{"title":"Judge financial holdings and case outcomes: Evidence from judge financial disclosures","authors":"Tuhin Harit,Sunil Parupati,Jedson Pinto,Gil Sadka","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101949","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"15 1","pages":"101949"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149210653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Good Idea Dilemma","authors":"Eti Einhorn,Nisan Langberg,Tsahi Versano","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101954","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"65 1","pages":"101954"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149210651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managerial delegation within firms and peer information environment","authors":"Jalal Sani","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101951","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"9 1","pages":"101951"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149092954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Direct and Indirect Effects of Transparency Regulation","authors":"Matthias Breuer, Patricia Breuer","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101950","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the direct and indirect effects of transparency regulation on economic activity. Using two distinct sources of regulatory variation—the varying extent of financial-reporting requirements and the staggered introduction of electronic business registers in Europe—, we find that direct exposure to transparency regulation tends to hurt focal firms’ economic activity (e.g., production and employment). By contrast, we find that indirect exposure to transparency regulation imposed on other related firms tends to help focal firms’ economic activity. In terms of relative magnitudes, we find that the negative direct and positive indirect effects tend to be of similar size, almost perfectly offsetting each other. Collectively, our evidence suggests that transparency regulation appears to primarily reallocate economic activity from more toward less regulated markets rather than help or hurt aggregate economic activity.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"7 1","pages":"101950"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149123818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Navigating new accounting standards: Implications for firms and their auditors","authors":"Will Anding","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101952","url":null,"abstract":"I examine the consequences of implementing new accounting standards on financial reporting quality. While prior research suggests that standards generally achieve their regulatory objectives, recent literature identifies firms’ significant technical accounting capacity constraints, motivating the need to explore the broader consequences of accounting standards adoption on financial reporting quality. Using a novel AI-based approach to identify firms affected by new accounting standards, I find a decrease in financial reporting quality when firms implement new standards. Evidence suggests the impaired financial reporting quality is in accounting areas unrelated to the new standards, consistent with a distraction effect. Results are more pronounced when firms face other concurrent accounting-related challenges, when accounting standards are more complex, and when auditors have resource constraints. These findings provide evidence of the unintended consequences of new accounting standards and shed light on potential ways to mitigate these costs.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"45 1","pages":"101952"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149124154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scott Dyreng, Elia Ferracuti, Robert Hills, Matthew Kubic
{"title":"Measurement Error when Estimating Covenant Slack and Violations","authors":"Scott Dyreng, Elia Ferracuti, Robert Hills, Matthew Kubic","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101937","url":null,"abstract":"We collect quantitative (true thresholds and realizations) and qualitative (compliance status) covenant information from SEC filings to examine the accuracy of compliance estimates derived using data from commercial databases. Estimated covenant slack frequently overestimates covenant violations, and only rarely understates them, with this asymmetry holding for both qualitative and quantitative disclosers. The non-random structure of this measurement error has implications for research that relies on estimated violations or on precise measurement of covenant realizations near a threshold. Across our two samples of disclosers, we find evidence consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis for debt-to-EBITDA covenants once measurement error is considered. We also show that the lender forbearance rate declines sharply after correcting estimated violations for measurement error, and that true violations, but not estimated violations, are associated with negative stock market reactions and loan renegotiations. Finally, we investigate practical approaches to reduce measurement error.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148884930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulating via Social Media: Deterrence Effects of the SEC’s Use of Twitter","authors":"Raphael Duguay, Jinjie Lin, Jake Thomas, Laiyi Yin","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101938","url":null,"abstract":"We study whether misconduct by firms and investment advisers declines around a quasi-natural experiment created by the staggered launch of Twitter accounts by regional offices of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Even though the tweets repackage information available on the SEC’s website, we find a reduction in opportunistic insider trading and financial misreporting for firms, and a reduction in customer complaints against investment advisers. Consistent with the tweets making enforcement actions more salient and widely disseminated, we find the decline in misconduct to be cross-sectionally related to Twitter following and engagement, the fraction of retail clients, tweet content, and investment in compliance. In addition, we find Twitter adoption expands press coverage of the SEC’s work and increases stock market reactions to SEC enforcement actions. Our results suggest that regulators’ use of social media, a relatively low-cost intervention, deters misconduct.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148852797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What drives banks’ overreaction to loan loss information? Discussion of imperfect expectations in loan loss forecasts","authors":"Scott Liao, Brent A. Schmidt","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2026.101936","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"35 1","pages":"101936"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148754818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}