导演经验的重要性:Donelson, Hutzler和Rhodes的讨论(2025)

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS
Mary Ellen Carter
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引用次数: 0

摘要

Donelson、Hutzler和Rhodes(本期)研究了政府加强对竞争对手连锁董事的反垄断执法对公司治理的影响。虽然这些董事可能促进公司之间的勾结,引发反垄断担忧,但他们也带来了关键的行业专业知识,可以增强公司治理。作者发现,加强执法导致这些董事自愿减少。鉴于这些董事与改善公司绩效、投资效率和CEO监督有关,作者认为这种强制执行将损害公司治理。我讨论了对导演经历的狭隘定义的担忧,这限制了对研究结果的解释。我还讨论了本研究提出的几个悬而未决的问题,以及本研究为共同所有权研究提供的机会。在整个过程中,我提出了未来研究可能探索的问题,这些问题将增强我们对竞争对手连锁董事的理解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What Director Experience Matters: A Discussion of Donelson, Hutzler and Rhodes (2025)
Donelson, Hutzler, and Rhodes (this issue) examine the impact on firms’ corporate governance of increased government antitrust enforcement against competitor interlocking directors. While these directors could facilitate collusion among firms, raising antitrust concerns, they also bring crucial industry expertise that enhances corporate governance. The authors find enhanced enforcement led to voluntary reductions in these directors. Given that these directors are associated with improved firm performance, investment efficiency, and CEO monitoring, the authors suggest that this enforcement will impair corporate governance. I discuss concerns around the narrow definition of director experience that limits the interpretation of the findings. I also discuss several open questions raised by the study and the opportunity this study provides to contribute to research on common ownership. Throughout I propose questions that future research might explore which would enhance our understanding of competitor interlocking directorates.
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