Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law最新文献

{"title":"Government and Immunization: Can We Do That?","authors":"T. Vesely","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Vaccinations are a controversial issue among new parents and the government. There are many disputed facts about vaccinations causing other diseases. This discrepancy is partially derived from celebrities coming out against vaccinations, claiming they can lead to autism. Vaccines have the support of years of research, which led to the elimination of diseases like polio. However, there have been movies, articles, and personal opinions that have incited paranoia and kept people from getting vaccinations, regardless of the overwhelming majority of doctors who have stated there is no causal relationship. Due to these false narratives concerning vaccines, many lawsuits have been filed against public schools and their immunization requirements. Most of the time, case law points to only a waiver for religious exceptions, except when there is an outbreak of a disease. However, courts tend to lean towards public health over religious exemptions. The power of what exemptions and vaccinations require lies within the states. Based on the following research, it is a sound argument that individual states are constitutionally allowed to require vaccinations for all people during an outbreak, regardless of religious beliefs.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121954647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Human Life and the Environment: Is There a Balance?","authors":"Uzochukwu Okonkwo","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Developments in technology have allowed humanity increasingly effective ways to combat diseases. These developments also come with controversy. As our understanding of disease has increased, certain moral questions have been raised. These questions ask: “To what extent does humanity have a duty to take care of the environment?” and “If this duty exists, how do we accomplish this goal?” These broad questions are almost impossible for us to answer. With the rise of the Zika virus, however, these moral questions are brought to the forefront again. Oxitec, a British biotechnology company, has come up with a controversial method of combating Zika involving the use of genetically engineered mosquitoes to combat the virus. The technique involves modifying captive mosquitoes with a gene that prevents their offspring from reaching adulthood. The company planned to release these modified mosquitoes in West Florida to mate with wild mosquitoes and drive down the mosquito population. While the inhabitants of West Florida passed a vote to allow the release, environmentalists have opposed this method. They claim that the release would reduce or eradicate the mosquito population. This article will argue that genetically modified mosquitoes should be used to combat Zika, and that the preservation of human life outweighs the potential environmental impact. It will do so by examining the positive and negative aspects of using genetically modified mosquitoes and by answering whether they should be used to combat Zika, not just in West Florida, but in other problematic areas as well. The legal ramifications of this issue are dependent on which governmental agency would regulate the genetically modified mosquitoes and the environmental impact of combatting Zika through genetically engineered mosquitos.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124501562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Disability Benefit Implications of an Intentional Biological Weapon Attack","authors":"L. Roach","doi":"10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0005","url":null,"abstract":"On September 21, 2001, an assistant at the New York Post manifested an anthrax infection, believed to be the first in a possible series.1 In the following twomonths, a total of twenty-two suspected or confirmed cases of anthrax infection were documented in four states andWashington, D.C., with one removed due to a lack of supporting laboratory evidence.2 In all, five people died from these attacks and several others were permanently injured by the bacterium’s toxin.3 Because these attacks occurred only 11 days after September 11, 2001, the victims of the Amerithrax attacks were overshadowed and forgotten when determining the victim’s compensation.4 Neither the World Trade Center Health Program nor the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund addresses the eligibility of the survivors of the Amerithrax attacks, forcing them to rely on programs such as worker’s compensation or privately administered insurance policies.5 While the decedents of September 11th victims and first responders continued to receive needed access to benefits totaling $200,000 in gross income annually, Amerithrax survivors were left with limited options.6 If as a nation we believe in supporting individuals directly affected by terroristic actions, we should analyze whether the options available to the Amerithrax survivors were equally effective in providing compensation for victims of a terror attack. This article will begin with a background on the victims of the twenty-two likely infected and their families. The infection was responsible for five deaths, eight full recoveries or no further information provided, and nine individuals suffering chronic and debilitating conditions suspected to have been caused by their exposure.7 Section IV will address the basic concepts of the disability provisions present in the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA), as well as general insurance contract provisions and the limits of Social Security Administration benefits. Section Vwill analyze the Amerithrax case as it relates to the existing law to determine whether current protections for future victims are adequate or need improvement.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"69 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114013351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is the Good Samaritan Really Good? A Look into the Possible Harm Caused by Current Good Samaritan Laws","authors":"Nicolas Northcut","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0002","url":null,"abstract":"As a society, we hope to incentivize others to help those in need. In crucial life-or-death medical situations, we do not want medical professionals to have to take time to consider the potential liability they could assume. In these emergency situations, a doctor’s main preoccupation should not be determining how best to reduce possible liability. The only thing on a medical professionals’ minds should be how to best treat the patient. This desire for incentivizing decisive action is in conflict with tort law, which makes a potential rescuer liable for the possible outcomes of his actions.