Logic and Logical Philosophy最新文献_第10页

The Therapeutic vs. Constructive Approach to the Transformative Character of Collective Intentionality. The Interpersonal Level of Explanation 集体意向转化特征的治疗与建构方法。解释的人际层面

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-02-19 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2020.004

D. Żuromski

{"title":"The Therapeutic vs. Constructive Approach to the Transformative Character of Collective Intentionality. The Interpersonal Level of Explanation","authors":"D. Żuromski","doi":"10.12775/llp.2020.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2020.004","url":null,"abstract":"In their article, Andrea Kern and Henrike Moll (2017) argue in support of a certain vision of shared/collective intentionality and its role in understanding our cognitive capacities. This vision is based on two aspects: a negative one, i.e. a theoretical diagnosis of the contemporary debate on shared/collective intentionality, and a positive one, referring to the proposals for shared/collective intentionality. As regards the negative aspect, the main thesis concerns the arbitrary assumptions underlying the whole debate on shared/collective intentionality. According to Kern and Moll (2017), this assumption prevents us from capturing the transformative character of shared/collective intentionality and therefore the uniqueness of the human being. This paper is not so much a detailed criticism or discussion of said article, as rather an opportunity to formulate my own position in the colloquy with Kern and Mole’s position. This approach states that understanding the transformative character of SI/CI requires taking into account a broader approach to the constitution of the mind, in which, apart from the personal and the sub-personal level of explanation, there is also a third level of explanation  the interpersonal level of explanation. Thus understood, Received March 25, 2019. Revised December 12, 2019. Published online February 19, 2020 © 2020 by Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48374252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Incorrect Responses in First-Order False-Belief Tests: A Hybrid-Logical Formalization 一阶错误置信测试中的错误回答：一种混合逻辑形式化

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-02-17 DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2020.003

T. Braüner

{"title":"Incorrect Responses in First-Order False-Belief Tests: A Hybrid-Logical Formalization","authors":"T. Braüner","doi":"10.12775/LLP.2020.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2020.003","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper (Brauner, 2014) we were concerned with logical formalizations of the reasoning involved in giving correct responses to the psychological tests called the Sally-Anne test and the Smarties test, which test children’s ability to ascribe false beliefs to others. A key feature of the formal proofs given in that paper is that they explicitly formalize the perspective shift to another person that is required for figuring out the correct answers – you have to put yourself in another person’s shoes, so to speak, to give the correct answer. We shall in the present paper be concerned with what happens when answers are given that are not correct. The typical incorrect answers indicate that children failing false-belief tests have problems shifting to a perspective different from their own, to be more precise, they simply reason from their own perspective. Based on this hypothesis, we in the present paper give logical formalizations that in a systematic way model the typical incorrect answers. The remarkable fact that the incorrect answers can be derived using logically correct rules indicates that the origin of the mistakes does not lie in the children’s logical reasoning, but rather in a wrong interpretation of the task.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":"29 1","pages":"415-445"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47196962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Some Formal Semantics for Epistemic Modesty 认识现代的一些形式语义学

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-02-08 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2020.002

Christopher Steinsvold

引用次数: 1

A Realistic View on Normative Conflicts 规范冲突的现实观

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-02-04 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2020.001

Daniela Glavaničová, Matteo Pascucci

引用次数: 2

On the system CB1 and a lattice of the paraconsistent calculi 关于系统CB1和准一致性结石的一个格

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-12-02 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2019.035

J. Ciuciura

引用次数: 3

Twist-Valued Models for Three-Valued Paraconsistent Set Theory 三值副相容集合论的扭值模型

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-11-26 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2020.015

