Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal最新文献

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The Anatomy of Behavioral Responses to Social Assistance When Informal Employment is High 非正规就业高水平下社会救助行为反应剖析
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-09-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3229548
M. Bérgolo, G. Cruces
{"title":"The Anatomy of Behavioral Responses to Social Assistance When Informal Employment is High","authors":"M. Bérgolo, G. Cruces","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3229548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3229548","url":null,"abstract":"The disincentive effects of social assistance programs on registered employment are a first order policy concern in developing countries. Means tests determine eligibility with respect to some income threshold, and governments can only verify earnings from registered employment. The loss of benefit at some level of formal earnings is an implicit tax that results in a strong disincentive for formal employment. We study an income-tested program in Uruguay and extend previous literature by developing an anatomy of the behavioral responses to this program. Our identification strategy is based on a sharp discontinuity in the program's eligibility rule and uses information from the program's records, social security administration data, and a follow-up survey. First, we establish that beneficiaries respond to the program's incentives by reducing their levels of registered employment by about 8 percentage points. Second, we find the program induces a larger reduction of formal employment for individuals with a medium probability to be a registered employee, suggesting some form of segmentation – those with a low propensity to work formally do not respond to the financial incentives of the program. Third, we find evidence that the fall in registered employment is due to a larger extent to an increase in unregistered employment, and to a lesser extent to a shift towards non-employment. Fourth, we find an elasticity of participation in registered employment of about 1.7, implying a deadweight loss from the behavioral responses to the program of about 3.2% of total registered labor income.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122986865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
Tax Incentives and Non-Compliance — Evidence from Swedish Micro Data 税收优惠与不合规——来自瑞典微数据的证据
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-09-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2309856
Annette Alstadsæter, M. Jacob
{"title":"Tax Incentives and Non-Compliance — Evidence from Swedish Micro Data","authors":"Annette Alstadsæter, M. Jacob","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2309856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2309856","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the role of tax incentives, tax awareness, and complexity in tax evasion. We observe a specific type of tax evasion among business owners in Swedish administrative panel data, after the tax authority has approved all tax returns. For the period 2006-2009, approximately 5% of tax returns overstate a claimed dividend allowance. Tax awareness decreases and complexity increases the likelihood of misreporting. Our results indicate that some observed misreporting could be accidental, while some misreporting is deliberate tax evasion. We identify a positive and significant effect of tax rates on tax evasion, by exploiting a large kink in the tax schedule. The majority of misreporting cases remains undetected by the tax authority. Self-correction of tax evasion by taxpayers is the dominant type of detection.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"313 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115805856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
Fiscal Issues and Super: Can There Ever Be Equilibrium? 财政问题与Super:是否可能存在均衡?
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-08-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2843370
J. Cooper
{"title":"Fiscal Issues and Super: Can There Ever Be Equilibrium?","authors":"J. Cooper","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2843370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2843370","url":null,"abstract":"A paper exploring the competing tensions in the Australian retirement income system as an explanation for the constant pressure for its review and reform.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128348318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fiscal-Financial Vulnerabilities Fiscal-Financial漏洞
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-08-02 DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-7776
Ludger Schuknecht
{"title":"Fiscal-Financial Vulnerabilities","authors":"Ludger Schuknecht","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-7776","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7776","url":null,"abstract":"In the 2000s, global inequality fell for the first time since the Industrial Revolution, driven by a decline in the dispersion of average incomes across countries. Between 1988 and 2008, a period of rapidly increasing global integration, income growth was largest for the global top 1 percent and for country-deciles in Asia, often in the upper halves of the national distributions, while the poorer deciles in rich countries lagged behind. Although within-country inequality increased in population-weighted terms, for the average developing country the rise in inequality slowed down in the second half of the 2000s. However, like any analysis based on household surveys, these results could miss important increases in inequality if they are concentrated at the top. These data constraints remain especially serious in developing countries where only very limited information on the top tail exists, especially regarding capital incomes.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114419594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
‘Nudging’ Risky Decision-Making: The Causal Influence of Information Order “助推”风险决策:信息秩序的因果影响
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-07-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2813291
J. Aimone, Sheryl B. Ball, B. King-Casas
{"title":"‘Nudging’ Risky Decision-Making: The Causal Influence of Information Order","authors":"J. Aimone, Sheryl B. Ball, B. King-Casas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2813291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2813291","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies have suggested a correlation between information acquisition and value maximization in risky decision-making. We show that changing how information is acquired can “nudge” agents into riskier decisions, suggesting that choice architecture influences observed risky decisions.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125364602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Behavioral Interventions in Tax Compliance: Evidence from Guatemala 税收合规的行为干预:来自危地马拉的证据
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-7690
Stewart Kettle, M. Hernandez, S. Ruda, M. Sanderson
