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Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics最新文献

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Laws, Dispositions, Memory: Three Hypotheses on the Order of the World 规律、处置、记忆：关于世界秩序的三个假设
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-19 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-0010
Joel Dolbeault
{"title":"Laws, Dispositions, Memory: Three Hypotheses on the Order of the World","authors":"Joel Dolbeault","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The more science progresses, the more it is evident that the physical world presents regularities. This raises a metaphysical problem: why is the world so ordered? In the first part of the article, I attempt to clarify this problem and justify its relevance. In the following three parts, I analyze three hypotheses already formulated in philosophy in response to this problem: the hypothesis that the order of the world is explained 1) by laws of nature, 2) by dispositions of the fundamental physical entities, 3) or by a memory immanent to matter (a hypothesis developed by Peirce, Bergson and James). The third hypothesis may seem surprising. However, it can be shown that the three hypotheses have a psychomorphic dimension in the sense that they give to nature properties analogous to those of mind. In addition, this third hypothesis presents several interesting arguments.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47425575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Self-Relating Internalism: Reply to Vallicella 自我关联的内在主义：对瓦利切拉的回应
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-17 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-2021
Bo R. Meinertsen
{"title":"Self-Relating Internalism: Reply to Vallicella","authors":"Bo R. Meinertsen","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-2021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-2021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2021-2021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48064681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Functional Approach to Ontology 本体的功能方法
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-0011
Nathaniel Gan
{"title":"A Functional Approach to Ontology","authors":"Nathaniel Gan","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There are two ways of approaching an ontological debate: ontological realism recommends that metaphysicians seek to discover deep ontological facts of the matter, while ontological anti-realism denies that there are such facts; both views sometimes run into difficulties. This paper suggests an approach to ontology that begins with conceptual analysis and takes the results of that analysis as a guide for which metaontological view to hold. It is argued that in some cases, the functions for which we employ a part of our conceptual scheme might give us reasons to posit ontological facts regarding certain objects. The proposed approach recommends ontological realism about an object just in case our conceptual scheme gives us reason to. This yields a mixed overall metaontological view that adopts ontological realism to some issues and ontological anti-realism to others, and that avoids the difficulties that typically arise for the two views.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44563272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Holism | Cosmopsychism – And the Collapse of the Wavefunction 整体论和宇宙论——以及波函数的坍缩
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-0003
Denis Bobanovic
{"title":"Holism | Cosmopsychism – And the Collapse of the Wavefunction","authors":"Denis Bobanovic","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The holistic view of the Universe is a very promising approach. The necessity of such a view is shown by the teaching of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, a German physicist and philosopher. If we accept Panpsychism as the best alternative to Materialism and Dualism, we should take the holistic view seriously. Panpsychism and Holism combined lead to the Idea of Cosmopsychism. If we consider the Universe as a holistic Quantum System, we should ask, what causes the collapse of its wavefunction? I offer four possible answers and I tend to divine consciousness, which brings the collapse of the wavefunction of our Universe.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41547137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Modes 内在和外在模式
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-0036
Michele Paolini Paoletti
{"title":"Intrinsic and Extrinsic Modes","authors":"Michele Paolini Paoletti","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I offer in this article an account of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties based on the ontology of modes. Modes are particular properties that directly depend for their identity on their “bearers”. In Section 1, I shall introduce the ontology of modes. In Section 2, I shall examine the problem of distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic properties by considering another, related problem: that of distinguishing between internal and external relations. In Section 3, I shall present my own account and I shall also single out different degrees of intrinsicality and extrinsicality. In Section 4, I shall deal with missing-relatum modes, namely, with modes that lack specific relata, such as Othello’s loving someone. I shall introduce three different theories to deal with them. Finally, in Section 5, I shall solve some problems affecting the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction from the standpoint of my account.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0036","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45710912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On the Nature of Persons; Persons as Constituted Events 论“人”的本质;作为构成事件的人
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-12 DOI: 10.14264/UQL.2014.237
