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Do major corporate customers deter supplier misconduct? 大公司客户是否能阻止供应商的不当行为？
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-05-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101801
Jie Chen, Xunhua Su, Xuan Tian, Bin Xu, Luo Zuo
{"title":"Do major corporate customers deter supplier misconduct?","authors":"Jie Chen, Xunhua Su, Xuan Tian, Bin Xu, Luo Zuo","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101801","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether major corporate customers can deter misconduct among their suppliers. Our findings indicate that firms with concentrated customer bases are less likely to commit misconduct and face lower penalties in equilibrium. We also observe a significant decline in supplier misconduct following the establishment of a major customer relationship. Furthermore, the deterrent effect of major customers is more pronounced when customer pressure to reduce supplier misconduct risk is higher. Additional analyses suggest that major customers exercise their exit option to penalize suppliers after acute violations. Overall, our results suggest that major customers play a crucial role in deterring supplier misconduct.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144133753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does observability of ratings shopping improve ratings quality? 评价购物的可观察性是否提高了评价质量？
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-05-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101800
Sanjay Kallapur, Abdul Khizer, Hariom Manchiraju, Rajesh Vijayaraghavan
{"title":"Does observability of ratings shopping improve ratings quality?","authors":"Sanjay Kallapur, Abdul Khizer, Hariom Manchiraju, Rajesh Vijayaraghavan","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101800","url":null,"abstract":"Ratings shopping is a well-documented cause for ratings inflation by credit rating agencies (CRAs). Its unobservability makes it difficult for market participants to undo it. In this paper, we exploit a unique regulation in India that requires CRAs to disclose ratings that were solicited but were eventually rejected by issuers. This regulation, which aims to enhance the transparency in the ratings process, allows us to empirically examine whether these disclosures influence ratings shopping and, consequently, ratings inflation. We find that the disclosure requirements result in an increase in the incidence of future downgrades and type 1 errors and a decrease in the occurrence of type 2 errors. These results are consistent with the view that the enhanced disclosure requirement did not reduce shopping and instead led to unintended consequences, such as an increase in implicit shopping, where issuers selectively engage lenient CRAs to obtain favorable ratings.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"157 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144133752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Muni Disclosure: All talk and no trade? 穆尼披露：光说不做？
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-04-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101797
Christine Cuny, Ken Li, Anya Nakhmurina, Edward M. Watts
{"title":"Muni Disclosure: All talk and no trade?","authors":"Christine Cuny, Ken Li, Anya Nakhmurina, Edward M. Watts","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101797","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines which municipal disclosures provide informational value to investors. Using the entire universe of post-issuance financial and event disclosures from 2009 to 2022, we find that most municipal bonds do not trade in the weeks following a disclosure. However, some disclosures do provide enough new information to increase trading. Investors trade more on credit-relevant disclosures, such as adverse credit event disclosures, and less on required annual financial statements. Trading after disclosures also increases more when a bond is large or risky. Moreover, we find that credit rating agencies respond to disclosures, lending support to the idea that some disclosures have informational value. In further analyses, we find that trading before the disclosure, lack of timeliness, illiquidity, and information processing constraints contribute to the limited trading on the average disclosure. The findings suggest that reconsidering a one-size-fits-all approach to regulating post-issuance municipal disclosures may be worthwhile.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"08 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143903139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equity-based compensation and the timing of share repurchases: the role of the corporate calendar 基于股权的薪酬和股票回购的时机：公司日历的作用
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-04-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101798
Ingolf Dittmann, Amy Yazhu Li, Stefan Obernberger, Jiaqi (Jacky) Zheng
{"title":"Equity-based compensation and the timing of share repurchases: the role of the corporate calendar","authors":"Ingolf Dittmann, Amy Yazhu Li, Stefan Obernberger, Jiaqi (Jacky) Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101798","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether CEOs use share repurchases to sell their equity at inflated prices. We document that share repurchases, like equity-based compensation, are affected by the corporate calendar—the firm's schedule of earnings announcements and insider trading restrictions. The corporate calendar can fully explain why share repurchases and equity-based compensation coincide. The alignment with the corporate calendar is stricter in firms with strong internal governance or high external monitoring. When CEOs sell equity, firms are actually less likely to repurchase. Our findings reconcile earlier studies and highlight the importance of the corporate calendar for the timing of share repurchases.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"280 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143903124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Assessing the objective function of the SEC against financial misconduct: A structural approach 评估美国证券交易委员会对金融不端行为的目标功能：一种结构方法
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101794
Chuan Chen, Yanrong Jia, Xiumin Martin, Bernardo Silveira
{"title":"Assessing the objective function of the SEC against financial misconduct: A structural approach","authors":"Chuan Chen, Yanrong Jia, Xiumin Martin, Bernardo Silveira","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101794","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the objective function of the SEC against financial misconduct by estimating a structural model of the interactions between the SEC and a regulated firm. The SEC considers social costs, enforcement costs, and firms' compliance costs when making enforcement decisions. Identification exploits SOX as a shock to enforcement intensity. Four insights emerge from counterfactual analyses. First, marginal social costs have a greater impact on the SEC's perceived welfare than marginal enforcement costs. Second, the SEC's current enforcement mitigates earnings management to a level close to the first-best scenario. Third, a “hawkish” regulator, who perceives high social costs of financial misconduct, would impose excessive costs on society. Lastly, removing regulatory discretion would result in higher penalties and lower welfare, with little effect on earnings management.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143877893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tax enforcement and R&D credits 税收执法和研发信贷
