强制性披露投资者持有的化石燃料股份

IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Gregory S. Miller, Douglas R. Stockbridge, Christopher D. Williams
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引用次数: 0

摘要

世界各地的监管机构已经开始要求投资公司向外部利益相关者提供有关化石燃料投资的信息。在本文中,我们考察了这些披露是否会影响披露公司的投资组合和/或投资政策。2016年,加州要求一些美国保险公司在公共网站上披露其化石燃料投资,我们发现,与未披露的保险公司相比,披露的保险公司减少了约20%的化石燃料投资。尽管这是平均结果,但我们注意到投资组合变化的显著差异。我们发现,受到外部利益相关者(包括公众股东和环保活动人士)压力的保险公司更有可能剥离资产。相比之下,加州监管权力的增强与资产剥离无关。即使在披露要求被撤销后,我们发现披露保险公司也没有恢复其政策前持有的化石燃料投资,这表明这种影响造成了投资行为的长期变化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mandatory Disclosure of Investors’ Fossil Fuel Holdings
Regulators around the world have begun to require investment companies to provide information regarding fossil fuel investments to external stakeholders. In this paper we examine whether such disclosures impact the investment portfolios and/or investment policies of the disclosing firms. Using a 2016 California disclosure mandate that required some U.S. insurance companies to disclose their fossil fuel investments on a public website, we find the disclosing insurers reduced their fossil fuel investments by approximately 20% relative to the non-disclosers. Despite this on-average result, we note significant variation in changes to investment portfolios. We find insurers pressured by external stakeholders, including public shareholders and environmental activists, are more likely to divest. In contrast, enhanced Californian regulatory oversight power is unrelated to divesture. Even after the disclosure mandate is reversed, we find the disclosing insurers do not revert to their pre-policy holdings of fossil fuel investments, suggesting the impact created a longer-term change in investment behavior.
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