{"title":"State-Dependent or Time-Dependent Pricing? New Evidence from a Monthly Firm-Level Survey: 1980-2017","authors":"Huw Dixon, Christian Grimme","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3467976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3467976","url":null,"abstract":"We take a monthly panel of German firms over the period 1980–2017 to examine the relative importance of time and state dependence in the decisions of firms to raise, lower or leave their price constant. In addition, we seek to estimate the relative importance of macroeconomic factors and firm-specific factors within state dependence. While price decreases can be well explained by time dependence alone, price increases are best predicted by the interaction of time-dependent and firm-specific state factors. Whilst on their own macroeconomic variables might seem important, once we add firm-specific variables the effects of macroeconomic variables become much smaller in magnitude. Our empirical results suggest that theoretical models should integrate both time and state dependence rather than developing the approaches separately. We also show that time dependence is better captured if we allow for different hazard functions for price increases and decreases.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123371864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Theory of SPACs","authors":"K. Hori, Hiroshi Osano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3938241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3938241","url":null,"abstract":"We explore an equilibrium allocation and efficiency when private firms are listed by merging with a SPAC, compared with those when they are listed through a traditional IPO. We show that a traditional IPO is more informationally efficient than a SPAC, except if the traditional IPO process is sufficiently long and costly. We also indicate that the private firms' willingness to select merging with a SPAC instead of a traditional IPO depends strongly on the choices of the information acquisition strategies of underwriters and sponsors. Our comparative static results suggest that in a hotter market, SPAC acquisitions are more likely to occur than traditional IPOs in a typical situation in which underwriters acquire information but sponsors do not. However, if the traditional IPO process becomes substantially long and costly, these predictions may be modified.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128476949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Article 53 TFEU [Mutual Recognition of Diplomas]","authors":"Thomas Papadopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3924132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3924132","url":null,"abstract":"Article 53 TFEU constitutes the legal basis for the harmonization of mutual recognition of diplomas of qualification and of the coordination of national provisions for the exercise of activities as self-employed persons. Article 53 TFEU states clearly that its objective is to facilitate the exercise of freedom of establishment of self-employed persons (“In order to make it easier for persons…”). More specifically, this article aims at attaining freedom of establishment of natural persons through the adoption of directives with regard to mutual recognition of diplomas and the coordination of the relevant national legislation. In the absence of this article, the free movement of persons would be incomplete. Positive harmonization is essential in this part of the internal market, where negative harmonization cannot provide comprehensive and coordinated solutions. The importance of harmonization and, as a matter of fact, of this legal basis, was stressed by the ECJ in Hocsman: “The function of directives which lay down common rules and criteria for mutual recognition of diplomas is thus to introduce a system in which Member States are obliged to accept the equivalence of certain diplomas and cannot require the persons concerned to comply with requirements other than those laid down by the relevant directives.”. National rules on the recognition of diplomas and other qualification requirements might constitute indistinctly applicable rules infringing freedom of establishment. Harmonization seeks to combat these obstacles and to facilitate the exercise of the freedom of establishment by self-employed persons. Article 53 TFEU constitutes the legal basis for the adoption of directives which aim at the harmonization of national qualification requirements, or the evaluation of the equality and compatibility of national qualification requirements, or the mutual recognition of diplomas. Hence, harmonized rules for the recognition of professional qualifications seek to facilitate persons interested in taking up and pursuing activities as self-employed persons in other MS.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129030711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Sensitivity of SME’s Investment and Employment to the Cost of Debt Financing","authors":"Cláudia Custódio, Diana Bonfim, Clara C. Raposo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3879737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3879737","url":null,"abstract":"We use variation in the access to a government credit certification program in Portugal to estimate the sensitivity of SMEs investment and employment to the cost of debt financing. Targeted firms have access to a credit certification and loan guarantees. We use a multidimensional regression discontinuity design to estimate real effects. Eligible firms increase borrowing and obtain bank loans at lower rates than non- eligible firms, allowing them to increase investment and employment during crises. Eligible firms also exhibit increased return on assets and default less. Industry-level analysis shows reduced heterogeneity in access to credit in more exposed industries.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125065023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Worsening of Technology Drive Non-Performing Loans?","authors":"S. Avetisyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3904638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3904638","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I study the empirical determinants of non-performing loan (NPL) ratios using a data set for EU countries covering the previous decade. The paper assumes that the spatial organization of banking systems and the geographical distribution of commercial banks' branches, ATMs (automatic teller machine) are major factors influencing the effectiveness in credit system. To my best knowledge this paper is the first is to construct a hypothesis, which will demonstrate the role of technology in NPLs.