{"title":"群-枢纽转介机制:核心选择转介策略-证明机制","authors":"Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, Joosung J. Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3574093","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We introduce the groupwise-pivotal referral (GPR) mechanism for auctions where buyers can participate only through referrals. Each buyer's type consists of a valuation and referable buyers. Unlike the second-price auction (SPA), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism provides referral incentives. However, VCG is not budget-feasible. In contrast, GPR is core-selecting, implying efficiency and budget feasibility. In GPR, bidders should refer truthfully and have no incentive to underbid. GPR is shill-proof and groupwise collusion-proof. Furthermore, GPR's ex-post revenue outperforms both VCG and SPA in undominated strategies. We also study more general environments than auctions.","PeriodicalId":434487,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Groupwise-Pivotal Referral Mechanism: Core-Selecting Referral Strategy-Proof Mechanism\",\"authors\":\"Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, Joosung J. Lee\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3574093\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We introduce the groupwise-pivotal referral (GPR) mechanism for auctions where buyers can participate only through referrals. Each buyer's type consists of a valuation and referable buyers. Unlike the second-price auction (SPA), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism provides referral incentives. However, VCG is not budget-feasible. In contrast, GPR is core-selecting, implying efficiency and budget feasibility. In GPR, bidders should refer truthfully and have no incentive to underbid. GPR is shill-proof and groupwise collusion-proof. Furthermore, GPR's ex-post revenue outperforms both VCG and SPA in undominated strategies. We also study more general environments than auctions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":434487,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal\",\"volume\":\"117 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-04-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"11\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3574093\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3574093","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Groupwise-Pivotal Referral Mechanism: Core-Selecting Referral Strategy-Proof Mechanism
We introduce the groupwise-pivotal referral (GPR) mechanism for auctions where buyers can participate only through referrals. Each buyer's type consists of a valuation and referable buyers. Unlike the second-price auction (SPA), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism provides referral incentives. However, VCG is not budget-feasible. In contrast, GPR is core-selecting, implying efficiency and budget feasibility. In GPR, bidders should refer truthfully and have no incentive to underbid. GPR is shill-proof and groupwise collusion-proof. Furthermore, GPR's ex-post revenue outperforms both VCG and SPA in undominated strategies. We also study more general environments than auctions.
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