Filosofskii Zhurnal最新文献

{"title":"Natural intelligence in a counterattack against artificial intelligence (a polemical response to “How to Create a Mind” by Ray Kurzweil)","authors":"A. Fatenkov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-172-183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-172-183","url":null,"abstract":"By turning to geometric metaphors, the author defends the naturally based intelligence and – in the context of analysing Ray Kurzweil’s conception – criticises the artificial in­telligence. The focus is on the ability of man and machine to solve the so-called unsolv­able problems. This issue is discussed in conjunction with the issues of hierarchy, homo­geneity and heterogeneity, contradiction and analogy, meaning and information. Argu­ments are given to support the following ideas: 1) digital technologies do not overcome the fundamental limitations of analogue technologies, thus AI capabilities are also ir­reparably limited; 2) the natural intelligence works in an original way (not by analogy), so there can be no insoluble theoretical problems for it; 3) in a healthy human brain, there is neither excess nor deficiency, it does not need artificial improvement; 4) incomplete actualisation of the brain potential is not a weakness, but a strength and special feature of the human mind; 5) the theory of artificial intelligence is characterised by excessive re­ductionism and fetishization of speed.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48911354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The relevance theory, pragmatics and the problem of meaning","authors":"L. B. Makeeva","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-125-139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-125-139","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses the theory of relevance, advanced in the middle of the 1980s by Dan Sperber and Deidra Wilson, in the context of opposition between the proponents of “ideal language philosophy”, or formal semantics, and adherents of “ordinary language philoso­phy”. Though the theory was created as a version of cognitive pragmatics, an area at the junction of cognitive sciences and theoretical linguistics, it is of undoubted interest for philosophical comprehension of language, verbal communication, and the nature of meaning. Treating verbal communication as a cognitive process, Sperber and Wilson for­mulate the two most important principles underlying the process – the cognitive principle of relevance and the communicative principle of relevance. The paper explains the basic notions of the theory – ostensive communication, informative and communicative inten­tions, optimal relevance, explicature; it reveals the advantages that the authors of the the­ory see in the “inferential” model of communication over the “code” model and discusses how they present the process of understanding a speaker’s utterance by a hearer on the “implicit” and “explicit” levels and what role in the process they ascribe to pragmatic inferences. The account of the relevance theory is accompanied by its comparison with the picture of verbal communication elaborated by Paul Grice, and it is shown that though Sperber and Wilson make a start from Grice’s ideas in many respects, they intro­duce significant alterations and so they are regarded as representatives of post-Gricean pragmatics. In conclusion, it is examined how, according to the relevance theory, the se­mantics/pragmatics distinction should be drawn. It is discussed how the proposed deci­sion alters the understanding of the nature of meaning and what consequences it has for philosophy.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41748526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The concept of sobornost’ in the Georges Gurvitch’s philosophy of law","authors":"M. Zagirnyak","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-34-49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-34-49","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on the subject contains a number of indications that G.D. Gurvitch pro­vided a justification for sobornost as a legal concept reflecting the level of social deve­lopment. However, there are still no special studies devoted to this issue. The author ex­plores Gurvitch’s doctrine of auto-theurgy as a justification of a sociocultural reality and shows how Gurvitch characterizes the concept of volezrenie as a way of socialization and enculturation of an individual. The analysis of volezrenie is then used to explain why the interaction of individuals and collective social actors is a legal matter in Gurvitch’s doctrine. In his doctrine of social law, Gurvitch identifies any social fact as a legal fact. For this reason, all social interactions acquire the status of normative facts, i.e. situations of law and order formation. According to Gurvitch, coexistence of a multitude of norma­tive facts, i.e. legal pluralism, ensures the flexibility of a legal system and becomes the basis for a harmonization of personal values of individuals and transpersonal values of social phenomena. Based on these provisions, Gurvitch argues that social law contrib­utes to the achievement of social unity, namely, sobornost in the most effective way. Gurvitch defines sobornost as a self-organizing wholeness within which the freedom of an individual finds its expression through participation in the development of culture it­self. In conclusion, it is shown that sobornost, understood as a legal concept, is used in Gurvitch’s philosophy to justify an ideal of social development that overcomes the limitations of the meta-ideologies of individualism and collectivism.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47822274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Knowledge and its dynamics in intuitionistic logic","authors":"A. Pavlova","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-113-124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-113-124","url":null,"abstract":"Thе article examines the problem of superposition of deductive and cognitive attitudes in the context of intuitionistic logic. The prerequisites and methods of modelling the change in knowledge within the framework of epistemic logic are studied. The main emphasis is placed on the difference in the understanding of truth and knowledge in clas­sical and intuitionistic logic. It is shown that an alternative understanding of truth in intu­itionistic logic entails an understanding of the modality of knowledge that is different from the one used in classical logic.