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101784
Mary Cowx
{"title":"Tax enforcement and R&D credits","authors":"Mary Cowx","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101784","url":null,"abstract":"Tax enforcement deters noncompliance, increasing tax revenue, but may also discourage taxpayer investment in activities that policymakers aim to incentivize through tax credits and deductions. This paper investigates this investment-revenue trade-off through the lens of the research and development (R&D) tax credit, a federal tax incentive that is highly scrutinized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). My results suggest that expectations about IRS corporate tax scrutiny are negatively associated with both R&D tax credits and R&D investment, on average. I estimate each $1 of aggregate enforcement spending is associated with a reduction in R&D tax credits of $2.64. In terms of elasticities, a 1 % increase in my estimate of IRS corporate tax scrutiny is associated with a decline in R&D tax credits and R&D investment of 0.4 % and 0.2 %, respectively. A survey of 116 managers further supports that the risk of IRS scrutiny affects both R&D tax credit take-up and R&D investment decisions. Moreover, both the survey responses and archival evidence underscore the importance of internal information quality in claiming R&D tax credits, suggesting tax policy simplification as a means to address enforcement-related declines in R&D investment.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143824978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mandatory disclosures and opportunism: Evidence from repurchases 强制性披露和机会主义：来自回购的证据
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-03-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783
Brian Bratten, Meng Huang, Nicole Thorne Jenkins, Hong Xie
{"title":"Mandatory disclosures and opportunism: Evidence from repurchases","authors":"Brian Bratten, Meng Huang, Nicole Thorne Jenkins, Hong Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of disclosure requirements on managers' stock repurchase decisions. In 2003, the SEC amended Rule 10b-18, significantly increasing the disclosure requirements for and transparency of stock repurchases for all issuers. While stock repurchases are often used by firms to efficiently return capital to shareholders, they can also be used opportunistically to increase earnings per share. We find that the 2003 SEC amendment enables investors to detect and discount opportunistic repurchases, curtails the extent to which firms use opportunistic repurchases, and reduces or eliminates the negative real effects stemming from opportunistic repurchases (reduced employment, reduced capital expenditures, and reduced R&D expenditures). Our evidence suggests that disclosures aimed at increasing the transparency of firms’ activities can significantly reduce the extent to which firms use these activities opportunistically to manage earnings, thereby reducing the accompanying real consequences of opportunistic behavior.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143744706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Current Expected Credit Losses and consumer loans 当前预期信贷损失和消费贷款
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-03-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101781
João Granja, Fabian Nagel
{"title":"Current Expected Credit Losses and consumer loans","authors":"João Granja, Fabian Nagel","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101781","url":null,"abstract":"We use data from TransUnion, a large U.S. credit bureau covering millions of individual consumer loans, to examine the transition to the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) accounting standard and to provide novel evidence about the impact that raising reserve requirements has on banks’ pricing and lending decisions in the U.S. consumer lending market. We find that greater reserve requirements following the adoption of CECL induce a statistically significant but economically moderate increase in loan interest rates. The effects are more pronounced for weakly-capitalized banks and even more so for underprivileged individuals borrowing from weakly-capitalized banks. Our evidence informs the ongoing policy debate between standard setters and members of the financial industry about the potential effects of CECL on credit markets.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"215 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143678332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The asset pricing and real implications of relationship intensity disclosure 关系强度披露的资产定价及其现实意义
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-02-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101770
Xu Jiang, Jordi Mondria, Liyan Yang
{"title":"The asset pricing and real implications of relationship intensity disclosure","authors":"Xu Jiang, Jordi Mondria, Liyan Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101770","url":null,"abstract":"Investors in financial markets are often uncertain about the relationship intensity between firms and have to rely on firms’ disclosure of such relationship intensity. We analytically study the asset pricing implications of this relationship intensity uncertainty and how such uncertainty affects firms’ incentives to form and disclose their relationship intensities (i.e., the real implications). We find that while such disclosure has a positive price impact by increasing the expected cash flow, it also has a negative impact by reducing the diversification benefit of investing in multiple firms that have more correlated cash flows. The price impact upon relationship intensity disclosure is therefore not monotone: it increases with the expected benefit of relationship and decreases with the risk of the underlying relationship. Our analysis implies that mandatory disclosure of firm relationship intensities may both destroy relationship development and reduce investor welfare, i.e., has adverse real consequences.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143532986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partisan regulatory actions: Evidence from the SEC 党派监管行动：来自美国证券交易委员会的证据
IF 1.2
International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting Pub Date : 2025-02-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101777
Vivek Pandey, Xingyu Shen, Joanna Shuang Wu
{"title":"Partisan regulatory actions: Evidence from the SEC","authors":"Vivek Pandey, Xingyu Shen, Joanna Shuang Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101777","url":null,"abstract":"We study the influence of political partisanship in SEC investigations and AAER enforcement actions against financial misconduct. We find that the SEC is more likely to launch an investigation against a firm that is misaligned with the agency’s political ideology than other firms. The likelihood of an AAER appears unaffected by political misalignment, but once named in an AAER, a misaligned firm faces harsher penalties than other firms. We find evidence that collectively points to potential misallocation of scarce enforcement resources due to partisanship: conditional on investigation, misaligned firms are less likely to receive an enforcement action, and conditional on misreporting, non-misaligned firms are less likely to be investigated.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143477811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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