{"title":"Firm Heterogeneity and Trade in EU Countries: A Cross-Country Analysis","authors":"Claire Giordano, Paloma López-García","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3446774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3446774","url":null,"abstract":"Firms are heterogeneous, even within narrowly defined sectors. This paper surveys the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on firm heterogeneity and external trade. By innovatively exploiting rich cross-country micro-aggregated data sourced from the ECB Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet), this study then investigates the main implications of firm heterogeneity for trade of EU countries, showing a set of stylised facts. On the one hand, exporting firms are larger, more productive and pay higher wages than non-exporting firms. Only these firms are able to bear export costs, related to various factors, such as tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, the quality of the legal system or access to finance. Hence, only few enterprises actually export, and the intensity of aggregate export concentration within few large firms varies across countries and sectors. On the other hand, opening to trade boosts individual firms’ productivity growth, via a number of channels, and also enhances allocative efficiency across firms, in turn increasing aggregate productivity growth. One of the main standard determinants of export growth, namely changes in the real effective exchange rate, impacts aggregate performance differently across countries and sectors, depending on sectoral composition and on firm characteristics within a given sector JEL Classification: F14, L25","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123741776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rachel Allsopp, Guido Noto La Diega, Daria Onitiu, Samantha Rasiah, A. Thanaraj
{"title":"Digital Currencies: An Analysis of Its Present Regulation in the UK: A Collaborative Essay by NINSO, the Northumbria Internet & Society Research Interest Group","authors":"Rachel Allsopp, Guido Noto La Diega, Daria Onitiu, Samantha Rasiah, A. Thanaraj","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3406653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3406653","url":null,"abstract":"Digital currencies, whilst being an innovative payment method, poses several regulatory challenges in light of the possibilities to be used for a criminal purpose. This collaborative essay illustrates a brief report, which intends to provide for a general outlook on the UK’s effort in understanding the risks digital currencies pose to financial crime, money laundering, terrorist financing and cybercrime. This premise paves the way for ensuring the balance between protection of essential interests and innovation, most notably, in ensuring the implementation of the 5th Money Laundering Directive. The present contribution is prepared by the Northumbria Internet & Society Research Interest Group (NINSO). The NINSO group is multidisciplinary research group that shares research interests on technology and its significance in law, computer-science, social sciences, and engineering. Being interested in a holistic outlook of technological developments, it frequently organises seminars that aim to strengthen both, collaborations and the quality of academic research in this area.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121176736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Facebook’s Anticompetitive Lean in Strategies","authors":"Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, J. T. Llanos","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3400204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3400204","url":null,"abstract":"Facebook is under fire on several fronts and with good reason. Regulators strive to make sense of and address a plethora of seemingly unrelated issues that arise from the operation of its platform. These range from antitrust, privacy violations, dissemination of harmful content and speech, deception and polarisation to political manipulation. This paper identifies Facebook’s unrestricted and excessive data collection as a unifying theme that requires immediate antitrust action. Once a privacy-oriented social network, Facebook soon mutated into a surveillance machine designed to hoover people’s personal data to identify and understand people’s interests, preferences and emotions and turn that knowledge into profit through the sale of targeted ads. Since people’s innate preference for privacy stood in the way of Facebook’s growth, Facebook resorted to privacy intrusions and deception to access as much user data as possible, thereby gaining market power. Currently, its overwhelming dominant position in the social media market means that no matter how much data Facebook extracts from users, how transparent its information about its data processing practices is and how many privacy scandals ensue from its reckless handling of data, users have nowhere else to go. This paper provides a course of action to correct this unacceptable anticompetitive outcome. The imposition of unfair commercial terms on consumers, the distortion of the competitive process through privacy violations and misleading practices, the squeezing of news publishers’ traffic and foreclosure of actual and potential competitors by Facebook, can be stopped. A combination of data and consumer protection measures alone cannot stop Facebook’s actions, but antitrust enforcement can be used to curb Facebook’s ability to reinforce its data-driven abuse of its market power.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131872812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Individual Behaviour, Regulatory Liability, and a Company’s Exposure to Risk: The Deterrent Effect of Individual Sanctions in UK Competition Law","authors":"Samet Caliskan","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPZ018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPZ018","url":null,"abstract":"UK competition law authorities primarily target companies. Such a strategy exposes companies to the risk of liability and loss, and its lack of effectiveness in deterring anti-competitive behaviour has led to the introduction of individual sanctions, which were greatly expected to deter wrongdoing directors. They however have not achieved the desired deterrent effect on wrongdoing directors, since there have been few cases in which individuals have been targeted. This illustrates either that serious obstacles faced by UK competition law authorities in cracking down on individuals, or that there is considerable reluctance from both these authorities and the courts to enforce the tools and convict. In either scenario, companies are left with no option but to mitigate the risk arising from the anticompetitive behaviour of directors.