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49461403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Moral aspects of compatibilism","authors":"M. Sekatskaya","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-157-171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-157-171","url":null,"abstract":"Most participants in the current free will debate do not believe that the thesis of physical determinism is true in the actual world. Regardless of this fact, compatibilists keep argu­ing that free will is compatible with physical determinism, and incompatibilists keep challenging this claim. In the first and second section of this paper, I show that the com­patibility of free will with physical determinism is mainly discussed as a means to clarify what the criteria of free will and moral responsibility are. Many naturalistically minded libertarians accept the same criteria of free and morally responsible action as many com­patibilists do, but they introduce an additional criterion of indeterminism. In the last three sections, I question the moral implications of this additional criterion. In the third section, I propose a thought experiment in which agents meeting the incompatibilist criteria of freedom (IC-agents) and agents meeting the compatibilist criteria of freedom (CC-agents) live in the same possible world. If libertarians are right that an agent’s moral status depends on whether that agent meets the additional incompatibilist criterion of indeter­minism, then our treatment of IC- and CC-agents in that world should be sensitive to the moral difference between these two types of agents. However, at least in some cir­cumstances this is not the case, as I demonstrate with the example of two moral dilemmas in sections four and five. I conclude that the assumption about the different moral status of CC- and IC-agents is not supported by our moral intuitions, and thus cannot be as­serted by incompatibilists as a self-evident truth, but requires further justification.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49592079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Karen Barad’s agential realism and Niels Bohr’s conceptualism","authors":"A. Paramonov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-100-112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-100-112","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the human and social sciences to­wards contemporary natural science. In this regard, we can talk about a kind of “natural sciences turn” in these fields of knowledge. It is not just a matter of an active use of ter­minological and ideological baggage from the arsenal of natural sciences, but we can even talk about direct borrowing of argumentation. American researcher Karen Barad is one of the leading figures of this movement. Barad connects her theoretical conception of agential realism directly with quantum mechanics in its interpretation proposed by Niels Bohr. The article compares some of the key concepts of the Bohr vision of quantum mechanics, such as phenomenon, agency of observation with the reading acquired by these concepts in Barad’s agential realism. On a comparative analysis of the interpreta­tion of these concepts by Bohr and Barad a number of problematic points of the concept of agential realism are revealed.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47550965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The poetics of gentle cosmism","authors":"N. Sosna","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-70-83","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-70-83","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes an issue in Jane Bennett’s vital materialism project, namely, a spe­cific conjunction of ideas about active matter that produces various combinations of be­ings, including humans, and the possibility of this matter to articulate itself in language, including poetic forms. After a brief, but necessary discussion of some essential aspects of Bennett’s theory such as ontology based on postulates of elementary particles physics (particle collisions, resonance, isomorphism), affective ethics (partial actions based on the “positive” repetition of random impressions) and ecology (“courteous” attention to representatives of other species), the author suggests to strengthen the fluctuating nature of Bennett’s project and explore its extremes: the cosmic level of theorizing where even sympathy appears as a “gravitational” force and the level of linguistic articulation where various forms of indirect utterance, the “middle voice”, are involved. Despite the fact that between these two levels one can observe a certain isomorphism of a “weak” “non-dramatism”, the author concludes that the “physicality” of solarity and sympathy viewed as cosmic manifestations are not equal in weight to their own expression in poetic lan­guage in the spirit of Whitman or Thoreau (as exemplified in many by Bennett’s books). Therefore, these two components do not remain in the state of balance, even though Ben­nett repeatedly tries to use the concept of an interval, which is responsible for the discon­tinuation of the narratives of both types. In other words, the project shifts from a study of materiality towards its non-romantic “naming” only.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44639765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The problem of the crisis of ideals in the political philosophy of Semyon Frank (to the 100th anniversary of the “Philosophical steamer”)","authors":"V. Sharova","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-21-33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-21-33","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of the article is the problem of the crisis of ideals generated by the European Enlightenment and the Modern era, as interpreted by Russian thinkers of the first third of the 20th century. Building on the conception of Semyon Frank, the author analyzes the relationship between the socio-political ideals of the Enlightenment in the Russian version and false “idols” that led Russia and Europe to an unprecedented escalation of evil in the early 20th century, is analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the assumption that the ideals of democracy as a true power of the people, as