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The Influence of Target Setting on Employees’ Investment Behavior 目标设定对员工投资行为的影响
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2017-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2312799
A. Brueggen, C. Feichter, F. Moers
{"title":"The Influence of Target Setting on Employees’ Investment Behavior","authors":"A. Brueggen, C. Feichter, F. Moers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312799","url":null,"abstract":"In this study we examine how target ratcheting affects employees’ tradeoff between short-term output and long-term investments. We hypothesize that while using past performance information in setting new targets (i.e. target ratcheting) decreases individuals’ short-term output, it increases investments in future productivity improvements by mitigating the negative consequences of the horizon problem. We test our prediction in a multi-period experiment, where we manipulate in a nested between subjects design the target setting procedure and within subjects the individuals’ time horizon. The results support our hypotheses that as individuals’ time horizon decreases the exogenously determined target groups lower their investment and put more attention to the short-term output task, while participants in the target ratcheting condition keep their initial strategy and invest relatively more in future productivity improvements. Therefore, this study provides a plausible explanation for the widespread use of an alleged dysfunctional practice, i.e., target ratcheting.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130561287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Earnings Management and Dynamic Incentives 盈余管理与动态激励
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2015-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2482133
S. Dutta, Qintao Fan
{"title":"Earnings Management and Dynamic Incentives","authors":"S. Dutta, Qintao Fan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2482133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2482133","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how the possibility of earnings management affect equilibrium incentives and welfare in a two-period agency setting. Managerial performance measures are positively correlated because of a time-invariant productivity component that affects earnings in both periods. The firm and the manager learn about this permanent earnings component over time and cannot commit not to revise the contract terms in light of updated information. While learning over time reduces uncertainty, its strengthening effect on the second period incentive rate is offset by the need to mitigate earnings inflation. We find that when the uncertainty about permanent earnings is large enough, allowing some earnings management can be welfare-enhancing. We also consider a career concern setting in which the permanent component of earnings relates to managerial ability. Contrary to Gibbons and Murphy (1992), we find that incentive rates and productive efforts can decline over the manager’s tenure.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114212666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Opportunistic Disclosure in the Inter-Organizational Relationships 组织间关系中的机会主义披露
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2015-08-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2540067
Grete Oll
{"title":"Opportunistic Disclosure in the Inter-Organizational Relationships","authors":"Grete Oll","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2540067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2540067","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect the accounting system choice has, when the supplier discloses accounting information opportunistically in an Inter-Organizational Relationship. A contract governs the trade and specifies: (i) a cost reimbursement and (ii) a profit sharing arrangement. The supplier’s opportunism emerges as he can manages the rate that is used for allocating overhead costs to the reimbursed product. Two methods of allocation rate management are available, leading to two distinct inefficiencies. First, the supplier can use some input factors in excess (Real Cost Management). Second, the supplier can influence the trade quantity (Real Activity Management). We find that even with opportunistic disclosure, the total profit of the relationship exceeds the profit under the arm’s-length relationship. With a traditional accounting system, the supplier engages in Real Cost Management if the total overhead cost is high compared to the total direct labour cost. With an Activity-Based Accounting system, the supplier engages in Real Cost Management when the overhead cost of the traded product is small compared to the overhead cost of other products. We further show that the supplier engage in Real Activity Management regardless of the accounting system. However, the size and the direction of the quantity distortion depends on the accounting system.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121886908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Private Information and Performance Measurement Bias with Multiple Agents 多个代理的私人信息和绩效衡量偏差
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2015-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2130729
Naomi R. Rothenberg
{"title":"Private Information and Performance Measurement Bias with Multiple Agents","authors":"Naomi R. Rothenberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2130729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2130729","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effect of performance measurement error and bias on the principal’s choice of whether to appoint a supervisor who signals private, pre-decision, productivity information to a subordinate. Without a supervisor, both agents are privately informed and relative performance evaluation is optimal, and an increase in the conservative bias increases information rents only if the bias is insignificant. With a supervisor, the subordinate learns about productivity by observing the supervisor’s effort, reducing the supervisor’s incentives to shirk. Thus, joint performance evaluation can be optimal in compensating the supervisor, and an increase in the conservative bias reduces the supervisor’s rents. The principal prefers a supervisor if the decision-making aspect of the agents’ information is insignificant, implying that effort incentives are paramount. Further, with a less accurate performance measure, the principal’s preference for a supervisor increases but only if the level of the conservative bias is small.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130414079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contractual Incentives and Career Concerns 合同激励和职业关注
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2014-08-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2482579
P. Christensen, Hans Frimor, Florin Şabac
{"title":"Contractual Incentives and Career Concerns","authors":"P. Christensen, Hans Frimor, Florin Şabac","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2482579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2482579","url":null,"abstract":"In a multi-period model of optimal contracting and career concerns, we show long-term contracting with renegotiation dominates short-term contracting if there is non-contractible information. If the non-contractible information is not effectively contractible through renegotiation of long-term contracts, the labor market may play an important role in providing incentives in a world of multiple information sources and several tasks.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116129285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Strategic CFO? Implications of the CFO's Role and Responsibilities 战略型CFO?首席财务官角色和责任的含义
