Hidden Beneficial Ownership and Control: Canada as a Pawn in the Global Game of Money Laundering

D. Meunier
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引用次数: 12

Abstract

Official estimates of money laundering in Canada range from $5 billion to $100 billion. Offences such as drug trafficking, fraud, tax evasion, smuggling and corruption are fuelling the laundering of dirty money. While many methods and techniques may be used to hide ill-gotten gains from tax authorities and police, launderers often use corporations and trusts to co-mingle dirty money with legitimate funds to flow them through these entities’ bank accounts or brazenly use the entity to exclusively conduct illegal activities. The “secret sauce” in this recipe is the creation of legal arrangements that hide the beneficial owner of the corporation, partnership or trust that exercises significant control over the entity. Indeed, with professional knowhow, complex structures can be created in Canada, or offshore, that will slow down or stop any intrepid investigator trying to connect the dirty money to the beneficial owner. The focus of this Commentary is to show how the lack of beneficial ownership transparency facilitates the use of corporations and trusts for illicit purposes. At present, there are no requirements to disclose beneficial ownership when creating a corporation. Nominee shareholders and directors can be appointed without disclosing the ultimate beneficial owner or the nominator. For trusts, there are also no requirements to identify the parties when registering. As a result, Canada fares poorly on international standards for disclosing beneficial ownership. Lack of beneficial ownership transparency is not only a structural flaw in Canada’s corporate registration system (federally, provincially and territorially) and, consequently, in its anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing measures, but it paints Canada as an international laggard and as a financial-secrecy jurisdiction. However, there now is a global momentum, led by the Europeans, to make beneficial ownership registries accessible to the public, and trusts under certain conditions, to more effectively address the threats posed by money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption and tax evasion. This Commentary’s recommendations are for the federal government, in collaboration with the provinces and territories, to establish a central publicly accessible beneficial ownership registry of corporations and certain trusts; require all reporting entities under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to identify beneficial ownership information; place the onus on corporations and trusts to truthfully and fully disclose beneficial ownership information; and follow the European example by keeping Canada current with the international standards, commitments and trends on beneficial ownership transparency.
隐藏的实益所有权和控制权:加拿大在全球洗钱游戏中的棋子
官方估计,加拿大的洗钱金额在50亿美元到1000亿美元之间。贩毒、诈骗、逃税、走私和贪污等罪行助长了洗钱活动。虽然可以使用许多方法和技术来向税务机关和警察隐瞒不义之财,但洗钱者经常利用公司和信托将脏钱与合法资金混在一起,通过这些实体的银行账户流动,或者肆无忌惮地利用这些实体专门从事非法活动。这个秘方的“秘方”是创造一种法律安排,隐藏对实体行使重大控制权的公司、合伙企业或信托的受益所有人。事实上,有了专业知识,可以在加拿大或海外建立复杂的结构,这将减缓或阻止任何勇敢的调查人员试图将脏钱与受益所有人联系起来。本评注的重点是说明受益所有权缺乏透明度如何促进公司和信托被用于非法目的。目前,在创建公司时,没有要求披露受益所有人。被提名的股东和董事可以在不披露最终受益所有人或提名人的情况下任命。对于信托,在注册时也不需要识别当事人。因此,加拿大在披露受益所有权的国际标准上表现不佳。受益所有权缺乏透明度不仅是加拿大公司注册制度(联邦、省和地区)的结构性缺陷,也因此是反洗钱和反恐融资措施的结构性缺陷,而且还将加拿大描绘成一个国际落后者和金融保密司法管辖区。然而,在欧洲人的领导下,现在出现了一种全球势头,向公众和信托公司开放受益所有权登记,以更有效地应对洗钱、恐怖主义融资、腐败和逃税构成的威胁。本评论的建议是联邦政府与各省和地区合作,建立一个公司和某些信托的中央可公开访问的受益所有权登记处;要求所有根据《犯罪收益(洗钱)法》和《恐怖主义融资法》申报的实体确定实益拥有人信息;将实益拥有人信息真实、全面披露的责任置于公司和信托身上;并遵循欧洲的榜样,使加拿大跟上有关受益所有权透明度的国际标准、承诺和趋势。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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