战略型CFO?首席财务官角色和责任的含义

Henry L. Friedman
{"title":"战略型CFO?首席财务官角色和责任的含义","authors":"Henry L. Friedman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2160046","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"CFOs wear many hats, as the primary agents responsible for financial reporting and control and as strategic partners within firms' top management teams. This paper uses an agency model to investigate how the role and responsibilities of the CFO affect reporting quality, firm value, and incentive compensation. In the model, a risk-neutral principal hires the risk-averse CEO and CFO. The CEO is mainly responsible for production, while the CFO is responsible for financial reporting and productive activities. Furthermore, the CEO and CFO may act independently or collaboratively. Results highlight the importance of CFO responsibilities besides financial reporting, and situations where CEO-CFO collaboration is more or less preferable. Results also contradict existing practitioner literature that espouses universal benefits to having a CFO who is purely a strategic partner in the top management team.","PeriodicalId":416245,"journal":{"name":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Strategic CFO? Implications of the CFO's Role and Responsibilities\",\"authors\":\"Henry L. Friedman\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2160046\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"CFOs wear many hats, as the primary agents responsible for financial reporting and control and as strategic partners within firms' top management teams. This paper uses an agency model to investigate how the role and responsibilities of the CFO affect reporting quality, firm value, and incentive compensation. In the model, a risk-neutral principal hires the risk-averse CEO and CFO. The CEO is mainly responsible for production, while the CFO is responsible for financial reporting and productive activities. Furthermore, the CEO and CFO may act independently or collaboratively. Results highlight the importance of CFO responsibilities besides financial reporting, and situations where CEO-CFO collaboration is more or less preferable. Results also contradict existing practitioner literature that espouses universal benefits to having a CFO who is purely a strategic partner in the top management team.\",\"PeriodicalId\":416245,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)\",\"volume\":\"6 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-08-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2160046\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2160046","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

首席财务官身兼数职,既是负责财务报告和财务控制的主要代理人,也是公司最高管理团队的战略合作伙伴。本文采用代理模型来研究CFO的角色和责任如何影响报告质量、公司价值和激励性薪酬。在这个模型中,风险中性的负责人雇佣了风险厌恶的首席执行官和首席财务官。CEO主要负责生产,CFO负责财务报告和生产活动。此外,首席执行官和首席财务官可以独立行动,也可以协同行动。结果突出了CFO除了财务报告之外职责的重要性,以及CEO-CFO协作或多或少更可取的情况。研究结果也与现有的从业者文献相矛盾,这些文献认为,拥有一位纯粹是高层管理团队战略合作伙伴的首席财务官,对所有人都有好处。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Strategic CFO? Implications of the CFO's Role and Responsibilities
CFOs wear many hats, as the primary agents responsible for financial reporting and control and as strategic partners within firms' top management teams. This paper uses an agency model to investigate how the role and responsibilities of the CFO affect reporting quality, firm value, and incentive compensation. In the model, a risk-neutral principal hires the risk-averse CEO and CFO. The CEO is mainly responsible for production, while the CFO is responsible for financial reporting and productive activities. Furthermore, the CEO and CFO may act independently or collaboratively. Results highlight the importance of CFO responsibilities besides financial reporting, and situations where CEO-CFO collaboration is more or less preferable. Results also contradict existing practitioner literature that espouses universal benefits to having a CFO who is purely a strategic partner in the top management team.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信