drawing regulatory and policy conclusions from the current body of conflicting empirical findings on the effects of common ownership is premature.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127080736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Die Digitalisierung der Missbrauchsaufsicht durch das „GWB-Digitalisierungsgesetz“ im Spannungsfeld von moderater Anpassung und Überregulierung (Digitalisation of the Provisions against the Abuse of Market Power by the ‘GWB-Digitalisierungsgesetz’ (Arc Digitalisation Law) between Moderate Improvemen","authors":"Torsten Körber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3543719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3543719","url":null,"abstract":"Digitalisation of the provisions against the abuse of market power by the \"GWB-Digitalisierungsgesetz\" (ARC digitalisation law) between moderate improvement and overregulation \u0000 \u0000The paper elaborates on the proposed changes to the provisions against the abuse of a dominant position in German competition law (draft 10th amendment to the ARC of Jan 24, 2020) with regard to the digital economy. It critizises the shortcomings of the draft and makes suggestions for improvements. The paper is based upon an expert opinion for Facebook.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124854080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards a Layered Approach to Relevant Markets in Multi-Sided Transaction Platforms","authors":"Caio Mario da Silva Pereira Neto, F. Lancieri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3408221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3408221","url":null,"abstract":"The American Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. American Express (AMEX) will shape the future of US antitrust enforcement on multi-sided platforms. In a controversial landmark ruling, both the Court’s majority and minority battled over definitions of relevant markets in the complex industry of electronic payments: the majority affirming that “transaction platforms” always constitute a single “two-sided relevant market” and the minority arguing that electronic payments are regular complementary goods subject to traditional “one-sided” analysis. This article challenges both views and proposes a novel, multi-layered approach to define relevant markets in multi-sided transaction platforms, one that focuses on how indirect network effects shape the competitive constraints faced by the multiple firms operating within and across such platforms. This approach acknowledges the importance of indirect network effects in multi-sided markets, but also stresses how, depending on the structure of the platform, these effects vary in intensity and may not effectively limit a firm’s ability to raise prices on a single side of the platform. This insight allows for the separation between one-sided and two-sided transaction markets, so that even transaction platforms may allow for the definition of multiple layers of competition—a proposition that helps bridge the divide between the majority and minority opinions in AMEX and in scholarship more generally. The article then discusses the rich international experience of the EU and Brazil in the application of competition law to of electronic payments’ markets as examples of cases where authorities sometimes correctly applied and sometimes fell short of this multi-layered view. Building on these insights, the article develops a framework to define relevant markets in cases involving transaction platforms, providing guidelines for scholars and policymakers faced with this difficult task. This framework allows lower courts and private parties to comprehend when a narrower interpretation of AMEX should be the ruling precedent, increasing legal certainty. The article concludes by outlining the applicability of this layered approach to a variety of markets commonly found in today’s digital economy, such as marketplaces, booking apps and mobility apps.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"147 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123369710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Recommendations and Thoughts on EDM and Merger Specificity","authors":"Koren W. Wong-Ervin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3523652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3523652","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers the following recommendations, focusing on #3 and 6: 1. Specifics on how the Agencies will implement the principles set forth in the Guidelines. The Guidelines state throughout that the Agencies “may consider�? certain factors; this language should be revised to say “will�? or “usually will�? consider. 2. An explicit recognition that empirical evidence indicates that vertical mergers are generally procompetitive or benign and, as the Agencies have previously stated, “vertical mergers merit a stronger presumption of being efficient than do horizontal mergers.�? 3. A clear statement that the government has the burden on EDM given that such calculations are part of the math of the raising rivals costs (RRC) argument and the two cannot be analyzed in isolation before evaluating their net effect. In other words, EDM can prevent RRC, not just net it out. The prima facie case should not, however, extend to netting the two out, but rather to showing that the merger is likely to result in RRC. 4. An explicit statement that the relevant inquiry for RRC is the effect on downstream competition and that raising the cost of an upstream input with no downstream effects does not warrant intervention. While examples in the Guidelines seem to suggest that the Agencies will follow this principle, an explicit statement would be helpful. 5. Explicitly requiring both the incentive and the ability to engage in anticompetitive conduct given that, without the ability there can be no harm, and lack of incentives is a strong indication that there are legitimate business reasons for the deal. 6. A recognition of the coordination problem presented by vertical dealing and that achieving EDM (and other efficiencies) through contracting presents challenges given the costly process of forming, administering, and enforcing contracts with independent suppliers. 7. Replacing the 20% market-share language with a clear safe harbor and increasing the relevant market share threshold (but not necessarily the “related product�? threshold) from 20% to at least 30%.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124707400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Maier-Rigaud, C.-Philipp Heller, Slobodan Sudaric
{"title":"A Primer on Pass-on","authors":"F. Maier-Rigaud, C.-Philipp Heller, Slobodan Sudaric","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3557361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3557361","url":null,"abstract":"The quantification of damage due to price overcharges necessarily involves the estimation of pass-on. This paper clarifies that pass-on is simply another way of describing the optimal reaction of firms to changes in their environment. It also addresses common misconceptions about a firms’ ability to pass-on changes in cost and the magnitude at which price adjustments take place both in an unregulated and in a regulated context.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126952751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Indispensability and Abuse of Dominance: From Commercial Solvents to Slovak Telekom and Google Shopping","authors":"Pablo Ibáñez Colomo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3502519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3502519","url":null,"abstract":"Evidence that an input or platform is indispensable is sometimes required to establish an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU; the circumstances in which this condition is required are not clear. \u0000 \u0000A systematic analysis of the case law suggests that indispensability is required where intervention (i) would be structural and/or (ii) would amount to prescribing the terms and conditions of access to an input or platform (‘proactive intervention’). \u0000 \u0000The analysis of the case law is useful to shed light on the controversies around recent cases, such as Google Shopping and Slovak Telekom, and ongoing investigations by the European Commission.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127142605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}