{"title":"Socrate néoplatonicien. Une science de l’amour dans le commentaire de Proclus sur le Premier Alcibiade, written by Nicolas D’Andrès","authors":"Peter Lautner","doi":"10.1163/18725473-12341525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-12341525","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46285604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"L’être et le temps dans le Parménide et dans le Timée de Platon","authors":"F. Karfík","doi":"10.1163/18725473-12341533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-12341533","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Two of Plato’s dialogues, the Parmenides and the Timaeus, deal explicitly with the relationship between being and time. The former builds on the assumption that whatever is must be temporal, while the latter makes being and time mutually exclusive. This paper begins by examining how the argument develops in the Parmenides, specifically in the corresponding sections 140e1-142a1 and 151e3-155e3 of the first and the second deductions of the dialectical exercise, as well as in the corollary to the second deduction at 155e4-157b5. It then compares this argument with the account of time given in Timaeus 37e6-39e2, which alludes to the account given in the Parmenides. In stressing the incompatibility of these two accounts, it highlights a remarkable feature they both share. Parmenides’ argument starts from the assumption that whatever is in time must be present, past or future, whether a process or a state resulting from a process. As he advances further in the game of Zenonian antilogies, however, he reduces the dimension of the present to a mere ‘now’, conceived of as a ‘stop’ in the process of becoming. In the corollary, he eventually removes the present from time the ‘instant’ in which a change between two mutually exclusive processes or states occurs. Timaeus, for his part, immediately rules out that the present is a temporal dimension, by restricting temporality to the past and the future. Thus, in both accounts, the present vanishes from time and temporal processes are made dependent on extratemporal conditions. However, Parmenides’ argument points to an extratemporal principle of indeterminacy allowing for change, while, for Timaeus, there are two extratemporal conditions for temporal processes, namely the being of the intelligible Forms, on the one hand, and a pre-cosmic, disorderly becoming in space, on the other.","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41604820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Werner Beierwaltes and the Yearning for Transcendence","authors":"D. Hedley","doi":"10.1163/18725473-12341531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-12341531","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this paper we explore some of the key themes in the thought of Werner Beierwaltes. He established a reputation as a scholar of Neoplatonism during a period of great renewal of Neoplatonic studies in the last century, and that esteem was justly deserved. Yet his work was motivated by the faith in Platonism as a living tradition and a resolute conviction that metaphysics is an ineluctable part of the philosophical vocation; and indeed he was irritated by jejune or simplistic critiques of metaphysics. Plotinus was at the centre of his scholarship, which explored the great themes of Neoplatonism through medieval, Renaissance and Idealistic philosophy into the contemporary context. Theology, aesthetics and the question of selfhood or subjectivity were recurrent topics in his writing. The discussion of these problems was fueled by a keen sense of the abiding significance of the Platonic tradition for the most puzzling and urgent intellectual questions.","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47200683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Der Geist als Bild des Einen","authors":"Christian Tornau","doi":"10.1163/18725473-bja10028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-bja10028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Plotinus claims that Intellect, the second hypostasis, is an image of the transcendent One or Good. While this is certainly an application of the paradeigmatist language inherited from the Platonic theory of Forms, it is not obvious how this claim squares with the Neoplatonic axiom that the One transcends Being and Thought and is absolutely formless. I argue that Plotinus solves this dilemma by interpreting Plato’s characterization of Intellect and Being as “Good-like” in such a way as to refer, not to the eidetic properties of Intellect, but to the goodness, desirability and unifying power it receives from the One. While these are not reducible to Intellect’s essence, they are nevertheless an integral part of its being insofar as Intellect is fully real and intelligible only through the First Principle’s presence in it. It may be said, then, that Intellect is an image of the One in a non-paradigmatic sense.","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44797828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comment l’âme voit l’intellect. Une note textuelle en marge de Plotin, Enn. IV 6 (41) 2, 22-24","authors":"Daniela P. Taormina","doi":"10.1163/18725473-12341536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-12341536","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This note aims to show that the text attested by the Medieval sources for Plotinus, Ennead\u0000 IV, 6 (41) 2, 22-24 can be retained, notwithstanding the doubts of several scholars who tried to amend it. Retaining the manuscript tradition enables us to read in the passage three different kinds of vision of the soul : (1) the soul’s ordinary vision of itself, characterized by duality and otherness ; (2) the soul’s vision of intellect and (3) its vision of itself, when she is within the intelligible : both these visions are characterized by the unified duality of the subject and the object of vision.","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44866729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Plotinus, Ennead VI.8: On the Voluntary and on the Free Will of the One, edited by Kevin Corrigan and John D. Turner","authors":"P. Lautner","doi":"10.1163/18725473-12341527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-12341527","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44901176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ὁ Θεὸς ἔρως ἐστί","authors":"D. Tolan","doi":"10.1163/18725473-bja10024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-bja10024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Origen of Alexandria uses the language of ἔρως to explain God’s desire to be with humanity. However, Plato’s classic definition of ἔρως as a mix of poverty and plenty seems to be at odds with Origen’s commitment to classical theism. This article explains why Origen does not consider this attribution to contradict his theological commitments. It starts with a discussion of Origen’s theory of divine attributes, the ἐπίνοιαι Χριστοῦ. Next, Origen’s doctrine of passio caritatis, which states that God can actively will to be passive, is explained. Then, Origen’s familiarity with Plato’s Symposium is demonstrated. The article then considers Origen’s attribution of ἔρως to God, and its context, in the Commentarium in Canticum Canticorum; it emerges that the Incarnation is, for Origen, God’s most erotic act. The final section shows that Origen maintains his understanding of God’s erotic, incarnational movement towards fallen humanity in works other than the Commentarium in Canticum Canticorum.","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44219958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Socrates’ Tomb in Antisthenes’ Kyrsas and its Relationship with Plato’s Phaedo","authors":"Menahem Luz","doi":"10.1163/18725473-bja10023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-bja10023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Socrates’ burial is dismissed as philosophically irrelevant in Phaedo 115c-e although it had previously been discussed by Plato’s older contemporaries. In Antisthenes’ Kyrsas dialogue describes a visit to Socrates’ tomb by a lover of Socrates who receivesprotreptic advice in a dream sequence while sleeping over Socrates’ grave. The dialogue is a metaphysical explanation of how Socrates’ spiritual message was continued after death. Plato underplays this metaphorical imagery by lampooning Antisthenes philosophy and his work (Phd. 81b-82e) and subsequently precludes him from an active role in the Phaedo. A similar case is the exclusion of Euclides of Megara. Fragments of a lost Socratic dialogue depict Apollodorus citing an unnamed Megarian in order to justify care for the remains of the dead. Similar mistaken notions explain Kyrsas’ belief when he lusts after Socrates even though he was dead. In spite of these disputes, the philosophers (Euclides, Antisthenes and Plato) each attempted to present Socrates’ moral influence as a force that continued after his death and burial.","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43089541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is the True Self God at Alcibiades 133c?","authors":"D. T. Sheffler","doi":"10.1163/18725473-12341524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-12341524","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Throughout the Platonic tradition, one encounters the idea that the true self of each person is, at bottom, numerically identical to a singular reality and hence that the distinction between one person’s true self and another’s is either illusory or derivative in some way. I label this idea the Strong Identity Thesis. While several passages might be cited to locate this thesis in the Platonic dialogues themselves, the striking culmination of the First Alcibiades is especially suggestive. In this paper, however, I argue that this passage does not in fact support the attribution of the Strong Identity Thesis to Plato. Instead, I will argue for the Weak Identity Thesis: namely that there is merely an analogical or qualitative link between the true self and some ultimate reality.","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42085280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Role of διάνοια in Plotinus’ Philosophy","authors":"L. Gerson","doi":"10.1163/18725473-bja10020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-bja10020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this paper, I explore the centrality of διάνοια in Plotinus’ philosophy. Plotinus says that the real “we” is found to be the subject of διάνοια and “upwards.” This fundamental definition elicits several pressing questions. First, how is the subject of discursive reasoning related to the subject of appetitive and affective states? Second, how does the subject of discursive reasoning come to recognize its ultimate destiny as an undescended and disembodied intellect? Finally, why should we think that, as Plotinus says, there is “no falsity” in discursive thinking? The answers to these questions begins with Plotinus’ reflections on Plato’s Divided Line and the sharp distinction between διάνοια and δόξα. I argue that διάνοια is the embodied expression of disembodied νοῦς. It is the focus of our ambiguous and conflicted personal identity.","PeriodicalId":40439,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Platonic Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42851248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}