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125973235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Fresh Threat: Will CAS9 Lead to CRISPR Bioweapons?","authors":"D. Willingham","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Imagine a scenario where, inspired by the attacks by members of the Rajneeshpuram Cult who poisoned Oregon salad bars with the salmonella bacteria, a terrorist cell in the United States has made plans to distribute salmonella at buffet-style restaurants throughout the country.3 This terrorist cell, aware that salmonella is treatable and that previous attacks have not taken any lives, is committed to enhancing the salmonella they use by making it highly drug-resistant. Their efforts to create a drug-resistant strain of the bacteria have so far failed, as they do not have access to the facilities and expensive lab equipment necessary for genetic engineering. However, having purchased a CRISPR kit for $150 online, they believe they are now equipped with the tools needed to create a genetically modified “superbug.”4","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128213232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Classifying and Regulating Biological Agents in the United States: Problems Posed to Global Biosecurity","authors":"C. Brooks","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Over the years, there have been many different classifications of biological agents. In the 20th century, classifications often revolved around and highlighted the weaponized potential of certain pathogens and chemicals.1 Since then, the official worldview of biological agents has shifted to a defensive stance, focusing more on classifying agents for public health preparedness and bio-risk prevention.2 However, an offense focused classification system is still utilized for militaristic purposes.3 Outside of military classifications, there are two major classification systems in the United States that have evolved from the days of the U.S.’s biological weapons program. The Select Agent Program holds regulatory power and determines which biological agents are regulated and what facilities must do to possess, use, or transfer them within the bounds of the law. The other classification system, disseminated by the National Institute of Health, takes no part in regulation, and instead provides insight into which agents scientifically pose the highest risk to global biosecurity. Navigating this broad and confusing framework can be challenging, and as with many administrative regulations, there are multiple problems associated with the implementation and enforcement of these policies that pose significant risks to global biosecurity.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123195030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Biological Warfare and Environmental Decontamination Post-Exposure: Who Is Responsible?","authors":"Kristyn Urban-Sorensen","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0007","url":null,"abstract":"In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian PrimeMinister Boris Yeltsin acknowledged that anthrax spores had escaped from a MOD laboratory in Yekaterinburg.2 Following this event, a Japanese group named Aum Shinrikyo attempted to weaponize and disseminate anthrax in the mid-1990s.3 Additionally, the radical group allegedly attempted but failed to acquire the Ebola virus from a village in Africa during an outbreak.4 Ultimately, the group unsuccessfully invested millions of dollars in an attempt to produce biological weapons, but their attempts had spurred public concerns over the reality of bioterrorism.5 In the fall of 2001, multiple envelopes containing spores of Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, were sent through the U.S. mail to New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Washington D.C. Numerous government and private buildings were contaminated as a result.6 Public interest in the potential danger of biological warfare and terrorism ultimately spiked after the events on and following September 11, 2001, as well as the depiction of fictitious biological attacks in books and movies.7 Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, much time and effort has been allocated to improving catastrophic incident response. But recovery—the period following initial response that focuses on the long-term viability of the affected area—has received much less attention.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134344520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Psychological Evaluations for the U.S. Army Biological Personnel Reliability Program","authors":"Scott J. Salvatore","doi":"10.1515/JBBBL-2017-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JBBBL-2017-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Given the inherent dangers associated with working in biodefense labs, coupled with the potential for insider threat, the Department of Defense and Federal Agencies are charged with determining the most suitable and reliable personnel for work in this high risk setting. A critical component to meeting this charge are Personnel Reliability Programs which aim to ensure the safety, security, and health of personnel who work with biological select agents and toxins. Behavioral health consultants can be an asset within an interdisciplinary approach for determining personnel suitability. The following perspective, on conducting psychological evaluations for the Army’s Biological Personnel Reliability Program, is intended to provide a framework for these complex exams along with highlighting relevant procedural, policy, and legal issues.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133763170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Islamic State’s Ability to Acquire Biological Weapons and Western Nations’ Response Mechanisms","authors":"Nick Pilcher","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2017-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2017-0013","url":null,"abstract":"The Islamic State, also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Da’esh, is no longer an ignorable threat to Western nations. The group has massive resources – according to one source, it generates up to $40 million per month in illicit oil sales and has assets worth $2.9 billion – and has captured several research facilities, potentially giving it the ability to develop offensive biological weapons. Recently, the United States’ Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, confirmed longheld suspicions that the Islamic State (IS) is capable of producing and deploying offensive chemical weapons, stating: “ISIL has ... used toxic chemicals in Iraq and Syria, including the blister agent Sulfur mustard.” Because of IS’s funding, access to dual-use biotechnology (through the capture of universities and former Iraqi weapons facilities), radical ideology, and demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction on the battlefield, there exists a significant possibility that IS will develop and deploy biological weapons. Proactive steps must be taken now to address this risk. The purpose of this article is to: (1) provide some background information on IS, the history of biological weapons programs in the middle","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126373165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social Media Mining: Can We Prevent the Apocalypse?","authors":"Megan Saltzman","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2017-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2017-0008","url":null,"abstract":"During the 2013 Colorado flooding disaster, researchers from Penn State University used social media mining to track flooding hotspots. The researchers developed an algorithm to identify flooding hotspots based on photographs published by Twitter users during the disaster. There were over 150,000 “tweets” and over 22,000 photographs analyzed during the crisis in Colorado. This data ultimately aided responders in rescuing and evacuating more than 10,000 victims. This is a strong indicator that social media websites can be used to prevent, protect, and aid individuals during emergency situations. In December 2015, there were 1.59 billion active monthly users on Facebook and 307 million on Twitter. Due to the popularity of social media outlets, organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have begun tracking information published by users to gather information during disasters like the 2013 Colorado flooding. In response to the overwhelming benefits and use of social media sites, along with user self-reporting around the world, Digital Disease Detection (DDD) has emerged. DDD, also referred to as digital epidemiology, is a growing field in which scientists and computer analysts use algorithms to track the symptoms","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125862639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}