European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Competition and Privacy in Online Markets: Evidence from the Mobile App Industry","authors":"R. Kesler, Michael E. Kummer, P. Schulte","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3542203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3542203","url":null,"abstract":"Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the combination of market power and massive data collection in digital markets. This concern is fueled by the theoretical prediction that more market ...","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"132 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123588159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rebuilding the Post-COVID-19 Economy Through an Industrial Strategy that Secures Livelihoods","authors":"H. Moore, H. Collins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3657066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3657066","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Covid-19 crisis has further exacerbated the insecurity of livelihoods in the UK. This commentary reflects on what resources the UK has to fulfil the calls to ‘build back better,’ to transform the economy to prioritise health and wellbeing over economic growth. We provide critical commentary on the current industrial strategy while recognising that industrial strategy can be a tool to unite public, private and third sectors in the shared goal for prosperous communities around the UK. Driven from the perspective of citizen’s understanding of prosperity and what it means to live a good life, we argue for a new local industrial strategy that places secure livelihoods at its centre. This means enhancing the capacities and capabilities of people and places to face 21st century global challenges locally.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121872226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Common Priors Under Endogenous Uncertainty","authors":"Pierfrancesco Guarino, E. Tsakas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3659295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3659295","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract For a fixed game and a type structure that admits a common prior, Action Independence states that the conditional beliefs induced by the common prior do not depend on the player's own strategy. It has been conjectured that Action Independence can be behaviorally characterized by means of a suitable no-betting condition ( Dekel & Siniscalchi, 2015 ), but whether this is indeed the case remains an open problem. In this paper, we prove this conjecture true by focusing on strategy-invariant bets, which are bets that cannot be manipulated by the players. In particular, first, we show that at least one of the common priors satisfies Action Independence if and only if there exists no mutually acceptable strategy-invariant bet among the players. Second, we show that, all common priors satisfy Action Independence if and only if there exists no mutually acceptable strategy-invariant bet among the players and an outside observer. These results give us a deeper understanding of existing foundations of solution concepts using only epistemic conditions that are expressed in terms of type structures and are therefore elicitable.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134535641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Three Body Problem – Extraterritoriality, Comity and Cooperation in Competition Law","authors":"Pedro Caro de Sousa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3659083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3659083","url":null,"abstract":"The three body problem in physics concerns the challenge of accurately calculating the interaction of three different bodies (e.g. planets). Examples include the motion of the Moon around the Earth as disturbed by the action of the Sun, or the movement of one planet around the Sun as disturbed by the action of another planet. Three body systems are chaotic, and despite centuries of work there is no general solution to this problem.<br><br>Understanding the extraterritorial effect of competition law raises challenges akin to the three body problem: while primarily governed by one dominant gravitational pull (a country’s rules on the scope of its competition law), in practice the extraterritorial effect of competition law is affected by other forces (in particular, international comity and cooperation against a common epistemic background). This means that a thorough analysis of extra-territorial effects requires us to look not only at legal/formal structures concerning the scope of a country’s law, but must also take into account ‘informal’ mechanisms– e.g., comity (i.e. unilateral self-restraint and tolerance on the part of the affected jurisdictions), cooperation (i.e. extra-legal mechanisms to coordinate between potentially conflicting legal regimes) and epistemic communities (i.e. relations between competition specialists) – that impact how law is applied in practice.