IO: Firm Structure最新文献

{"title":"How Do Independent Directors View Powerful Executive Risk-Taking Incentives? A Quasi-Natural Experiment","authors":"Viput Ongsakul, P. Jiraporn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3305749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3305749","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We explore how independent directors view managerial risk-taking incentives using a natural experiment. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous shock that raised board independence. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that independent directors view powerful risk-taking incentives unfavorably. Our results are consistent with the notion that strong managerial risk-taking incentives lead to excessive risk-taking and, as a result, are reduced in the presence of more effective governance, i.e. stronger board independence. Further analysis confirms the results, including fixed- and random-effects analysis, propensity score matching, and using Oster's (2017) method to test coefficient stability.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126827415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dynamic Networking by Entrepreneurs: Collaborative Efforts in Developing Opportunities and Mobilizing Resources","authors":"T. Elfring, W. Hulsink","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3305410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3305410","url":null,"abstract":"The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship and Collaboration is a comprehensive volume that addresses the most important topics related to collaboration and connects them to unique challenges and opportunities related to entrepreneurship.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"74 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120938669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bertrand and Cournot Competition with Network Effects and Input Pricing Strategy","authors":"Kangsik Choi, Seonyoung Lim, Dongjoon Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3302499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3302499","url":null,"abstract":"We revisit the endogenous choice of price or quantity made by two retailers in a vertical structure with a monopolistic manufacturer under network externalities when the retailers involve in centralized Nash bargaining with the two-part tariff contracts. When comparing integration to separation under Cournot and Bertrand competition, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that regardless of competition mode and the strength of network externalities, Pareto superiority can obtain under separation rather than under integration. Furthermore, we find the result that regardless of network externalities, Cournot emerges in equilibrium obtained under uniform input pricing, which is asserted to be in contrast with Basak and Wang (2016) showing that Bertrand emerges in equilibrium under discriminatory input pricing in the absence of network externalities. However, the irrelevance results hold in equilibrium: the levels of social welfare, retailers' and manufacturer's profits are equal irrespective of whether (i) input pricing strategy of the manufacturer with/without network externalities, or (ii) endogenous competition mode.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115061707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Partial Horizontal Ownership Lessen Competition More Than a Monopoly?","authors":"Duarte Brito, Ricardo Ribeiro, Helder Vasconcelos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3295318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3295318","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we investigate the anti-competitive effects of partial horizontal ownership in a setting where: (i) two cost-asymmetric firms compete a la Cournot; (ii) managers deal with eventual conflicting interests of the different shareholders by maximizing a weighted sum of firms operating profits; and (iii) weights result from the corporate control structure of the firm they run. Within this theoretical structure, we find that if the manager of the more efficient firm weights the operating profit of the (inefficient) rival more than its own profit, then partial ownership can lessen competition more than a monopoly.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116210327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tacit Collusion of Partial Cross Ownership Under Cournot Competition","authors":"Zheng Gong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3306203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3306203","url":null,"abstract":"Partial cross ownership (PCO) among firms affects their incentives to engage in tacit collusion. We analyze collusion behavior in an n-firm industry which allows asymmetric cross ownership, under Cournot competition. We find that in some ways increasing PCO hinders tacit collusion under the traditional uniform output distribution scheme. However, this scheme is not always feasible for collusion. For a greater variety of situations, we examine different subgame perfect equilibriums and conclude that, tacit collusion can be facilitated when PCO increases.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123562556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Outsourcing of Information Technology Foster Innovations in Client Organizations? An Empirical Analysis","authors":"Anjana Susarla, T. Mukhopadhyay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2323023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2323023","url":null,"abstract":"There is a substantial body of literature on information technology (IT) outsourcing. However, little is known about employing IT outsourcing to generate innovation. In this paper, we articulate the ex ante as well as ex post contracting challenges that could preclude firms from realizing such business value through outsourcing. We develop and test a model linking innovation in IT outsourcing (process innovation and service innovation) to two complementary solutions to the contractual problems: credible commitments and contingent control rights. Alternative empirical estimation approaches support the basic thesis that contractual solutions are complementary in their association with enhanced innovation performance. Our study suggests that portfolios of complementary contractual provisions need to simultaneously address ex ante and ex post hazards through contract design in the outsourcing of innovative tasks. Theoretical and practical implications are explicated.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"488 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120996967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Potential Impact of Blockchains on Corporate Governance: A Survey on Shareholders’ Rights in the Digital Era","authors":"V. Magnier, P. Barban","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3307521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3307521","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchains offer a revolutionary application of cryptography and information technology to old financial record-keeping issues while forging great hopes with regard to lower cost, greater liquidity, more accurate record-keeping, and transparency of ownership. There is also an increasing demand from individual companies to employ blockchains in their activities as some stock exchanges see blockchain technology as a new method for trading corporate equities and tracking their ownership.<br><br>At the same time, an expanded use of this new technology may introduce new risks on the market and lead to far-reaching changes in corporate governance. The end of anonymity is one of these issues but other corporate governance issues may be raised. While EU regulation regarding shareholders’ rights is moving forward, these risks have not been taken into account so far: the potential impact blockchains may have on shareholders’ protection in the EU Market and elsewhere is absent. European institutions seem to have dodged consideration of this impact.