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Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics最新文献

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Haecceity Mereology Haecceity Mereology
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-08-10 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0034
Ruoyu Zhang
{"title":"Haecceity Mereology","authors":"Ruoyu Zhang","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Haecceities are non-qualitative properties for individuation but the current theories about haecceities are still to be much more explored. This paper aims to develop a “haecceity mereology” – that is, an ontological system that understands substances as mereological combinations of haecceities and qualitative properties. In this way, the view developed is an alternative to Paul’s (2002. “Logical Parts.” Noûs 36 (4): 578–96; 2006. “Coincidence as Overlap.” Noûs 40 (4): 623–59) mereological approach. Three rules are proposed: (1) If S is a substance, then there is one and only one haecceity which is S’s qualitative part; (2) For all the fusions with the same haecceity, at most only one of those fusions is a substance; (3) When all the relevant elements are abundant, every element must overlap at least one substance. This is the first ontology of haecceities in the recent literature and would be a model for systematic metaphysics.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"275 - 294"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43559066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics 不仅仅是许多世界，还有许多宇宙？量子力学多世界观的一个问题
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-08-04 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0012
Peter Baumann
{"title":"Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics","authors":"Peter Baumann","doi":"10.1515/mp-2022-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2022-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The many-worlds view is one of the most discussed “interpretations” of quantum mechanics. As is well known, this view has some very controversial and much discussed aspects. This paper focuses on one particular problem arising from the combination of quantum mechanics with Special Relativity. It turns out that the ontology of the many-worlds view – the account of what there is and what branches of the universe exist – is relative to inertial frames. If one wants to avoid relativizing ontology, one has to argue either that there is an additional source of branching due to Special Relativity and thus additional branches or worlds. Or one has to argue that there are not only many worlds but also many universes (sets of worlds or world-branches); there is thus not only one tree of many world-branches but many frame-specific trees, a “forest” of many world-trees. The main problem here is how one can understand all or any of this.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"295 - 305"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41461718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
All Designators are Rigid 所有指示器都是刚性的
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-07-13 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0040
H. Noonan
{"title":"All Designators are Rigid","authors":"H. Noonan","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Naming and Necessity Kripke introduces the concept of a rigid designator and argues that proper names are rigid designators. He argues that in this way they are different from typical definite descriptions (though he allows that some definite descriptions, e.g., ‘the actual winner of the lottery’, ‘the square of 3’, are rigid designators). His opponents have either argued that names can be regarded as abbreviations of rigid descriptions (e.g., ‘actualized’ ones) or have tried to deny that names are rigid designators. I shall argue that no unambiguous descriptions are non-rigid. All unambiguous descriptions are rigid. The appearance of non-rigidity in descriptions is simply an illusion, a manifestation of ambiguity. I shall then go on to show that an explanation of the difficulty which has been found in extending the rigid/non-rigid distinction from singular terms to predicates follows.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"24 1","pages":"101 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44298686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will 形而上学的相容论与跨世界人格的本体论:一个关于神性预知(决定论)与形而上学自由意志相容的新刘易斯论证
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-07-13 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0041
Bartlomiej A. Lenart
{"title":"Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will","authors":"Bartlomiej A. Lenart","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0041","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract David Lewis’ contemplations regarding divine foreknowledge and free will, along with some of his other more substantial work on modal realism and his counterpart theory can serve as a springboard to a novel solution to the foreknowledge and metaphysical freedom puzzle, namely a proposal that genuine metaphysical freedom is compatible with determinism, which is quite different from the usual compatibilist focus on the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. This paper argues that while Lewis opens the doors to such a possibility, in order to fully elucidate a genuinely metaphysical compatibilist account, Lewis’ own counterpart theory must be abandoned in favour of an account of trans-world identity that is theoretically framed by a modified version of Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"385 - 407"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42290706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Relations in the Metaphysics of Science 科学形而上学中的关系
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-06-21 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0013
Stavros Ioannidis, S. Psillos, Elina Pechlivanidi
{"title":"Relations in the Metaphysics of Science","authors":"Stavros Ioannidis, S. Psillos, Elina Pechlivanidi","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper we examine the status of relations in two prominent views in metaphysics of science, i.e. dispositionalism and structuralism, and argue that the current consensus about the metaphysics of relations, according to which relations are to be viewed as internal and as constituting no addition of being over and above their relata, needs to be re-examined. After discussing what we call internalism and externalism about relations, we show that dispositionalism and structuralism lead to opposite but equally controversial accounts of the metaphysics of relations. While we criticise some widespread versions of those views, we identify versions of dispositionalism and structuralism that we deem more promising. A core feature of both of these more promising variants is an externalist view about relations. Against the current internalist consensus, we claim that a version of externalism about relations is the view that best combines metaphysical rigour with a naturalistic stance.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"145 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45213083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Events and Modes 事件和模式
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-06-10 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0047
Michele Paolini Paoletti