<br><br>This paper reviews how these three concepts operate in practice in the context of (EU) competition law. It will argue that, as with the traditional three body problem, no purely legal and formal conceptual framework can explain how competition law is applied extra-jurisdictionally. The best we can is to approximate such a point through increasingly sophisticated application of three partially overlapping legal doctrines – extra-jurisdictional reach, international comity, and international cooperation – against a common epistemic background shared by the global (and regional) competition communities. <br>","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132287488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"'The Right to be Forgotten' and its Unintended Consequences to Intelligence Gathering","authors":"C. Goldfield","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3564854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3564854","url":null,"abstract":"Social media has dramatically changed how we interact and communicate with one another. The reliance on social media has also sparked many international debates revolving around privacy. We have seen the enactment of the comprehensive privacy law in the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in the United States—both enacted in 2018. In the GDPR, Article 17 known as the “Right to Be Forgotten” (RTBF) principle allows for data subjects to request that their information be removed from online service providers like social media companies. In recent years, cases from the Court of Justice for the European Union have expanded these RTBF principles through three major cases: Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), GC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), and Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook. This Article argues that the RTBF model will present unintended consequences to Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) by mandating online service providers to delete more data than necessary based on the pressures placed on these online service providers by the recent Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU) cases. This will lead to problems in the Intelligence Community when obtaining open source intelligence especially when scrubbing social media information. This RTBF system will make it easier for terrorist groups, terrorist sympathizers or any other associated individuals to hide behind a process by which they can easily delete data that was not so easily removable before RTBF. Lastly, this Article proposes legal, procedural, and oversight solutions to address the issues caused by RTBF and OSINT.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129595515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Digitalisation and (De)Centralisation in Germany - A Comparative Study of Retail Banking and the Energy Sector","authors":"Franz Flögel, Marius Beckamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3636537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3636537","url":null,"abstract":"The paper in hand compares retail banking and the electric energy sector to investigate how digitalisation influences (de)centralisation. Structural similarities of both industries like the direct competition of large international companies (Deutsche Bank and RWE) with locale providers such as savings banks and municipal utilities (Stadtwerke) motivate this comparison. Our findings suggest that digitalisation affects (de)centralisation differently. Despite scale economies inherent to processes of digitalisation, small entities must not be on the losing side. Cooperation tends to play a key role for regional companies to profit from digitalisation. Interestingly, digitalisation of the first and second transformation affects (de)centralisation of both industries diametrically (though, it is too early for final conclusions about the second digital transformation). The geographical properties of the businesses in question (i.e. the distance dependence of soft information respectively the physical properties of electricity transmission) and (regulatory) context factors tend to influence the relationship between digitalisation and (de)centralisation. More research is needed to enhance our understanding of digitalisation on (de)centralisation of the economy. As this discussion paper indicates, sector comparisons tend to be useful to contribute to such an understanding.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126976793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Network Sharing and EU Competition Law in the 5G Era: A Case of Policy Mismatch","authors":"D. Geradin, Theano Karanikioti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3628250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3628250","url":null,"abstract":"The deployment of 5G networks represents a key EU policy objective. 5G deployment, however, creates significant challenges for mobile network operators (“MNOs”). They need to pay for access to available spectrum and to undertake massive investments in infrastructure, as the complexity of 5G and the required denser coverage of base stations entail higher deployment costs than previous technologies. In this context, the conclusion of network sharing agreements (“NSAs”), whereby MNOs share some components of their infrastructure to deliver their services to end users, is an effective way to speed up the rollout of 5G networks and reduce the costs of such a rollout. It seems even fair to say that, because of the large investments required, 5G networks will not be rolled out in most Member States within the ambitious timeframe set by the EU absent the conclusion of NSAs, as few operators will be able to undertake the required investments on their own. \u0000 \u0000The European Commission threw some confusion as to the compatibility of NSAs with EU competition law when it issued a Statement of Objections (“SO”) in August 2019 against T-Mobile, CETIN and O2 to challenge their NSAs involving 2G/3G/4G technologies in the Czech Republic. The most remarkable statement in the Commission’s press release announcing the SO is that its analysis “is without any prejudice to any future assessment of network agreements involving emerging technologies such as 5G, which may have very different characteristics.” This is troubling for the following reasons. First, one may wonder why the Commission investigates NSAs involving legacy technologies without prejudice