Anton Pichler, Marco Pangallo, R. M. del Rio-Chanona, F. Lafond, J. Farmer
{"title":"Production Networks and Epidemic Spreading: How to Restart the UK Economy?","authors":"Anton Pichler, Marco Pangallo, R. M. del Rio-Chanona, F. Lafond, J. Farmer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3606984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3606984","url":null,"abstract":"We analyse the economics and epidemiology of different scenarios for a phased restart of the UK economy. Our economic model is designed to address the unique features of the COVID-19 pandemic. Social distancing measures affect both supply and demand, and input-output constraints play a key role in restricting economic output. Standard models for production functions are not adequate to model the short-term effects of lockdown. A survey of industry analysts conducted by IHS Markit allows us to evaluate which inputs for each industry are absolutely necessary for production over a two month period. Our model also includes inventory dynamics and feedback between unemployment and consumption. We demonstrate that economic outcomes are very sensitive to the choice of production function, show how supply constraints cause strong network effects, and find some counter-intuitive effects, such as that reopening only a few industries can actually lower aggregate output. Occupation-specific data and contact surveys allow us to estimate how different industries affect the transmission rate of the disease. We investigate six different re-opening scenarios, presenting our best estimates for the increase in R0 and the increase in GDP. Our results suggest that there is a reasonable compromise that yields a relatively small increase in R0 and delivers a substantial boost in economic output. This corresponds to a situation in which all non-consumer facing industries reopen, schools are open only for workers who need childcare, and everyone who can work from home continues to work from home.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131090136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anticompetitive Effects in EU Competition Law","authors":"Pablo Ibáñez Colomo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3599407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3599407","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines the meaning and scope of the notion of anticompetitive effects in EU competition law. It does so by bringing together several strands of the case law (and this across all provisions, namely Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and merger control). The analysis is structured around a framework that considers the main variables that shape the notion in practice: the time variable (actual or potential effects); the dimensions of competition and the counterfactual; the meaning of effects and the probability threshold (plausibility, likelihood, certainty). The exercise shows that it is possible to discern a concrete meaning to the notion of anticompetitive effects. Some central questions, including the role and operation of the counterfactual and the threshold of effects, have already been answered by the Court of Justice. In particular, it has long been clear that anticompetitive effects amount to more than a mere competitive disadvantage and/or a limitation of a firm’s freedom of action. The impact on equally efficient firms’ ability and/or incentive to compete would need to be established. At the same time, some open questions and some potential areas of friction (relating, inter alia, to stakeholders’ tendency to conflate appreciability and effects) remain. These are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"38 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114022433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Critical Mass for Two-sided Platforms and the Strength of the Externalities","authors":"Adriaan ten Kate, Gunnar Niels","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3591811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3591811","url":null,"abstract":"Whether a two-sided platform faces a critical-mass problem in its start-up phase depends on how difficult it is to get each of the sides on board when the other side is not yet there – the so-called chicken-and-egg problem. If there is no chicken-and-egg problem, there is no critical-mass problem either. But having both sides on board is not enough to get the platform off the ground. The mutual encouragement between the sides must be sufficiently strong to trigger a self-sustained growth and this depends on the strength of the externalities. In this paper, we propose a measure for the strength of the externalities and define critical mass for two-sided platforms in terms of that parameter. Our definition is different from that proposed by Evans and Schmalensee (2010), but more in line with the way critical mass is defined for one-sided networks. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of critical mass.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116612517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Traditional and Shadow Banks Symbiotic?","authors":"E. Chrétien, V. Lyonnet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3376891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3376891","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents how traditional and shadow banks interacted with one another during the 2007 financial crisis, when both assets and liabilities flew from shadow to traditional banks. To rationalize their behavior, we propose a simple model which demonstrates the symbiotic coexistence and mutual reliance of traditional and shadow banks through their interaction in a crisis. In our model, shadow banks escape the costly regulation traditional banks must comply with, but give up deposit insurance, which traditional banks can rely upon. Without deposit insurance, shadow banks repay their creditors in a crisis by selling assets at fire-sale prices to traditional banks. By using deposit insurance to purchase these assets, traditional banks are able to generate enough profit to offset their regulatory costs. The model allows us to study the (unintended) consequences of regulations for traditional banks on the shadow banking sector.