<br><br>This paper evaluates the potential implication blockchains may have in a near future, assessing whether and how this new technology may modify the balance of power among managers, institutional investors, small shareholders, proxy advisors and other parties involved in corporate governance.<br>","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116983208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"State Ownership-Capital Structure Nexus: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms","authors":"Xiao Jiang, J. Shen, Jun Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3286287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3286287","url":null,"abstract":"We study the determinants of capital structure, especially the effect of state ownership on corporate debt financing practices in Chinese listed firms from year 2003 to 2015. We employ quantile regression analysis as static model and system GMM as dynamic model to discover whether state ownership variations have significant impact on Chinese listed firms’ capital structure. Evidence shows that increase in state ownership can statistical significantly lead to reduction in firms’ total debt financing and short-term debt financing, but no statistical evidence supports the relationship between state ownership and reduction in long-term debt financing. Our research also found that smaller sized firms can significantly cut down debt financing if there is a boosting in state ownership in the previous period, however, larger firms are positively but statistically insignificantly affected by the variation in state ownership. Our finding suggests that Chinese listed firms, especially smaller firms are likely to reduce excessive short-term debt financing by employing state ownership even in sacrifice of private solvency, despite that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may demonstrate healthier proportion of debt capital than non-SOEs.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130725937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust","authors":"Joshua D. Wright, Elyse Dorsey, J. Rybnicek, Jonathan Klick","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3249524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3249524","url":null,"abstract":"For antitrust practitioners, scholars, and economists – those who work with antitrust in agencies, courts, or law firms – the development of the antitrust laws over the past half century has been a remarkable and positive development for the American economy and consumers. Most fundamentally, there is agreement that the goal of protecting consumer welfare is and should be the lodestar of modern antitrust enforcement. This has not always been the case. For much of its history, antitrust has done more harm than good. Prior to the modern “consumer-welfare” era, antitrust laws employed confused doctrines that pursued populist notions and often led to contradictory results that purported to advance a variety of social and political goals at the expense of American consumers. From the perspective of antitrust professionals and academics, there is widespread agreement that the intellectual revolution that led to the consumer welfare standard saved an incoherent doctrine from its own internal inconsistencies and saved consumers from its perverse and paradoxical results. Outside of mainstream antitrust practice and the academy, things look quite different. There appears to be another revolution brewing – the Hipster Antitrust Movement. It calls for the return of populism in antitrust enforcement. It declares the modern antitrust era - and the consumer welfare standard specifically – a failure. Hipster Antitrust lays at antitrust law’s feet a myriad of perceived socio-political problems, including, but not limited to, rising inequality, employee wage concerns, and the concentration of political power. The drumbeat for this revolution is strong and growing, with a broad range of enthusiastic participants and devotees, including public intellectuals and think tankers, as well as prominent members of Congress. At its core, the Hipster Antitrust movement calls for a total rejection of the commitment to economic methodology and evidence-based policy that lies at the heart of modern antitrust enforcement. In this Article, we evaluate the Hipster Antitrust claims. Some of those claims are made on modern antitrust’s own terms: that a return to “big-is-bad” antitrust enforcement based upon firm size or banning vertical mergers would make consumers better off. Others are “outside” the domain of consumer welfare-based antitrust: that lax antitrust has caused an increase in economic inequality. We demonstrate that, when evaluated as evidence-based policy proposals, the Hipster Antitrust agenda fails to substantiate its claims and promises. We discuss the dangers to consumers and society of adopting the populist antitrust approach, including enhancing corporate welfare at the expense of consumers, and encouraging rent-seeking by giving agencies and judges unbridled discretion.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131630036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hidden Beneficial Ownership and Control: Canada as a Pawn in the Global Game of Money Laundering","authors":"D. Meunier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3246098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3246098","url":null,"abstract":"Official estimates of money laundering in Canada range from $5 billion to $100 billion. Offences such as drug trafficking, fraud, tax evasion, smuggling and corruption are fuelling the laundering of dirty money. While many methods and techniques may be used to hide ill-gotten gains from tax authorities and police, launderers often use corporations and trusts to co-mingle dirty money with legitimate funds to flow them through these entities’ bank accounts or brazenly use the entity to exclusively conduct illegal activities. The “secret sauce” in this recipe is the creation of legal arrangements that hide the beneficial owner of the corporation, partnership or trust that exercises significant control over the entity. Indeed, with professional knowhow, complex structures can be created in Canada, or offshore, that will slow down or stop any intrepid investigator trying to connect the dirty money to the beneficial owner. The focus of this Commentary is to show how the lack of beneficial ownership transparency facilitates the use of corporations and trusts for illicit purposes. At present, there are no requirements to disclose beneficial ownership when creating a corporation. Nominee shareholders and directors can be appointed without disclosing the ultimate beneficial owner or the nominator. For trusts, there are also no requirements to identify the parties when registering. As a result, Canada fares poorly on international standards for disclosing beneficial ownership. Lack of beneficial ownership transparency is not only a structural flaw in Canada’s corporate registration system (federally, provincially and territorially) and, consequently, in its anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing measures, but it paints Canada as an international laggard and as a financial-secrecy jurisdiction. However, there now is a global momentum, led by the Europeans, to make beneficial ownership registries accessible to the public, and trusts under certain conditions, to more effectively address the threats posed by money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption and tax evasion. This Commentary’s recommendations are for the federal government, in collaboration with the provinces and territories, to establish a central publicly accessible beneficial ownership registry of corporations and certain trusts; require all reporting entities under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to identify beneficial ownership information; place the onus on corporations and trusts to truthfully and fully disclose beneficial ownership information; and follow the European example by keeping Canada current with the international standards, commitments and trends on beneficial ownership transparency.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116844188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}