European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal最新文献_第6页

Privacy Concerns in Insurance Markets: Implications for Market Equilibria and Social Welfare 保险市场中的隐私问题:对市场均衡和社会福利的影响

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3480629

Irina Gemmo, M. Browne, Helmut Gründl

{"title":"Privacy Concerns in Insurance Markets: Implications for Market Equilibria and Social Welfare","authors":"Irina Gemmo, M. Browne, Helmut Gründl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3480629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3480629","url":null,"abstract":"Telemonitoring devices can be used to screen consumer characteristics and mitigate information asymmetries that lead to adverse selection in insurance markets. Nevertheless, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private information with insurers. In a second-best efficient Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence (MWS) framework, we allow consumers to reveal their risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as social welfare. We find that information disclosure can substitute deductibles for consumers whose transparency aversion is sufficiently low. This can lead to a Pareto improvement of social welfare. Yet, if all consumers are offered cross-subsidizing contracts, the introduction of a screening contract decreases or even eliminates cross-subsidies. Given the prior existence of a cross-subsidizing MWS equilibrium, utility is shifted from individuals who do not reveal their private information to those who choose to reveal. Our analysis informs the discussion on consumer protection in the context of digitalization. It shows that new technologies challenge cross-subsidization in insurance markets, and it stresses the negative externalities that digitalization has on consumers who are unwilling to take part in this development.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126618627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Detecting Learning‐By‐Exporting Effects on Firms' Productivity Distribution by Accounting for Heterogeneous Macrofactors and Panel Attrition 通过考虑异质性宏观因素和面板消耗来检测出口学习对企业生产率分配的影响

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/twec.12807

M. Ferrante, Marzia Freo

{"title":"Detecting Learning‐By‐Exporting Effects on Firms' Productivity Distribution by Accounting for Heterogeneous Macrofactors and Panel Attrition","authors":"M. Ferrante, Marzia Freo","doi":"10.1111/twec.12807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12807","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to verify the presence of the learning‐by‐exporting effect on total factor productivity growth. The study starts, as is typical in this context, by addressing the pre‐entry selection bias at firm level but differs from the literature by focusing on the distribution of the outcome and considering the presence of the different influences of macroeconomic factors on exporters and non‐exporters. Additionally, the paper addresses the panel attrition, a current source of estimation bias in longitudinal studies. The analysis is based on a panel of Italian manufacturing firms in the 1998–2007 period. We design an experiment by aligning and pooling cohorts of firms that allow us to obtain a sufficiently large group of firms entering the international market. Our results show that internationalisation affects firms' productivity and that the effect is heterogeneous over total factor productivity distribution and larger for the firms at the bottom section of the distribution itself. Furthermore, we observe that the learning‐by‐exporting effect may be confounded without (a) considering that domestic and exporter firms may afford heterogeneous demand cycles and (b) managing the dropout of some firms from the panel.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133703375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Antitrust and Tech: Europe and the United States Differ, and It Matters 反垄断和科技:欧洲和美国的不同，这很重要

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3442798

G. Werden, Luke M. Froeb

引用次数: 1

DIRECTRICES SOBRE EL CÁLCULO DE LOS SOBRECOSTES REPERCUTIDOS-2019.COMISIÓN EUROPEA (Passing-on Guidelines in Competition) 2019年结转附加费计算指南。欧洲委员会(比赛通过指引)

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3441276

E. Sanjuan

引用次数: 0

LA PROTECCIÓN DE LA COMPETENCIA TRAS UN BREXIT SIN ACUERDO Reino Unido vs Europa (The Protection of Competition After a Brexit Without Agreement United Kingdom vs. Europe) 无协议脱欧后的竞争保护英国vs欧洲(无协议脱欧后竞争保护英国vs欧洲)

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3441265

E. Sanjuan

引用次数: 0

The CAP Dualism-Efficiency or Competition CAP的二元论——效率还是竞争

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-12 DOI: 10.31031/MCDA.2019.05.000601