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116363820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Slot-specific Priorities with Capacity Transfers","authors":"Michelle Avataneo, Bertan Turhan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3547785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547785","url":null,"abstract":"We study two-sided matching markets in which agents match to institutions that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. In many real-world institutions, there are restrictions for some slots (if not all) either on slot priorities or on the transferability of unfilled slots over others (or both). We construct a rich family of practical choice rules, slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (SSPwCT), that utilize both independent slot priorities and transferability of vacant slots. We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is stable, strategy-proof and respects improvements with regards to SSPwCT choice rules. Transferring the capacity of one more unfilled slot, while all else is constant, leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement of the COM. We also provide comparative static results for expansion of branch capacity and addition of new contracts. Our results have implications for resource allocation problems with diversity considerations.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128122268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pass-Through as an Economic Tool -- On Exogenous Competition, Social Incidence, and Price Discrimination","authors":"Jeanine Miklós-Thal, G. Shaffer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3413943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3413943","url":null,"abstract":"Weyl and Fabinger (2013) analyze the social incidence of competition and the<br>output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by considering the<br>hypothetical entrance of exogenous quantity into a market. The formulas they use for<br>this purpose, however, are correct only for marginal changes in exogenous quantity<br>starting at zero or if demand functions are linear. We show how using the correct<br>formulas changes Weyl and Fabinger's analyses and leads to new results on the social<br>incidence of competition and on the output and welfare effects of third-degree price<br>discrimination in monopoly and oligopoly markets.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125408665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hands on the Wheel, Eyes on the Phone: the Effect of Smart Phone Usage on Road Safety","authors":"D. Brands, J. Klingen, F. Ostermeijer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3603218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3603218","url":null,"abstract":"We provide novel evidence on the effect of smart phone use on road accidents. We exploit variation in phone usage fees in the Netherlands following a change in European Union (EU) roaming regulations implemented in 2017. The growth rate of mobile data roaming increased substantially after the change, which allows us to estimate a difference-in-differences model where non-Dutch drivers from the EU are treated, while Dutch drivers serve as control group. Our results suggest that around 10% of vehicles involved in accidents can be explained by the use of smart phones, and that these accidents mainly happen on urban roads.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127943370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Groupwise-Pivotal Referral Mechanism: Core-Selecting Referral Strategy-Proof Mechanism","authors":"Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, Joosung J. Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3574093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3574093","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce the groupwise-pivotal referral (GPR) mechanism for auctions where buyers can participate only through referrals. Each buyer's type consists of a valuation and referable buyers. Unlike the second-price auction (SPA), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism provides referral incentives. However, VCG is not budget-feasible. In contrast, GPR is core-selecting, implying efficiency and budget feasibility. In GPR, bidders should refer truthfully and have no incentive to underbid. GPR is shill-proof and groupwise collusion-proof. Furthermore, GPR's ex-post revenue outperforms both VCG and SPA in undominated strategies. We also study more general environments than auctions.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123102082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exposing the Public Interest Dimension of the Digital Single Market: Public Undertakings as a Model for Regulating Data Sharing","authors":"Heiko Richter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3565762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3565762","url":null,"abstract":"The availability of public and private data plays a crucial role for the digital single market. Increasing the availability of data by incentivizing and mandating public and private actors to share their data ranks high on the EU policy agenda. When designing suitable legal data sharing regimes, there is an inevitable need to balance multiple public and private interests. While there have been considerable discussions on data sharing between private businesses (B2B), no binding rules have been established yet. In contrast, public undertakings are increasingly covered by mandatory rules. This article focuses on data sharing regulation for public undertakings, which lie at the state-market interface. The way their data is regulated offers a prototype for how to reconcile business reasoning with the public interest. In particular, the article inquires into the design of the recast Public Sector Information (PSI) Directive regarding public undertakings as well as into different national rules which mandate access to public undertakings’ data. On this basis, it discusses four general characteristics which can inform other strands of regulatory debate on data sharing in the EU.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"06 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130618805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coalition and Core in Resource Allocation and Exchange","authors":"Jun Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3553233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3553233","url":null,"abstract":"In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, we propose new core notions in the conventional flavor by regarding endowments as rights to consume or trade with others. Our key idea is to identify self-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property rights. Our first notion lies between the strong core and the weak core and is independent of Balbuzanov and Kotowski’s (2019a) exclusion core. Our second notion refines the first and the exclusion core by combining their different merits. We generalize the you request my house - I get your turn mechanism to find our core allocations.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128487003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}