Biological Warfare and Environmental Decontamination Post-Exposure: Who Is Responsible?

Abstract

In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian PrimeMinister Boris Yeltsin acknowledged that anthrax spores had escaped from a MOD laboratory in Yekaterinburg.2 Following this event, a Japanese group named Aum Shinrikyo attempted to weaponize and disseminate anthrax in the mid-1990s.3 Additionally, the radical group allegedly attempted but failed to acquire the Ebola virus from a village in Africa during an outbreak.4 Ultimately, the group unsuccessfully invested millions of dollars in an attempt to produce biological weapons, but their attempts had spurred public concerns over the reality of bioterrorism.5 In the fall of 2001, multiple envelopes containing spores of Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, were sent through the U.S. mail to New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Washington D.C. Numerous government and private buildings were contaminated as a result.6 Public interest in the potential danger of biological warfare and terrorism ultimately spiked after the events on and following September 11, 2001, as well as the depiction of fictitious biological attacks in books and movies.7 Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, much time and effort has been allocated to improving catastrophic incident response. But recovery—the period following initial response that focuses on the long-term viability of the affected area—has received much less attention.