Christopher Townley, Mariana Tavares, Mattia Guidi
{"title":"Influence in the International Competition Network (Icn): Who Seeks It, How Do They Do This and Why?","authors":"Christopher Townley, Mariana Tavares, Mattia Guidi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3415067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3415067","url":null,"abstract":"It “…is an important and growing…” phenomenon that businesses, and their manufacturing and distribution chains, often affect several countries. The same applies to anti-competitive arrangements that they adopt. Private barriers to market access are increasingly obvious as the public ones fall. More than 120 legal systems now have competition rules; this number exploded in the 1990s, accompanied by the establishment of competition agencies worldwide. This can create a bewildering array of substantive and procedural competition rules for businesses to follow. This has costs, in terms of a loss of efficiency, for companies operating across different countries. It can also have benefits from a democratic and public interest perspective, as each jurisdiction can (try to) protect the values that it holds dear. \u0000 \u0000Jurisdictions have sought influence through extra-territorial application of their competition rules. Another approach is to develop hard and/or soft international rules. Sometimes this happened through bilateral discussions, such as between the US and the EU in the 1990s. There were also several (unsuccessful) attempts to develop international competition ‘laws’; for example, the EU inspired effort to introduce competition rules into the WTO. Many international organisations have entered the competition arena (such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)) too. However, each had limitations. For example, the OECD did not include many countries with competition laws; and UNCTAD was seen as producing work that is too vague and pitched at the lowest common denominator. These initiatives encouraged dialogue between competition authorities (NCAs), but they were not always sufficient to remove tensions; think of the aborted mergers of GE/ Honeywell or Boeing/ McDonnell Douglas. Although infrequent, such tensions were high profile. \u0000 \u0000In 1997, the US Attorney General established a committee, the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC), to pay particular attention to three things: \u0000 \u0000“…multijurisdictional merger review; the interface of trade and competition issues; and future directions in enforcement co-operation between US antitrust authorities and their counterparts around the world…” \u0000 \u0000ICPAC delivered its report in February 2000. It sought to provide an environment conducive to the expansion of international trade, to be tolerant to different nations, and to enhance world welfare. Having said that, as one might expect from a US report, it also sought to remove barriers to market access stemming from anti-competitive private barriers to trade. To do this, it advised pushing nations to apply their competition rules in a non-discriminatory manner, to not apply non-competition factors in merger review (with limited exceptions), and to establish independent NCAs. This advice is likely indirectly discriminatory in favour of major firms ","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"196 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121743841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Application of Current Antitrust Law to Explicit Collusion by Autonomously Acting Pricing Algorithms","authors":"Ina Fey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3526100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3526100","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to answer the question whether the current (EU) antitrust law is well-equipped to deal with explicit collusion by pricing algorithms that act independently from the companies using them. The paper unfolds in three main parts: first, it outlines the exact circumstances of the later discussed scenario and the differentiation to other ways in which algorithms can be related to infringements of antitrust law. Then it investigates whether the use of algorithms specified in the first part falls under the scope of antitrust law in general, that is whether the term 'agreement' according to Art. 101 (1) TFEU is applicable to independently acting algorithms or whether any other tool of current antitrust law (here: concerted practices) enables for the application of Art. 101 (1) TFEU to algorithmic price-setting. Finally, it assesses if the company using the algorithm can be held responsible for any breach of antitrust law that the algorithm is engaged in. It does so by applying the concept of attribution of liability for acts of employees to the employing firm. My hypothesis is that there is no fundamental difference between the conduct of deep learning algorithms and human employees and that as a result the same principles of attribution of liability to firms can be applied.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"258 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125996424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Harmful Signals - Cartel Prohibition and Oligopoly Theory in the Age of Machine Learning","authors":"Stefan Thomas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3392860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392860","url":null,"abstract":"The classical legal approach for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct is to rely on proxies, such as elements of “practical cooperation”, on “plus factors”, or on the finding of an anticompetitive intent among rival firms. These criteria ultimately relate to the inner sphere of natural persons and its emanations in communicative acts. Some authors therefore conclude that the cartel prohibition of Article 101 TFEU or Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman Act are unable to capture collusion if it is achieved by autonomously acting computers relying on machine learning capabilities. It is instead suggested here to define collusion as parallel informational signals, which achieve a supracompetitive equilibrium, and to use the consumer welfare standard as a proxy for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct. This approach is not tantamount to the idea of prohibiting tacit collusion as such. Rather, it is to check singular elements of communication, i.e. “informational signals”, within an existing oligopolistic setting for their propensity to create a consumer harm. This approach can help to close potential regulatory gaps currently associated with the surge of algorithmic pricing.