to the emerging technology (5G) at a time where MNOs are investing heavily in 5G and are adopting 5G NSAs. Second, the Commission fails to realise that any decision it would adopt on the Czech NSAs investigation would necessarily impact 5G deployment and the attainment of the EU 5G targets, as 5G will initially be developed on top of 4G networks. Finally, the advent of 5G has a direct impact on the Commission’s analysis of the 2G/3G/4G NSAs, since the Commission’s preliminary concerns (e.g. with regards to investments in these legacy or soon-to-be legacy networks) will become irrelevant with the advent of 5G. \u0000 \u0000Against this background, this paper argues that the Commission’s investigation of the Czech NSAs is an example of “policy mismatch”. While the EU has made the fast rollout of 5G networks a priority, due to the significant benefits this technology may unlock in terms of competitiveness and innovation, the Commission – instead of providing necessary guidance on the compatibility of (5G) NSAs with EU competition law in a timely manner – has spent the last few years investigating NSAs involving legacy technologies without prejudice to 5G. Because of this lack of guidance, combined with the uncertainty created by the Commission’s investigation of the Czech NSAs, there is a significant risk that MNOs willing to conclud","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133782494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anti-Selective Disclosure Regulation and Analyst Forecast Accuracy and Usefulness","authors":"A. Cowan, Valentina Salotti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3626390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3626390","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate regulations intended to stop managers from privately disclosing corporate information to analysts in a setting with enhanced potential to isolate regulatory effects: the European Union (EU) Market Abuse Directive (MAD), a common regulation implemented by member states with varying sanctions and enforcement resources. Following the implementation of MAD in a country, analyst forecasts become more accurate, with relatively little of the effect attributable to increased voluntary public disclosure by covered firms. The effect of MAD on analyst accuracy is stronger in countries with more stringent enforcement and sanction systems. Although the improvement in accuracy is associated with the implementation of MAD alone, stock prices do not respond more strongly to analyst forecast releases until after market-trading enforcement improves under subsequent EU legislation (MiFID).","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115610568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Germany's 'Lex Apple Pay': Payment Services Regulation Overtakes Competition Enforcement","authors":"J. Franck, D. Linardatos","doi":"10.1093/jeclap/lpaa032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpaa032","url":null,"abstract":"As of January 2020, Section 58a of the German Payment Services Supervisory Act (PSSA) provides a right for payment service providers and e-money issuers to access technical infrastructure that contributes to mobile and internet-based payment services. This right of access is intended to promote technological innovation and competition in the consumers’ interests in having a wide choice among payment services, including competing solutions for mobile and internet-based payments. The provision has been dubbed ‘Lex Apple Pay’ as it seems to have been saliently motivated by the objective to give payment service providers the right of direct access to the NFC interfaces of Apple’s mobile devices. In enacting Section 58a PSSA, the German legislature has rushed forwards, overtaking the EU Commission’s ongoing competition investigation into Apple Pay as well as the pending reform of the German Competition Act, which is aimed precisely at operators of technological platforms, which enjoy a gatekeeper position. This article explores the scope of application and the statutory requirements of this right of access as well as available defences and possible legal barriers. We point out that, to restore a level playing field in the internal market, the natural option would be to further harmonize EU payment services regulation, including the availability of a right of access to technical infrastructure for mobile and internet-based payment services and e-money issuers.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131014382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bargaining With Endogenous Learning","authors":"Jetlir Duraj","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3615758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3615758","url":null,"abstract":"I study a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game in which a buyer can choose to learn privately about her value of the good. Information generation takes time and is endogenous. After learning, the buyer can disclose verifiable evidence of her valuation to the seller. Examples include venture capital negotiations or procurement of new technologies, which sometimes feature significant delay due to endogenous costly learning. The buyer receives informational rents for any period-length only if learning is costly. The high-frequency limits of stationary equilibria result in a folk- theorem type of result about the delay until agreement. Maximal delay is achieved in equilibria with mixed pricing. Near the high-frequency limit, all stationary equilibria feature non-extreme prices and non-extreme payoffs. The analysis allows for closed-form solutions and for comparative statics.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132360820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}