{"title":"导演经验的重要性:Donelson, Hutzler和Rhodes的讨论(2025)","authors":"Mary Ellen Carter","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101816","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Donelson, Hutzler, and Rhodes (this issue) examine the impact on firms’ corporate governance of increased government antitrust enforcement against competitor interlocking directors. While these directors could facilitate collusion among firms, raising antitrust concerns, they also bring crucial industry expertise that enhances corporate governance. The authors find enhanced enforcement led to voluntary reductions in these directors. Given that these directors are associated with improved firm performance, investment efficiency, and CEO monitoring, the authors suggest that this enforcement will impair corporate governance. I discuss concerns around the narrow definition of director experience that limits the interpretation of the findings. I also discuss several open questions raised by the study and the opportunity this study provides to contribute to research on common ownership. Throughout I propose questions that future research might explore which would enhance our understanding of competitor interlocking directorates.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What Director Experience Matters: A Discussion of Donelson, Hutzler and Rhodes (2025)\",\"authors\":\"Mary Ellen Carter\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101816\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Donelson, Hutzler, and Rhodes (this issue) examine the impact on firms’ corporate governance of increased government antitrust enforcement against competitor interlocking directors. While these directors could facilitate collusion among firms, raising antitrust concerns, they also bring crucial industry expertise that enhances corporate governance. The authors find enhanced enforcement led to voluntary reductions in these directors. Given that these directors are associated with improved firm performance, investment efficiency, and CEO monitoring, the authors suggest that this enforcement will impair corporate governance. I discuss concerns around the narrow definition of director experience that limits the interpretation of the findings. I also discuss several open questions raised by the study and the opportunity this study provides to contribute to research on common ownership. Throughout I propose questions that future research might explore which would enhance our understanding of competitor interlocking directorates.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42721,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting\",\"volume\":\"52 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101816\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101816","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
What Director Experience Matters: A Discussion of Donelson, Hutzler and Rhodes (2025)
Donelson, Hutzler, and Rhodes (this issue) examine the impact on firms’ corporate governance of increased government antitrust enforcement against competitor interlocking directors. While these directors could facilitate collusion among firms, raising antitrust concerns, they also bring crucial industry expertise that enhances corporate governance. The authors find enhanced enforcement led to voluntary reductions in these directors. Given that these directors are associated with improved firm performance, investment efficiency, and CEO monitoring, the authors suggest that this enforcement will impair corporate governance. I discuss concerns around the narrow definition of director experience that limits the interpretation of the findings. I also discuss several open questions raised by the study and the opportunity this study provides to contribute to research on common ownership. Throughout I propose questions that future research might explore which would enhance our understanding of competitor interlocking directorates.