{"title":"Events and Modes","authors":"Michele Paolini Paoletti","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0047","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I shall refine in this article Jaegwon Kim’s theory of events by appealing to modes, i.e., particular properties that also depend on their ‘bearers’ for their identity. Events will turn out to be occurrent modes, i.e., relational modes having further modes and times as their relata. In Section 1 I shall briefly present Kim’s theory and some difficulties that affect it. In Section 2, after having made some preliminary assumptions on modes and universals, I shall introduce occurrent modes. In Section 3 I shall show how my theory can deal with the difficulties discussed in Section 1.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"24 1","pages":"71 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47536939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In Praise of Externalism? Spaulding, Dewey, and the Logic of Relations 赞美外在主义?斯波尔丁，杜威，与关系逻辑
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-06-03 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0002
M. Neuber
{"title":"In Praise of Externalism? Spaulding, Dewey, and the Logic of Relations","authors":"M. Neuber","doi":"10.1515/mp-2022-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2022-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debate over ‘internal’ and ‘external’ relations is well explored, as far as its course in Britain is concerned. F. H. Bradley’s idealistic internalism, on the one hand, and Bertrand Russell’s realistic externalism, on the other, were at the center of this debate. Less well known, however, is that there was also a discussion about relations in the United States at the time. The central figures in this discussion were Edward Gleason Spaulding and John Dewey. Like Russell, Spaulding advocated a realist-inspired externalism, while Dewey criticized this viewpoint from a pragmatist perspective. The aim of the present paper is to reconstruct the exchange between Spaulding and Dewey and to elaborate the specifics of this exchange. In doing so it will emerge, among other things, (1) that, in contrast to Bradley’s idealist rejection of externalism, Dewey’s pragmatist attempt at a refutation was more in line with common sense and science and (2) that Spaulding’s version of externalism differed markedly from Russell’s in its strong empirical orientation. Overall, an undeservedly forgotten chapter in the history of early twentieth-century American philosophy is revisited and reassessed.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"123 - 144"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47030448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Presentism & Passage 现代主义与通道
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0052
Paul R. Daniels
{"title":"Presentism & Passage","authors":"Paul R. Daniels","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0052","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the presentist, only the present moment exists and, as time passes, what’s present changes. However some argue that, if only one moment exists, the presentist cannot explain the passage of time. While the presentist historically appeals to surrogates—proxies which exist in the present but play the role of non-existent past times—to evade this sort of worry, the appeal to surrogates has come under renewed attack from Lisa Leininger. But hope is not lost for the presentist. I argue that presentists do have the resources available to address the underlying issue Leininger articulates. Moreover, there’s disagreement amongst presentists about which version of presentism is best. For instance, David Ingram has recently argued that thisness presentism is preferable to other versions of presentism because it’s able to handle certain problems other versions of presentism cannot. However, I argue that this assessment is premature. More specifically, I argue that Ingram’s response to an objection from Lisa Leininger fails to address the core issue she raises. Consequently, I argue that presentists shouldn’t embrace thisness presentism just yet. In this way, my aims here are to: sharpen Leininger’s objection, highlight tenable presentist replies to it, and advance the discussion about which version of presentism should be favoured.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"369 - 384"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45640979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Mental-Physical-Self Topology: The Answer Gleaned From Modeling the Mind-Body Problem 身心自拓扑：从身心问题建模中寻找答案
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0016
Christopher Morgan
{"title":"A Mental-Physical-Self Topology: The Answer Gleaned From Modeling the Mind-Body Problem","authors":"Christopher Morgan","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The mind-body problem is intuitively familiar, as mental and physical entities mysteriously interact. However, difficulties arise when intertwining concepts of the self with mental and physical traits. To avoid confusion, I propose instead focusing on three categories, with the mental matching the mind and physical the body with respect to raw inputs and outputs. The third category, the self, will experience and measure the others. With this new classification, we can see difficulties clearly, specifically five questions covering interaction and correlation. We break down the problem using both existing theories and a hypercube topology representing the solution. We show any satisfactory theory must explain both spatial interaction and content correlation, and that we cannot escape our topology, whatever our preferred fundamental substance and mind-body movement permutation. We conclude by looking outside the hypercube, noting how solutions such as existential monism, priority monism, and will-based cosmic-idealism avoid the dangers involved.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"319 - 339"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49371880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fictional Universal Realism 虚构的普遍现实主义
IF 0.2
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics Pub Date : 2022-05-31 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2021-0049
J. Goodman
{"title":"Fictional Universal Realism","authors":"J. Goodman","doi":"10.1515/mp-2021-0049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0049","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Certain realists about properties and relations identify them with universals. Furthermore, some hold that for a wide range of meaningful predicates, the semantic contribution to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which those predicates figure is the universal expressed by the predicate. I here address ontological issues raised by predicates first introduced to us via works of fiction and whether the universal realist should accept that any such predicates express universals. After assessing arguments by Braun, D. (2015. “Wondering about Witches.” In Fictional Objects, edited by S. Brock, and , A. Everett, 71–113. Oxford: Oxford University Press) and Sawyer, S. (2015. “The Importance of Fictional Properties.” In Fictional Objects, edited by S. Brock, and A. Everett, 208–29. Oxford: Oxford University Press) for fictional universal anti-realism, I propose a novel, Kripke-inspired argument for the same conclusion. I ultimately defend the claim that while this argument presents the strongest case for fictional universal anti-realism, it is nonetheless unsound. I conclude that nothing stands in the way of accepting that some fictional predicates express fictional universals.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":"23 1","pages":"177 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43202296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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