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"162 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129150216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly","authors":"Gyula Seres","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3373560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3373560","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers dynamic pricing strategies in a durable good monopoly model with uncertain commitment power to set price paths. The type of the monopolist is private information of the firm and not observable to consumers. If commitment to future prices is not possible, the initial price is high in equilibrium, but the firm falls prey to the Coase conjecture later to capture the residual demand. The relative price cut is increasing in the probability of commitment as buyers anticipate that a steady price is likely and purchase early. Pooling in prices may occur for perpetuity if commitment is suciently weak. Polling for innity is also preserved if committing to a high price is endogenously chosen by the firm.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131684499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Data, Innovation and Transatlantic Competition in Finance: The Case of the Access to Account Rule","authors":"G. Colangelo, O. Borgogno","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3251584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3251584","url":null,"abstract":"Technological innovation is transforming the structure of the retail banking sector. Traditional business models are facing a rapid disruption process led by the emergence of FinTech companies which provide innovative digitally-enabled banking and financial services. In order to offer payment initiation services and account information services, third party providers need to access customer accounts, since information on the availability of funds on the consumer’s payment account is a key element.The paper focuses on two major trends that underpin this new business environment, which is known as Open Banking. First, the EU has taken the lead in the transition by providing, within the revised Payment Service Directive (PSD2), a sector-specific portability regime (the access to account rule) expressly aimed at fostering competition. Indeed, one of the key points of the PSD2 is that new market players should be granted access to account data. Second, in such a context standardization plays a crucial role with regards to the implementation process and the overall effectiveness of this new pro-competitive mechanism. Regulators in other countries have recently expressed interest in developing frameworks that put consumers in control of their account data. Additionally, they have encouraged standardization initiatives aimed at defining shared, open application programming interfaces (APIs). Will regulators in the U.S. follow suit?","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124821793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"White Paper: Antitrust Analysis of NOPEC Legislation","authors":"H. First, D. Bush","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3376125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3376125","url":null,"abstract":"This White Paper analyzes the proposed “No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2019” (NOPEC). This legislation, which has been introduced in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, addresses the antitrust issues involved in allowing the Department of Justice to sue the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), their member states, their state owned oil companies (SOEs), nonmember states and their SOEs, and private companies for their participation in an international cartel that has long been involved in regulating the production and distribution of oil and other petroleum products. \u0000 \u0000The White Paper begins with a background discussion of the participants in the oil cartel. The paper then describes in detail the proposed legislation. The paper discusses how prior suits against OPEC have failed as courts have applied several substantive law doctrines — comity, Act of State, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act — as well as rules on service of process under the Federal Rules of Civil procedure, to turn away the four private cases that have been filed. The paper then addresses how NOPEC is directed at removing the substantive defenses that have blocked the private party litigation and that might block litigation filed by the Justice Department. The bill removes the substantive law blocks, although an issue might remain if the Department brings a criminal prosecution, but NOPEC does not address the procedural issue of service of process. The White Paper concludes that NOPEC is an important part of a worldwide effort to stop international cartels that harm consumers and reduce economic welfare.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116440294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predictive Analytics","authors":"Daryl Lim","doi":"10.1002/9780470417409.ch4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470417409.ch4","url":null,"abstract":"“Predictive Analytics” blends the latest research in behavioral economics with artificial intelligence to address one of the most important legal questions at the heart of intellectual property law and antitrust law – how do courts and agencies make judgments about innovation and competition policies? How can they better predict the consequences of intervention or non-intervention?