税收合规的行为干预:来自危地马拉的证据

Stewart Kettle, M. Hernandez, S. Ruda, M. Sanderson
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引用次数: 76

摘要

本文介绍了危地马拉一项大型(43,387)全国随机对照试验的结果,该试验使用提醒来促进税收合规。这次审判改变了未缴纳2013纳税年度所得税的纳税人(个人和公司)收到的信件。纳税人被随机分配,要么没有收到字母,危地马拉税务机关最初使用的字母,要么使用行为设计改编的四个字母变体。研究发现,虽然所有信件都提高了申报率,但只有两封信成功地提高了付款率和每封收到的信件的平均付款金额。效果最好的治疗方法是发出一种威慑信息,将不申报视为有意和深思熟虑的选择,而不是监督(旨在克服现状偏见),以及发出一种社会规范信息,指的是64.5%的纳税人已经缴纳了这项税(加入现状)。这两项干预措施提高了支付率以及有条件支付的平均支付金额,总体上增加了两倍多的税收收入。该论文估计,如果将社会规范信发送给样本中的所有纳税人,在11周内将产生约76万美元的额外税收收入,这是发送信件成本的36倍。这些信件的影响是持久的,并在12个月后保持不变,这表明这些信件有效地增加了税务机关的收入,而不仅仅是增加了税收收入。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Behavioral Interventions in Tax Compliance: Evidence from Guatemala
This paper presents results from a large (43,387) nationwide randomized controlled trial in Guatemala that used reminders to promote tax compliance. The trial varied the letter received by taxpayers (individuals and firms) who had failed to pay their income tax for the 2013 tax year. Taxpayers were randomly allocated to receive either no letter, the letter originally used by the Guatemalan Tax Authority, or four letter variants adapted using behavioral design. The study finds that although all letters increased the rate of declaration, only two of the letters were successful at increasing the rate of payment and the average amount paid per letter received. The best performing treatments were a deterrent message framing non-declaration as an intentional and deliberate choice, rather than oversight (designed to overcome status quo bias), and a social norms message that referred to the 64.5 percent of taxpayers that had already paid this tax (join the status quo). These two interventions increased the rate of payment as well as the average amount paid conditional on paying, overall more than tripling tax receipts. The paper estimates that if sent to all taxpayers in the sample, in 11 weeks the social norms letter would have generated additional tax revenues of approximately US$760,000, which is 36 times the cost of sending the letters. The effects are persistent and remain at 12 month follow up, suggesting the letters are effective in increasing revenue for the tax authority rather than just bringing tax receipts forward.
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