Minko Georgiev

{"title":"The CAP Dualism-Efficiency or Competition","authors":"Minko Georgiev","doi":"10.31031/MCDA.2019.05.000601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31031/MCDA.2019.05.000601","url":null,"abstract":"The Common Agricultural Policy of the EU (CAP) contains incentives for consolidation of resources and integration of organizations. The entire CAP follows the concept of efficiency achieved through product structure optimization and economies of scale. CAP imposes an advantage for the concept of efficiency at each level of the economic system. For this reason, integration -- horizontal and vertical -- has been imposed as more important for farmers than competition. Such an approach stimulates large-scale exchange and consolidation of resources, at the same time being a prerequisite for problems for market competition. The Chicago School addresses the concept of efficiency in relation to the “antitrust paradox” . Harvard authors propose that the “leverage effect” can occur as a result of efficiency, meaning that the related markets could be influenced by some market players, and therefore discrimination against other subjects can emerge. Another way to achieve higher economies of scale is horizontal integration. Practically, however, in the course of resource exchange, certain actors can be excluded from the economic organization. The type of organizational structure determines the way of resource distribution and it is essential for competition. A critical analysis of the collision between competition and integration has been offered by Glick M. Actually, efficiency may turn out to be in a conflict with competition.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130981083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does Export Intensity Affect Corporate Leverage? Evidence from Portuguese SMEs 出口强度影响企业杠杆率吗?来自葡萄牙中小企业的证据

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3357050

Cátia Silva, João M. Pinto

引用次数: 5

Price Discrimination within and Across Emu Markets: Evidence from French Exporters 欧洲货币联盟市场内部和市场之间的价格歧视:来自法国出口商的证据

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-01 DOI: 10.3386/w26246

F. Fontaine, Julien Martin, I. Mejean

引用次数: 12

Eigentor: Die Zentralvermarktung der Fußballmedienrechte, Komplementaritäten und das Alleinerwerbsverbot (Own Goal: The Centralised Sale of Football Media Rights, Complementarities and the No-Single-Buyer-Rule) 分遣干吗干吗?

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-07-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3428880

C.-Philipp Heller, Slobodan Sudaric

{"title":"Eigentor: Die Zentralvermarktung der Fußballmedienrechte, Komplementaritäten und das Alleinerwerbsverbot (Own Goal: The Centralised Sale of Football Media Rights, Complementarities and the No-Single-Buyer-Rule)","authors":"C.-Philipp Heller, Slobodan Sudaric","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3428880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3428880","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: Bei der Versteigerung der Medienrechte der Bundesliga fur die Spielzeiten 2017/18 bis 2020/21 wurde nach Einwirkung des Bundeskartellamts erstmals das Alleinerwerbsverbot in Deutschland angewendet. Das Alleinerwerbsverbot verlangt, dass kein Rechteerwerber die exklusiven Rechte fur alle Spiele erwerben darf. Wir legen dar, dass die Entscheidung des Bundeskartellamts auf einer unzutreffenden Marktabgrenzung beruht, die alle Spiele unter Beteiligung deutscher Vereine einem gemeinsamen sachlich relevanten Markt zuordnet. Wird hingegen eine einzelspielbezogene Marktabgrenzung verwendet, zeigt sich, dass die Zentralvermarktung der Fusballmedienrechte keine Wettbewerbsbeschrankung bezweckt. Im Gegenteil fuhren Komplementaritaten im vorliegenden Fall dazu, dass eine Zentralvermarktung wettbewerbsforderliche Wirkungen hat. Schlussendlich wird gezeigt, dass die Umsetzung des Alleinerwerbsverbots die Konsumentenwohlfahrt reduziert hat. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: The auction of media rights for the German premium football league (Bundesliga) for the seasons from 2017/18 to 2020/21 marked the first time the league was required to adopt the no-single-buyer rule, resulting from an intervention of the Federal Cartel Office. The no-single-buyer rule implies that no single broadcaster can obtain exclusive rights to all the matches. We argue that the decision by the Federal Cartel Office was based on a flawed market definition, which found a wide market covering all games with participation of German football clubs within a year. Using a match-specific relevant market instead, we argue that the centralised sale of football media rights does not restrict competition by object. In fact, given the complementarities in the case at hand, a centralised sale is pro-competitive. Finally, we show that the way the no-single-buyer rule was implemented had adverse effects on consumer welfare.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127935269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Evolution, Local Risk and Skewness Loving 进化、局部风险和偏好偏度

European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal Pub Date : 2019-07-21 DOI: 10.3982/TE3949

Yuval Heller, A. Robson

引用次数: 2