M. R. Tahmasbi
{"title":"On the Nature of Persons; Persons as Constituted Events","authors":"M. R. Tahmasbi","doi":"10.14264/UQL.2014.237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14264/UQL.2014.237","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The diachronic question of persons deals with personal identity over time: “In virtue of what conditions is a person, P1, at t1, the same person, P2, at t2?” To answer the question, I suggest expanding the constitution theory from a static definition to a dynamic definition. ‘Life’ is an event and the stream of consciousness is an event too. Reflective self-consciousness—which I take to be definitive of persons—is an event. Persons are irreducible constituted events who remain the same through time while they undergo change. This idea faces neither the problem of substance dualism nor the fission problem.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66849624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way 个人身份与混合视角：一条折中之路
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-12 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-0007
H. Noonan
{"title":"Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way","authors":"H. Noonan","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Olson, the hybrid view, takes (non-branching) psychological continuity as a sufficient but, pace the neo-Lockeans, not necessary condition for personal persistence. It sides with the animalist in allowing that mere (non-branching) biological continuity is also sufficient. So I am, in a sense, a psychological continuity theorist. But I am also in a sense, a biological theorist (or as Olson put it, a new animalist).","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43327786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contra Static Dispositions 反静态处置
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-11 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-0023
Andrei A. Buckareff, M. Andrews, Shane Brennan
{"title":"Contra Static Dispositions","authors":"Andrei A. Buckareff, M. Andrews, Shane Brennan","doi":"10.1515/mp-2020-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Work on dispositions focuses chiefly on dispositions that are manifested in dynamic causal processes. Williams, Neil. 2005. “Static and Dynamic Dispositions.” Synthese 146: 303–24 has argued that the focus on dynamic dispositions has been at the expense of a richer ontology of dispositions. He contends that we ought to distinguish between dynamic and static dispositions. The manifestation of a dynamic disposition involves some change in the world. The manifestation of a static disposition does not involve any change in the world. In this paper, we concede that making a conceptual distinction between dynamic and static dispositions is useful and we allow that we can truthfully represent objects as manifesting static dispositions. However, we argue that the distinction is not ontologically deep. Rather, the truthmakers for our representations of static dispositions are actually dynamic dispositions to whose manifestations we may fail to be sensitive.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2020-0023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44382027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Hume’s Thoroughly Relationist Ontology of Time 休谟的时间关系论本体论
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-11 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0004
Matias Slavov
{"title":"Hume’s Thoroughly Relationist Ontology of Time","authors":"Matias Slavov","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I argue that Hume’s philosophy of time is relationist in the following two senses. 1) Standard definition of relationism. Time is a succession of indivisible moments. Hence there is no time independent of change. Time is a relational, not substantial feature of the world. 2) Rigid relationism. There is no evidence of uniform natural standard for synchronization of clocks. No absolute temporal metric is available. There are countless times, and no time is privileged. Combining 1) and 2) shows that Hume’s ontology of time is thoroughly relationist.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2021-0004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43517994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Counterpart Theories: The Argument from Concern 对等理论：来自关注的争论
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-02-17 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-2020
H. Baber
{"title":"Counterpart Theories: The Argument from Concern","authors":"H. Baber","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-2020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-2020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory, the stage view, according to which people and other ordinary objects are instantaneous stages, identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Both counterpart theories invite what has been called ‘the argument from concern’ (Rosen, G. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism.” Mind 99 (395): 327–54). Why should I be concerned about my counterparts at other possible worlds or other times? I care about how things might have gone for me—not how they go for other people at other possible worlds; I care about my prospects—not the way go for other people at other times. Jiri Benovsky has argued that while modal counterpart theory can be defended against this style of argument, temporal counterpart theory cannot (Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34). I argue that temporal counterpart theory, like modal counterpart theory, resists the argument from concern.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2021-2020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41727062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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