作为一个形象的精神

Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI:10.1163/18725473-bja10028
Christian Tornau
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引用次数: 0

摘要

普罗提诺认为,作为第二本质的“智”是一种超越“一”或“善”的形象。虽然这当然是对从柏拉图形式理论继承来的游街主义语言的应用,但这一主张如何与新柏拉图公理相一致并不明显,即一个人超越存在和思想,绝对是无形式的。我认为,普罗提诺通过将柏拉图对智力和存在的描述解释为“类善”来解决这一困境,即不是指智力的内在属性,而是指它从“一”那里获得的善、可取性和统一力量。虽然这些不能归结为智慧的本质,但它们仍然是其存在的一个组成部分,因为只有通过第一原则的存在,智慧才是完全真实和可理解的。因此,可以说,智慧是非典范意义上的一个形象。
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Der Geist als Bild des Einen
Plotinus claims that Intellect, the second hypostasis, is an image of the transcendent One or Good. While this is certainly an application of the paradeigmatist language inherited from the Platonic theory of Forms, it is not obvious how this claim squares with the Neoplatonic axiom that the One transcends Being and Thought and is absolutely formless. I argue that Plotinus solves this dilemma by interpreting Plato’s characterization of Intellect and Being as “Good-like” in such a way as to refer, not to the eidetic properties of Intellect, but to the goodness, desirability and unifying power it receives from the One. While these are not reducible to Intellect’s essence, they are nevertheless an integral part of its being insofar as Intellect is fully real and intelligible only through the First Principle’s presence in it. It may be said, then, that Intellect is an image of the One in a non-paradigmatic sense.
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