合同激励和职业关注

Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only) Pub Date : 2014-08-18 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2482579

P. Christensen, Hans Frimor, Florin Şabac

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在最优契约和职业考虑的多时期模型中，我们发现在存在非契约信息的情况下，重新谈判的长期契约优于短期契约。如果非契约性信息不能通过长期合同的重新谈判有效地契约性，那么在一个多信息来源和多任务的世界中，劳动力市场可能在提供激励方面发挥重要作用。

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Contractual Incentives and Career Concerns

In a multi-period model of optimal contracting and career concerns, we show long-term contracting with renegotiation dominates short-term contracting if there is non-contractible information. If the non-contractible information is not effectively contractible through renegotiation of long-term contracts, the labor market may play an important role in providing incentives in a world of multiple information sources and several tasks.

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Research Papers (Concurrent Session Only)

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