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2014-08-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2160046
Henry L. Friedman
{"title":"The Strategic CFO? Implications of the CFO's Role and Responsibilities","authors":"Henry L. Friedman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2160046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2160046","url":null,"abstract":"CFOs wear many hats, as the primary agents responsible for financial reporting and control and as strategic partners within firms' top management teams. This paper uses an agency model to investigate how the role and responsibilities of the CFO affect reporting quality, firm value, and incentive compensation. In the model, a risk-neutral principal hires the risk-averse CEO and CFO. The CEO is mainly responsible for production, while the CFO is responsible for financial reporting and productive activities. Furthermore, the CEO and CFO may act independently or collaboratively. Results highlight the importance of CFO responsibilities besides financial reporting, and situations where CEO-CFO collaboration is more or less preferable. Results also contradict existing practitioner literature that espouses universal benefits to having a CFO who is purely a strategic partner in the top management team.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128972940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Confounding Effect of Cost Stickiness in Conservatism Research 成本粘性在稳健性研究中的混淆效应
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2014-08-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2482025
R. Banker, Sudipta Basu, Dmitri Byzalov, Janice Y. S. Chen
{"title":"The Confounding Effect of Cost Stickiness in Conservatism Research","authors":"R. Banker, Sudipta Basu, Dmitri Byzalov, Janice Y. S. Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2482025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2482025","url":null,"abstract":"Sales decreases affect earnings more than sales increases because of cost stickiness. We hypothesize that this correlated omitted variable constitutes a confounding effect in standard asymmetric timeliness models. Adding sales change direction to the Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2013b) models decreases measured conservatism significantly and has a large impact on the relative ranking of industry-level conservatism estimates and on inferences about drivers of conservatism. Future empirical research on conditional conservatism should control for the potential confounding effect of sticky costs.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121596352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
The Case of the Missing Cabinets Or: How I Learned to Love Risk and Become an Accounting Intrapreneur 遗失橱柜的案例:我如何学会热爱风险并成为一名会计内部企业家
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2012-08-20 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2132955
D. Spradling, M. Alvis, Wilber Clark, Nikki Shoemaker
{"title":"The Case of the Missing Cabinets Or: How I Learned to Love Risk and Become an Accounting Intrapreneur","authors":"D. Spradling, M. Alvis, Wilber Clark, Nikki Shoemaker","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2132955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2132955","url":null,"abstract":"This teaching case uses storytelling to illustrate how a missing set of cabinets can be the innovative spark that causes an existing company to enter a new line of business. The story arc illustrates how opportunities can be found anywhere, even in a low-tech/old-school business like kitchen and bath cabinets. The case demonstrates how FACE (Fast/Accurate/Cheap/Easy) should be used as a prism for fostering innovation and how intrapreneurship is the preferred vehicle for managing entrepreneurship risk. The plot requires participants to demonstrate their understanding of how management accountants can use their critical thinking skills to assist in the preparation of a Proof of Concept. The teaching notes explain how the themes of (1) Proof of Concept, (2) Critical Thinking, (3) FACE, and (4) Governance v Innovation can be scaled to fit a wide array of participants ranging from undergraduate to graduate to corporate training classes. The notes also contain various instructional resources which the instructor can use to help the participants understand how to apply critical thinking skills to solve an unstructured assignment such as a Proof of Concept. However, answering whether the business model presented in the case is a good idea is left up to the instructor and participants. Life does not come with a solution manual.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122960471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Determinants of ‘Sticky Costs': An Analysis of Cost Behavior using United States Air Transportation Industry Data “粘性成本”的决定因素:使用美国航空运输业数据的成本行为分析
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2011-06-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1895615
James N. Cannon
{"title":"Determinants of ‘Sticky Costs': An Analysis of Cost Behavior using United States Air Transportation Industry Data","authors":"James N. Cannon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1895615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1895615","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: This paper examines determinants of sticky cost behavior, costs that increase faster than they decrease as demand fluctuates. The majority of the literature infers that sticky costs arise because managers retain idle capacity as demand falls, but add capacity as demand grows. I use United States Air Transportation industry data to confirm that managers do retain idle capacity when demand falls. However, I also find that sticky costs arise because managers lower selling prices to utilize existing capacity when demand falls, but add capacity (rather than raise selling prices) when demand grows. Finally, I find that sticky costs arise because managers incur more cost when adding capacity as demand grows than they incur when they add capacity as demand falls. Conversely, I find evidence of anti-sticky costs that occur because managers save more cost by removing capacity when demand falls than they save by removing capacity when demand grows. Data Availability: Data are available from the author upon...","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116221795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 115
Impact of Alternative Reporting Systems in Multi-Agent Contracting 多代理合同中替代报告系统的影响
Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2005-11-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.773584
Gerald A. Feltham, C. Hofmann
{"title":"Impact of Alternative Reporting Systems in Multi-Agent Contracting","authors":"Gerald A. Feltham, C. Hofmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.773584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.773584","url":null,"abstract":"The analysis in this paper extends the single-agent/multi-task LEN model in Feltham/Xie (1994) to a multi-agent/multi-task context. A key feature of the paper is that we consider the impact of alternative reporting systems on full- and limited-commitment contracts. With a centralized reporting system all performance measures are reported to the principal, while some measures are not reported to the principal with a decentralized reporting system. Under limited commitment, the principal may prefer to restrict the agents' access to certain measures. While additional reports are weakly preferred if there is full commitment, these reports may have a negative effect if there is limited commitment.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131968114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
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