非因果解释能回答莱布尼兹问题吗?

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
Jens Lemanski
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要当谈到“为什么有东西而不是什么都没有?”这个问题的制定和回答策略时,莱布尼茨经常被认为是权威。然而,目前的许多研究都认为莱布尼茨提倡一个明确的问题和答案策略。在这方面,人们反复发现文献中的论点,即对这个问题的替代解释方法违反了莱布尼茨的意图,因为他从充分理性的原则中得出了这个问题,并要求对这个问题进行因果解释。特别是,关于莱布尼茨问题的非因果解释策略的新研究似乎关注这一反论点。然而,在这篇论文中,我认为,虽然莱布尼茨是通过充分理性原则提出这个问题的,但他甚至倾向于对这个问题采取非因果解释策略。因此,更准确的莱布尼茨解释似乎不仅使莱布尼茨问题合法化,而且支持对莱布尼兹问题的非因果解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question?
Abstract Leibniz is often cited as an authority when it comes to the formulation and answer strategy of the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Yet much current research assumes that Leibniz advocates an unambiguous question and strategy for the answer. In this respect, one repeatedly finds the argument in the literature that alternative explanatory approaches to this question violate Leibniz’s intention, since he derives the question from the principle of sufficient reason and also demands a causal explanation to the question. In particular, the new research on non-causal explanatory strategies to the Leibniz question seems to concern this counter-argument. In this paper, however, I will argue that while Leibniz raises the question by means of the principle of sufficient reason, he even favours a non-causal explanatory strategy to the question. Thus, a more accurate Leibniz interpretation seems not only to legitimise but also to support non-causal explanations to the Leibniz question.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
29
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