IO: Firm Structure最新文献

Double Marginalization and Misplacement in Online Advertising 网络广告中的双重边缘化与错位

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2021-09-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3926873

Alexander White, K. Jain, Shota Ichihashi, Byung-Cheol Kim

引用次数: 0

Compensating with Style? The Role of Compensation-Committee Experience on CEO Pay 用风格来补偿?薪酬委员会经验对CEO薪酬的作用

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2021-07-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3911947

Joonil Lee, S. Lee, Kevin J. Murphy, P. Oh

{"title":"Compensating with Style? The Role of Compensation-Committee Experience on CEO Pay","authors":"Joonil Lee, S. Lee, Kevin J. Murphy, P. Oh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3911947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3911947","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how the level and structure of CEO pay is influenced by the characteristics and past experience of the members of the compensation committee, and also how these characteristics and experiences affect the probability of committee appointment. Our main findings indicate that (1) CEO pay in the current firm is more likely to be above (or below) market if CEO pay in the committee-members’ prior-firm experience was also above (or below) market; (2) the influence of this past experience diminishes over time as current year’s pay decisions are more likely to be influenced by experience from recent past years than from experience further past; and (3) while new directors are more likely to be appointed to the compensation committee if they have prior compensation-committee experience, we find no evidence that new directors with experience with highly paid CEOs are more likely to be appointed to compensation committees, and also no evidence that that companies choose compensation committees with experiences matching the focal firm’s pay philosophy. Overall, our paper extends the literature on board of directors affecting CEO pay, and also contributes to the literature on managerial styles and contagion.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129702408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Assessing the Value of Cooperative Membership: A Case of Dairy Marketing in the United States 合作社成员的价值评估:以美国乳制品营销为例

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3722157

Daniel M. Munch, T. Schmit, R. Severson

{"title":"Assessing the Value of Cooperative Membership: A Case of Dairy Marketing in the United States","authors":"Daniel M. Munch, T. Schmit, R. Severson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3722157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3722157","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The existence of cooperative organizations in today’s business environment, particularly in agriculture, signals their continued ability to provide value to their member owners. However, due largely to data limitations, we know very little about the monetary value of ownership held by members and how value changes across members of differing characteristics. Through a discrete choice experiment with more than 200 dairy farmers in the United States, we examine these issues explicitly for dairy marketing cooperatives that purchase their members’ milk and process it into finished dairy products. Results suggest that dairy farmers, on aggregate, are willing to accept lower per hundredweight compensation, 2.3% of the average milk price, to be cooperative members relative to selling to independent handlers. Results also suggest dairy farmers actively consider the industry wide impacts within pricing offers on preferences for other milk pricing attributes. The inclusion of demographic covariates highlights preferences important to understanding heterogeneous member interests and, thus, informing improved cooperative governance strategies and board decision making to address them.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129120807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Vertical Integration and Bargaining: Linear vs Two-part tariffs 垂直整合与议价:线性与两部分关税

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2021-05-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3851918

Frago Kourandi, Ioannis N. Pinopoulos

引用次数: 0

Public Company Auditing Around the Securities Exchange Act 围绕《证券交易法》的上市公司审计

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2021-04-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3837593

Thomas Bourveau, Matthias Breuer, Jeroen Koenraadt, Robert C. Stoumbos

{"title":"Public Company Auditing Around the Securities Exchange Act","authors":"Thomas Bourveau, Matthias Breuer, Jeroen Koenraadt, Robert C. Stoumbos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3837593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3837593","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the landscape of public company auditing around the introduction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934. Using a broad sample of historical annual reports spanning several decades, we document that most public companies obtained audits even before the SEC’s audit mandate, which limited the mandate’s impact on audit rates. We further document that these companies selected their auditors based on characteristics reﬂecting independence and competence, even before the SEC’s mandate. While changes in audit rates and auditor choices were limited, we observe signiﬁcant changes in the content of audit statements around the introduction of the SEC. These changes, however, appear to reﬂect concurrent standardization eﬀorts initiated and driven by private-sector actors rather than the SEC. Finally, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact of the SEC’s audit mandate on capital-market outcomes. Collectively, our descriptive evidence suggests that the introduction of the SEC, while widely viewed as a sea-change in public company auditing, had a limited impact on companies’ reliance on audits and investors’ trust in companies’ reports, at least initially.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126442922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Board Composition and Performance of State-owned Enterprises: Quasi-experimental Evidence 国有企业董事会构成与绩效:准实验证据

