个人身份与混合视角：一条折中之路

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY

Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2021-03-12 DOI:10.1515/mp-2020-0007

H. Noonan

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在关于个人持久性的争论中，两个主要的竞争者是新洛克的心理连续性观点和由奥尔森和斯诺登捍卫的动物主义。两者都错了。我将论证的立场，我称之为，跟随奥尔森的混合观点，将(非分支)心理连续性作为个人坚持的充分条件，但按照新洛克学派的说法，不是必要条件。它站在动物主义者的一边，认为仅仅(无分支)生物连续性也是足够的。所以在某种意义上，我是一个心理连续性理论家。但在某种意义上，我也是一个生物理论家(或者像奥尔森所说的，一个新动物主义者)。

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Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way

Abstract Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Olson, the hybrid view, takes (non-branching) psychological continuity as a sufficient but, pace the neo-Lockeans, not necessary condition for personal persistence. It sides with the animalist in allowing that mere (non-branching) biological continuity is also sufficient. So I am, in a sense, a psychological continuity theorist. But I am also in a sense, a biological theorist (or as Olson put it, a new animalist).

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来源期刊

Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.30

自引率

50.00%

发文量