a result of uncritical imple­mentation, lead to revolutionary violence and further reproduction of tyranny. Two ver­sions of democracy are considered: according to Frank, one of them is genuine, based on the idea of disinterested service to the truth, and the second is “false”, oriented to­wards a totalitarian utopia, fundamentally hostile to freedom. The author also analyzes Frank’s views on the phenomenon of the “idol of culture”, which is based on the idea of linear progress. According to Frank, linear progress cannot prevent Russia and Europe from falling into barbarism. Moreover, it even significantly contributed to that break­down. It is concluded that Frank as a Christian philosopher and political thinker became one of the relatively few (along with, for example, Fyodor Stepun and Vladimir Weidle), but all the more significant conductors of the Russian cultural tradition in Europe and the European cultural tradition in Russia: that is, a genuine personification of the phe­nomenon of a “Russian European”.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46246923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Problems with the problem of consciousness. Abstractions and pseudo-abstractions","authors":"V. Molchanov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-5-20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-5-20","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of consciousness is explored in the article from conceptual and terminologi­cal perspective. The question of the origins of the ambiguity of the relevant philosophical terms is discussed and relevant examples are given. The basic premise of the study is the as­sertion that abstraction works as a differentiation of differences that characterize and sep­arate kinds of experience. A methodological distinction is made between abstraction and pseudo-abstraction, which can bear the same name, in this case “consciousness”. Termi­nology is interpreted as naming of abstractions of different levels and of realizable expe­riences. The term “consciousness” denotes an element of the ultimate distinction “con­sciousness/objective world”, abstracted from a series of distinctions that characterize the types and levels of experience. Pseudo-abstraction is formed from a series of pre-ex­isting meanings of the word “consciousness” without regard to realizable types of experi­ence as types of distinctions. There are two main alternative trends in the formulation of the problem of consciousness – structural-genetic and phenomenological. The high­lighted tendencies have something in common: the vagueness of the meaning in the use of the word “consciousness” and its functioning as a pseudo-abstraction. The ideological aspect of the problem is also considered. The principle of empiricism is identified with the recognition of the primacy of the diversity of experience as the source of abstraction. An alternative is formulated concerning the problem of the unity of consciousness. Husserl’s argumentation, through which an attempt is made to single out the sphere of consciousness as independent of any type of objectivity and as self-sufficient is analyzed, as well as the way he introduces such terms as “consciousness”, “sensation”, “experi­ence”, “perception” “intentionality”. Husserl’s thought experiment, the purpose of which is to prove the identity of the sensation of color from a real and illusory object, is sub­jected to a detailed analysis.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41432183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The ontological constitution of res as simul totum and the doctrine of distinctions in Metaphysica of Nicholas Bonetus, OFM","authors":"Vitaly Ivanov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-50-69","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-50-69","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the doctrine of thing in the “Metaphysics” created in the early 1330s by an original Franciscan theologian and philosopher Nicholas Bonetus. The article points to the historical-philosophical significance of this work. In the scholastic tradition, Bonetus’s “Metaphysics’ is argued to be one of the first large and independent treatises on metaphysics, i.e. it is not related to the tradition of commenting on Aristotle. It is also the first treatise in the history of philosophy under the title “Metaphysics”, named so by the author himself. First, we present the biography of the author of the treatise and briefly characterize the structure of his four-part “Opus philosophicum”, as well as emphasize the importance of the division between metaphysics and natural theology, for the first time in the history of the scholastic tradition not only declared as a project, but also im­plemented by Bonetus. Secondly, we examine the place that book III of the “Meta­physics” occupies in Bonetus’s entire metaphysical treatise, and determine the two main themes of this book: the doctrine of res and the doctrine on distinctions and identities. Thirdly, through the analysis of the Ist and IIIrd books of “Metaphysics” we demonstrate the connection, opposition and partial coincidence of two fundamental concepts of Bone­tus's metaphysics: the concept of being as being and the concept of thing. Additionally, the leading meaning of the concept of a thing as a simul totum, that is, a single “consti­tuted whole” from metaphysical elements (formalities, quidditative and individual differ­encies, intrinsic modes, properties), is clarified. Finally, we analyze the relationship be­tween the doctrine of res and the doctrine on distinctions in Bonetus and explain how the doctrine of real and formal distinction and identity is subordinated to the goal of ana­lytics of the metaphysical “constitution of res” and is built into the treatise on the thing. This, in turn, allows us to conclude that the main difference between the “formalist trea­tise” on distinctions and identities (and this is exactly how the content of the IIIrd book of Bonetus’s “Metaphysics” was perceived in the subsequent Scotist tradition), in com­parison with the corresponding treatises of Francis of Meyronnes and Peter Thomae, is precisely the role of the ontological concept of a thing as a “metaphysical whole” or in­dividual in Bonetus that determines his understanding of “formalities”.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49199455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}