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2021-04-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3852382

A. Baltrunaite, Mario Cannella, S. Mocetti, Giacomo Roma

引用次数: 11

Risk Concentration and Interconnectedness in OTC Markets 场外交易市场的风险集中与互联性

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2021-03-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3808072

Briana Chang, Shengxing Zhang

引用次数: 2

Does Board Gender Diversity Matter? Evidence From Hostile Takeover Vulnerability 董事会性别多元化重要吗?恶意收购漏洞的证据

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2021-01-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3770682

Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, P. Jiraporn, Sang Mook Lee, Ali Uyar, Merve Kılıç

{"title":"Does Board Gender Diversity Matter? Evidence From Hostile Takeover Vulnerability","authors":"Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, P. Jiraporn, Sang Mook Lee, Ali Uyar, Merve Kılıç","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3770682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3770682","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Purpose\u0000Theory suggests that the market for corporate control, which constitutes an important external governance mechanism, may substitute for internal governance. Consistent with this notion, using a novel measure of takeover vulnerability primarily based on state legislation, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on board characteristics with special emphasis on board gender diversity.\u0000\u0000\u0000Design/methodology/approach\u0000This paper exploits a novel measure of takeover vulnerability based on state legislation. This novel measure is likely exogenous as the legislation was imposed from outside the firm. By using an exogenous measure, the analysis is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is thus more likely to show a causal effect.\u0000\u0000\u0000Findings\u0000The results show that a more active takeover market leads to lower board gender diversity. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in a decline in board gender diversity by 10.01%. Moreover, stronger takeover market susceptibility also brings about larger board size and less board independence, corroborating the substitution effect. Additional analysis confirms the results, including propensity score matching, generalized method of moments dynamic panel data analysis and instrumental variable analysis.\u0000\u0000\u0000Originality/value\u0000The study is the first to explore the effect of the takeover market on board gender diversity. Unlike most of the previous research in this area, which suffers from endogeneity, this paper uses a novel measure of takeover vulnerability that is probably exogenous. The results are thus much more likely to demonstrate causality.\u0000","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125392193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 22

Polarized Corporate Boards 两极分化的公司董事会

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2020-12-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3747607

T. Hoang, P. Ngo, Le Zhang

引用次数: 3

Assessing the Long Run Competitive Effects of Digital Ecosystem Mergers 数字生态系统合并的长期竞争效应评估

IO: Firm Structure Pub Date : 2020-12-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3746343

Jasper van den Boom, Peerawat Samranchit

{"title":"Assessing the Long Run Competitive Effects of Digital Ecosystem Mergers","authors":"Jasper van den Boom, Peerawat Samranchit","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3746343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3746343","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on the assessment of long run anti-competitive effects on direct entry following acquisitions by digital ecosystems. The paper develops a model to combine the effects of complementarity and economies of scope, which are the two main characteristics observed in digital ecosystems. We show that these two characteristics provide a sufficient condition for a higher entry barrier of competing ecosystem, since conglomerate mergers involving ecosystem can reduce entry by reducing the potential profitability of market entry. As such, some mergers that provide short run benefits for consumer have anti-competitive long run effects that ultimately hurt consumers. Then, we study five major cases before the European Commission involving one of the ecosystems of the Big Five (Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google and Microsoft), to demonstrate how these long run effects was assessed in practice. The paper finds that the Commission should incorporate a novel test for long run effects of mergers to capture the ecosystem effect in mergers. The paper concludes by suggesting that the assessment of long run effects could happen under a reversed burden of proof, by tying it in with the undertakings claims for efficiency justifications.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126707662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2