{"title":"Behavioral Interventions in Tax Compliance: Evidence from Guatemala","authors":"Stewart Kettle, M. Hernandez, S. Ruda, M. Sanderson","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-7690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7690","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents results from a large (43,387) nationwide randomized controlled trial in Guatemala that used reminders to promote tax compliance. The trial varied the letter received by taxpayers (individuals and firms) who had failed to pay their income tax for the 2013 tax year. Taxpayers were randomly allocated to receive either no letter, the letter originally used by the Guatemalan Tax Authority, or four letter variants adapted using behavioral design. The study finds that although all letters increased the rate of declaration, only two of the letters were successful at increasing the rate of payment and the average amount paid per letter received. The best performing treatments were a deterrent message framing non-declaration as an intentional and deliberate choice, rather than oversight (designed to overcome status quo bias), and a social norms message that referred to the 64.5 percent of taxpayers that had already paid this tax (join the status quo). These two interventions increased the rate of payment as well as the average amount paid conditional on paying, overall more than tripling tax receipts. The paper estimates that if sent to all taxpayers in the sample, in 11 weeks the social norms letter would have generated additional tax revenues of approximately US$760,000, which is 36 times the cost of sending the letters. The effects are persistent and remain at 12 month follow up, suggesting the letters are effective in increasing revenue for the tax authority rather than just bringing tax receipts forward.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130918708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 76
Subjective Wellbeing Impacts of National and Subnational Fiscal Policies 国家和地方财政政策对主观幸福感的影响
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-04-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2759636
A. Grimes, Judd Ormsby, Anna Robinson, Siu Wong
{"title":"Subjective Wellbeing Impacts of National and Subnational Fiscal Policies","authors":"A. Grimes, Judd Ormsby, Anna Robinson, Siu Wong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2759636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2759636","url":null,"abstract":"We study the association between fiscal policy and subjective wellbeing using fiscal data on 34 countries across 129 country-years, combined with over 170,000 people’s subjective wellbeing scores. While past research has found that ‘distortionary taxes’ (e.g. income taxes) are associated with slow growth relative to ‘non-distortionary’ taxes (GST/VAT), we find that distortionary taxes are associated with higher levels of subjective wellbeing than non-distortionary taxes. This relationship holds when we control for macro-economic variables and country fixed effects. If this relationship is causal, it would offer an explanation as to why governments pursue these policies that harm economic growth. We find that richer people’s subjective wellbeing is less harmed by indirect taxes than people with lower incomes, while “unproductive expenditure” is associated with higher wellbeing for the middle class relative to others, possibly reflecting middle class capture. We see little evidence for differential effects of fiscal policy on people living in different sized settlements. Devolving a portion of expenditure to subnational government is associated with higher subjective wellbeing but devolving tax collection to subnational government is associated with monotonically lower subjective wellbeing.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133804698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
A Comparison of Fiscal Rules for Resource-Rich Economies 资源丰富经济体财政规则比较
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-02-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2731570
R. Iacono
{"title":"A Comparison of Fiscal Rules for Resource-Rich Economies","authors":"R. Iacono","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2731570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731570","url":null,"abstract":"This paper produces a normative evaluation of fiscal rules for a resource-rich economy. Ad hoc fiscal rules might imply substantial welfare costs; the goal is to analyze the magnitude of these costs by quantitatively evaluating the relative welfare sub-optimality of these rules. I posit a closed form solution for the infinite horizon consumption problem of the planner of a resource-rich economy with resource price uncertainty and precautionary saving. The model is subsequently calibrated and simulated to provide a welfare-based comparison between the fiscal rules based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis and on the ad hoc Bird-in-Hand policy. The results of the simulation indicate the presence of a positive and substantial welfare loss suffered from switching to the Bird-in-Hand rule. This result is shown to be robust under different parameterizations.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121127640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Tax Compliance and Cultural Values: The Impact of 'Individualism and Collectivism' on the Behaviour of New Zealand Small Business Owners 税收合规和文化价值观:“个人主义和集体主义”对新西兰小企业主行为的影响
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-02-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2804417
Dr. Sue Yong, Fiona Martin
{"title":"Tax Compliance and Cultural Values: The Impact of 'Individualism and Collectivism' on the Behaviour of New Zealand Small Business Owners","authors":"Dr. Sue Yong, Fiona Martin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2804417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2804417","url":null,"abstract":"Due to changes in immigration rules and globalisation, most developed countries including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are becoming more culturally diverse. The consequence of cultural diversity challenges the present assumption of homogenous resident taxpayers. This leads to the need to examine existing tax policies and administration. Sparse research on tax compliance and culture also provides the rationale for an in depth qualitative study of ethnic small business taxpayers' compliance behaviours. This study examines the attitudes and abilities of small business operators in New Zealand towards paying their taxes on time. The small business operators are categorised, using Statistics New Zealand categories, into New Zealand's four largest ethnic taxpayer groups: Europeans, Asians, Maori and Pacific peoples. The study adopts a qualitative research methodology and evaluates the taxpayers' behaviour through the lens of the cultural values of \"individualism\" and \"collectivism\". The results of this study are relevant for tax administrators, academics and practitioners in New Zealand and also Australia, in view of the fact that Australia is also a multicultural nation.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115145056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Democracy and Redistribution 民主与再分配
Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-01-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2722886
Santanu Gupta, R. Jha
{"title":"Democracy and Redistribution","authors":"Santanu Gupta, R. Jha","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2722886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2722886","url":null,"abstract":"In a probabilistic voting model with three jurisdictions with residents with different income levels, we demonstrate that it is always optimal to distribute tax revenues as public good to only the residents of richest and median income jurisdictions. In this context, we compare the overall welfare of all citizens in a one bracket Tax Structure where the poor contribute to tax and does not receive public goods, to that in a progressive Two bracket or a Three bracket Tax Structure where the poor face no taxes but neither do they receive any public goods. In a situation where the government extracts a part of the tax revenues as political rents and maximizes expected payoff rather than the probability of re-election, there is a possibility of complete extraction which implies taxing away all private income with no allocation of public good, if electoral uncertainty be high.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134415256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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