<br><br>The premise of this Article is that we should not continue to build doctrine at the IP-antitrust on theoretical neoclassical assumptions alone but also on the reality of markets using all that AI has to offer us. Behavioral economics and AI do not replace traditional antitrust analysis. Rather they are complements and imbue antitrust law with continuing durability. <br><br>Predicting competitive effects is difficult and we need tools to predict outcomes as precisely and reliably as possible. Until now, antitrust law has only been able to operate before a veil of assumptions and rhetoric. Stakeholders have only been able to think about whether and how to intervene in the exercise of IP rights, particularly patent rights, in the broadest terms since even the smallest perturbations in a complicated set of variables can set off ripples that lead to dramatically divergent outcomes. Facts have always mattered in antitrust law, and a more expansive toolkit can only increase our likelihood of getting it right.<br><br>Behavioral economics sheds light on anticompetitive conduct that neoclassical antitrust may regard as irrational and therefore improbable. Once we recognize that it is rational and probable, we need to quantify and value the effects of the conduct. To do this, we need to employ more of the analogical reasoning intrinsic in antitrust law. For that, predictive analytics is very good in helping stakeholders with pattern recognition and simulation runs. This brings us closer to being able to ascribe value which human judgment can be brought to bear. In these, AI provides stakeholders with augmented capabilities to confront the computational challenges these tasks require. <br>","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"416 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116082206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Revisiting Frank H. Knight's 'The Ethics of Competition'","authors":"Ross B. Emmett","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3366596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3366596","url":null,"abstract":"James M. Buchanan revisited his mentor’s famous 1923 essay “The Ethics of Competition” in an essay written for the centenary celebration of Frank Knight’s birth in 1985. Buchanan’s paper focused on the first section of Knight’s essay, and outlined why it provided an inadequate criticism of a competitive market economy. Essentially, the essay was flawed by what Buchanan understood to be a methodological ambiguity which formed the basis for Knight’s ethical critique. A year later, in Buchanan’s Nobel Lecture, he made no reference to Knight, despite have widely acknowledged in other ways his general indebtedness to Knight’s appreciation for competitive markets in forming his own approach to public choice. After reviewing the structure of Buchanan’s criticism, the paper turns to examine what Knight did with his views on ethics, economics, and social/political organization after the mid-1920s. Knight’s Weberian turn led him to abandon the “successive approximation” method he had argued in favor of in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921), and instead seek an economics that provided general insights from an ideal type analysis of market interaction, combined with a) a comparative social and political institutional analysis; and b) a comparative study of ethical systems to evaluate which was appropriate to the problems of a liberal, democratic society. At the end, a brief look at Buchanan’s movement toward Knight on methodological issues after his Nobel Lecture is examined. Buchanan’s changes come from a new appreciation for increasing cost and social ideas and norms, as well as his growing appreciation for Knight’s notion of democracy as “government by discussion.”","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"92 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125974041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Autonomous Algorithmic Collusion: Q-Learning Under Sequential Pricing","authors":"Timo Klein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3195812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3195812","url":null,"abstract":"A recent and prominent concern is that intelligent, self-learning pricing algorithms may learn to tacitly collude. To date the debate is mostly based on intuition only. We show in a simulated environment of sequential competition that Q-learning (a simple and well-established reinforcement learning algorithm) can indeed collude on supra-competitive fixed-price equilibria -- at least when the number of discrete prices is limited. When the number of discrete prices increases, Q-learning increasingly converges to profitable asymmetric price cycles. We show that results are robust to various extensions and identify and discuss existing practical limitations.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126700463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Framework for the Experimental Research on Cartel Deterrence Through Leniency and Whistleblowing Programmes","authors":"Christopher Spaeth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3356925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3356925","url":null,"abstract":"Die deutsche Version des Papers ist abrufbar unter: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3337826 So far, leniency programmes have been widely used to combat cartels. A company participating in the cartel gets a reduction of its fine for the initial notification of the Antitrust Authorities (AA). The emerging trust problem and the increased attractiveness for a specific company to deviate from the cartel agreements are intended to effectively deter cartels. The introduction of an incentive-based whistleblowing programme for individuals could be another important contribution to the effective deterrence of cartels. The experimental design which is presented here serves to analyse such a whistleblowing programme and its interaction with a corporate leniency programme. The variation of the design regarding reductions in penalties and the interaction of the two measures makes it possible to examine in which cases deterrence of cartels can be achieved. Ultimately, these are fundamental findings which can serve as a basis for a criminal policy decision.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127003679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}