Polarized Corporate Boards

T. Hoang, P. Ngo, Le Zhang
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

We show that political polarization between directors and a CEO negatively impacts the effectiveness of corporate boards. At the director level, polarization increases directors’ incentive to monitor the CEO but creates a hostile board environment and discourages moderate directors’ board meeting attendance. This leads to compromised board capacity at the firm level and significantly reduces forced turnover-performance sensitivity. Our results are more pronounced in presidential election years and for firms with more monitoring and advising needs. Finally, we show that polarization in the boardroom lowers investment-Q sensitivity. Our findings highlight the real economic cost of political polarization.
两极分化的公司董事会
我们发现,董事和CEO之间的政治两极分化对公司董事会的有效性产生了负面影响。在董事层面,两极分化增加了董事监督CEO的激励,但却造成了敌对的董事会环境,阻碍了温和派董事出席董事会会议。这导致公司层面的董事会能力受损,并显着降低了强制营业额-绩效敏感性。我们的结果在总统选举年和有更多监督和咨询需求的公司更为明显。最后,我们发现董事会的两极分化降低了投资q的敏感性。我们的研究结果突出了政治两极分化的实际经济成本。
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