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124785430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Recommenders’ Originals: The Welfare Effects of the Dual Role of Platforms as Producers and Recommender Systems","authors":"Guy Aridor, Duarte Gonçalves","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3928005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3928005","url":null,"abstract":"We study a model of strategic interaction between producers and a monopolist platform that employs a recommendation system. We characterize the consumer welfare implications of the platform’s entry into the production market. Upon entry, the platform biases recommendations to steer consumers towards its own goods, which leads to equilibrium investment adjustments by the producers and lower consumer welfare when the platform’s market size is large. Furthermore, we find that a policy separating recommendation and production or imposing unbiased recommendations is not always welfare improving. Our results highlight the ability of platforms to foreclose competition through the use of biased recommender systems.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133983689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Market Structure of Central Counterparties in the EU","authors":"G. Demange, Thibaut Piquard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3875468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875468","url":null,"abstract":"New regulations promote the role of Central Counter-Parties (CCPs) as insurers of counterparty risk to stabilize derivative markets. Whereas the US favors monopolistic CCPs, the EU promotes the coexistence of several CCPs for a given asset class. In this paper, we shed light on the competition between CCPs. We start by reviewing their business model and gather public data to show how they differentiate on several dimensions: geographic, product line, and quality. We then study how pairs of dealers choose the CCP on which they clear a given transaction. For that, we use transaction data on three main CDS indices and focus on major dealers who are members of the two main CCPs clearing these indices. We find that differences in transaction size, two indicators of CCP's robustness quality, and market volatility affect this choice but not the collateral costs, proxied by the dealers' positions.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"302 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116837184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Firm Relocations, Commuting and Relationship Stability","authors":"Kristína Hrehová, Erika Sandow, U. Lindgren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3890889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3890889","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study the impact of firm relocations on commuting distance and the probability of married couples and cohabiting couples with children separating. We use Swedish register data for 2010-2016 and select employees of relocating firms with one workplace and more than 10 employees. Focusing on this sample allows us to use plausibly exogenous variation in the commuting distance arising from the relocation. We extend the literature on the effect of commuting on relationship stability by reducing the possibility for unobserved time-variant factors to bias our estimates. While previous literature has focused on the difference between short- and long-distance commuting, we focus on changes in the commuting distance that are externally induced by firm management. We find a small but statistically significant negative effect of increased firm relocation distance on family stability. A 10 km change in commuting distance leads to a 0.09 percentage point higher probability of separation if the commuter remains with the firm for the next 5 years.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127504210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prominence-for-Data Schemes in Digital Platform Ecosystems: Implications for Platform Bias and Consumer Data Collection","authors":"M. Bourreau, Jan Kraemer, Janina Hofmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3867580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3867580","url":null,"abstract":"It is crucial for content providers (CPs) to appear prominently on dominant online platforms in order to attract consumer demand. Platforms often offer content providers prominence in return for a monetary compensation (e.g., a sponsored listing). We consider the case where CPs can pay the platform for prominence by sharing data about their consumers, rather than money. Since data is non-rivalrous, the economic effects of data sharing for prominence are more complex and differ from paying for prominence with money. In a game-theoretic model we show that more consumer data will be collected as soon as CPs can obtain prominence on the platform. Whether the platform is more biased under a prominence-for-money scheme or under a prominence-for-data scheme depends on the marginal revenue from shared (non-exclusive) data. If this marginal revenue is high, e.g., because the platform and the CPs do not compete fiercely on the data market, then prominence-for-data will yield a higher platform bias, lead to more data collection by the CPs, and ultimately lower consumer surplus. We also show that a vertically integrated dominant platform can extort the non-integrated CP to share data even without giving prominence, and that our results are robust when CPs can strategically invest in data analytics technology. Our results therefore bear important insights for the regulation of data-rich online platforms.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122009001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cartel Activity and Recidivism","authors":"Catarina Marvão","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3875885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875885","url":null,"abstract":"The existence and extent of recidivism have been highly debated in the last few years. This chapter examines the current theoretical, experimental and empirical literature on recidivism and related issues. It also presents novel evidence on: (i) the amount of recidivism in the EU between 1998 and December 2020 (up to 19% of cartel members, depending on how recidivism is defined); (ii) the trend of EU “leniency inflation” noticed by Marvão and Spagnolo (2018b), which is even steeper for multiple offending firms; and (iii) the ability of recidivists to use leniency programs strategically by rotating reports and using multi-market contact. While “true recidivism” seems to have been eliminated in the US (Werden et al., 2011), it appears to be on the rise in the EU. Although it represents only 2% of the cartel members, it should be interpreted as a lower bound estimate since many cartels may remain undeterred and undetected (Ormosi, 2013).","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134091644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}