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134535627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Treatise on the Theory of Regulatory Compliance","authors":"Richard Fiene","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3390451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3390451","url":null,"abstract":"This treatise provides some insights into certain assumptions related to regulatory compliance and the implications for regulatory researchers and policy-makers for the future development of rules and regulations. Once regulatory compliance decision making moves from requiring full compliance with all rules to a substantial regulatory compliance decision making approach, the measurement and monitoring systems employed to assess programs and facilities change dramatically.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125226269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Systemic Risk, Economic Policy Uncertainty and Firm Bankruptcies: Evidence from Multivariate Causal Inference","authors":"M. Stolbov, M. Shchepeleva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3502420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3502420","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper investigates causal relationships between systemic risk, economic policy uncertainty and firm bankruptcies, conditional on global volatility proxied by the VIX index, in a sample of 15 advanced and major emerging market economies during January 2008-June 2018. We test for Granger causality in time and frequency domains as well as dissect multivariate causal linkages in the dynamic complex system framework by applying a novel technique – convergent cross mapping ( Sugihara et al., 2012 ). Based on strictly coincident results from all the three approaches, we find that systemic risk causes firm exit in Spain, while in the UK and the Netherlands bankruptcies are triggered by economic policy uncertainty. In South Korea and the USA, the VIX index causes the firm shutdown. For the rest of the countries, the causality inference provides less robust evidence. We argue that the magnitude of deleveraging by banks with respect to the private nonfinancial sector, proxied by the volatility of credit-to-GDP gaps, shapes the presence or absence of causal impact by systemic risk, economic policy uncertainty or the VIX index on bankruptcies.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128515452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C.-Philipp Heller, Heiner Lindenlaub, Frank P. Maier-Rigaud
{"title":"Exclusionary Bundle Discounts: A Simple Model with two Applications","authors":"C.-Philipp Heller, Heiner Lindenlaub, Frank P. Maier-Rigaud","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3285887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3285887","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a simple theoretical model of exclusionary bundle discounts. Based on the model, we develop a screening test for exclusionary bundle discounts. This test only requires knowledge of prices and an estimate of the coverage of the bundle discount. We apply this test to the Vodafone/Liberty Global merger in Germany and find bundle discounts in the German broadband Internet access market consistent with exclusion. We finally use the model to simulate the merger's price effects.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123029227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francisco Gomez-Martinez, S. Onderstal, M. Schinkel
{"title":"Can Collusion Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence from the Lab","authors":"Francisco Gomez-Martinez, S. Onderstal, M. Schinkel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3383591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383591","url":null,"abstract":"Competition has been argued to erode socially responsible behavior in markets, suggesting that allowing cartel agreements among firms may promote public interest objectives. We test this idea in a laboratory experiment. Participants playing the role of firms choose between offering a OfairO and an OunfairO good to a consumer participant. When the unfair good is traded, a negative externality is imposed on a third party. We vary whether or not the firms are allowed to coordinate on the type of good they sell Ð while remaining in price competing. We find that the opportunity to coordinate leads to more coordinated equilibria, but has no significant impact on the fraction of fair goods traded on the market. Instead it polarizes: more of the same good, fair or unfair, is offered in coordination. Irrespective of whether quality coordination between firms is allowed, participants are more likely to trade the fair good, the stronger their third-party preferences are. These findings suggest that both consumer and managerial values are more important drivers of socially responsible behavior than opportunities for firms to coordinate their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We highlight implications for competition policy, where cartels may be exempted on CSR grounds.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131752582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Price Setting on a Network","authors":"Toomas Hinnosaar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3172236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3172236","url":null,"abstract":"Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their profits. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on a network. The key distortion reducing both total profits and social welfare is multiple-marginalization, which is magnified by strategic interactions. Individual profits are proportional to influentiality, which is a new measure of network centrality defined by the equilibrium characterization. The results emphasize the importance of the network structure when considering policy questions such as mergers or trade tariffs.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116626917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exploring the Relation of CSR Activities With Operating Activities: Cost Asymmetry and Asymmetric Sales Response","authors":"Apostolos Ballas, Anastasia Filiou, Vassilios-Christos Naoum, Orestes Vlismas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3229029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3229029","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the relation of CSR activities with SG&A cost stickiness and asymmetric sales response by using a data sample of 7.464 firm-year observations of European firms for the period 2009-2015. Our empirical findings indicate that SG&A expenses exhibit cost stickiness (anti-stickiness) in the case of firms with high (low) intensity of CSR activities. Depending on a firm’s intensity on CSR activities, it seems that sales revenues exhibit asymmetric responses towards different directions on the changes of SG&A expenses. The asymmetric sot behaviour of SG&A expenses and the asymmetric sales response are also affected by the extent that CSR activities are anchored with investing or signalling profile. A possible explanation is that firms with high intensity of CSR activities tend to focus on improving long term growth, they adopt a prospector’s strategy and they are characterised with high intensity of intangible investments.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126503729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}