W. Carnielli, M. Coniglio

{"title":"Twist-Valued Models for Three-Valued Paraconsistent Set Theory","authors":"W. Carnielli, M. Coniglio","doi":"10.12775/llp.2020.015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2020.015","url":null,"abstract":"Boolean-valued models of set theory were independently introduced by Scott, Solovay and Vopv{e}nka in 1965, offering a natural and rich alternative for describing forcing. The original method was adapted by Takeuti, Titani, Kozawa and Ozawa to lattice-valued models of set theory. After this, L\"{o}we and Tarafder proposed a class of algebras based on a certain kind of implication which satisfy several axioms of ZF. From this class, they found a specific 3-valued model called PS3 which satisfies all the axioms of ZF, and can be expanded with a paraconsistent negation *, thus obtaining a paraconsistent model of ZF. The logic (PS3 ,*) coincides (up to language) with da Costa and D'Ottaviano logic J3, a 3-valued paraconsistent logic that have been proposed independently in the literature by several authors and with different motivations such as CluNs, LFI1 and MPT. We propose in this paper a family of algebraic models of ZFC based on LPT0, another linguistic variant of J3 introduced by us in 2016. The semantics of LPT0, as well as of its first-order version QLPT0, is given by twist structures defined over Boolean agebras. From this, it is possible to adapt the standard Boolean-valued models of (classical) ZFC to twist-valued models of an expansion of ZFC by adding a paraconsistent negation. We argue that the implication operator of LPT0 is more suitable for a paraconsistent set theory than the implication of PS3, since it allows for genuinely inconsistent sets w such that [(w = w)] = 1/2 . This implication is not a 'reasonable implication' as defined by L\"{o}we and Tarafder. This suggests that 'reasonable implication algebras' are just one way to define a paraconsistent set theory. Our twist-valued models are adapted to provide a class of twist-valued models for (PS3,*), thus generalizing L\"{o}we and Tarafder result. It is shown that they are in fact models of ZFC (not only of ZF).","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44895209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Mereology with super-supplemention axioms. A reconstruction of the unpublished manuscript of Jan F. Drewnowski 具有超级补充公理的纯粹论。简·F·德鲁诺夫斯基未出版手稿的重建

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-09-28 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2019.034

K. Świętorzecka, Marcin Łyczak

{"title":"Mereology with super-supplemention axioms. A reconstruction of the unpublished manuscript of Jan F. Drewnowski","authors":"K. Świętorzecka, Marcin Łyczak","doi":"10.12775/llp.2019.034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2019.034","url":null,"abstract":"We present a study of unpublished fragments of Jan F. Drewnowski’s manuscript from the years 1922–1928, which contains his own axiomatics for mereology. The sources are transcribed and two versions of mereology are reconstructed from them. The first one is given by Drewnowski. The second comes from Leśniewski and was known to Drewnowski from Leśniewski’s lectures. Drewnowski’s version is expressed in the language of ontology enriched with the primitive concept of a (proper) part, and its key axiom expresses the so-called weak super-supplementation principle, which was named by Drewnowski “the postulate of the existence of subtractions”. Leśniewski’s axiomatics with the primitive concept of an ingrediens contains the axiom expressing the strong super-supplementation principle. In both systems the collective class of objects from the range of a given non-empty concept is defined as the upper bound of that range. From a historical point of view it is interesting to notice that the presented version of Leśniewski’s axiomatics has not been published yet. The same applies to Drewnowski’s approach. We reconstruct the proof of the equivalence of these two systems. Finally, we discuss questions stemming from their equivalence in frame of elementary mereology formulated in a modern way.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47306675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Per Se Modality and Natural Implication – an Account of Connexive Logic in Robert Kilwardby 本质情态与自然蕴涵——罗伯特·基尔沃比对康涅西韦逻辑的一种阐释

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-09-12 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2019.033

S. Johnston

引用次数: 1

ω-circularity of Yablo's paradox Yablo悖论的ω-圆性

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-08-30 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2019.032

A. Cevik

引用次数: 1

On a multilattice analogue of a hypersequent S5 calculus 超序S5微积分的多格模拟

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Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-07-18 DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2019.031

Oleg M. Grigoriev, Y. Petrukhin

引用次数: 7