The Anatomy of Behavioral Responses to Social Assistance When Informal Employment is High

M. Bérgolo, G. Cruces
{"title":"The Anatomy of Behavioral Responses to Social Assistance When Informal Employment is High","authors":"M. Bérgolo, G. Cruces","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3229548","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The disincentive effects of social assistance programs on registered employment are a first order policy concern in developing countries. Means tests determine eligibility with respect to some income threshold, and governments can only verify earnings from registered employment. The loss of benefit at some level of formal earnings is an implicit tax that results in a strong disincentive for formal employment. We study an income-tested program in Uruguay and extend previous literature by developing an anatomy of the behavioral responses to this program. Our identification strategy is based on a sharp discontinuity in the program's eligibility rule and uses information from the program's records, social security administration data, and a follow-up survey. First, we establish that beneficiaries respond to the program's incentives by reducing their levels of registered employment by about 8 percentage points. Second, we find the program induces a larger reduction of formal employment for individuals with a medium probability to be a registered employee, suggesting some form of segmentation – those with a low propensity to work formally do not respond to the financial incentives of the program. Third, we find evidence that the fall in registered employment is due to a larger extent to an increase in unregistered employment, and to a lesser extent to a shift towards non-employment. Fourth, we find an elasticity of participation in registered employment of about 1.7, implying a deadweight loss from the behavioral responses to the program of about 3.2% of total registered labor income.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"26","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3229548","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26

Abstract

The disincentive effects of social assistance programs on registered employment are a first order policy concern in developing countries. Means tests determine eligibility with respect to some income threshold, and governments can only verify earnings from registered employment. The loss of benefit at some level of formal earnings is an implicit tax that results in a strong disincentive for formal employment. We study an income-tested program in Uruguay and extend previous literature by developing an anatomy of the behavioral responses to this program. Our identification strategy is based on a sharp discontinuity in the program's eligibility rule and uses information from the program's records, social security administration data, and a follow-up survey. First, we establish that beneficiaries respond to the program's incentives by reducing their levels of registered employment by about 8 percentage points. Second, we find the program induces a larger reduction of formal employment for individuals with a medium probability to be a registered employee, suggesting some form of segmentation – those with a low propensity to work formally do not respond to the financial incentives of the program. Third, we find evidence that the fall in registered employment is due to a larger extent to an increase in unregistered employment, and to a lesser extent to a shift towards non-employment. Fourth, we find an elasticity of participation in registered employment of about 1.7, implying a deadweight loss from the behavioral responses to the program of about 3.2% of total registered labor income.
非正规就业高水平下社会救助行为反应剖析
在发展中国家,社会援助项目对注册就业的抑制作用是首要的政策问题。经济状况调查确定了某些收入门槛的资格,政府只能核实登记就业的收入。某种正规收入水平上的福利损失是一种隐性税收,它会对正规就业产生强烈的抑制作用。我们研究了乌拉圭的一项收入测试计划,并通过对该计划的行为反应进行解剖来扩展先前的文献。我们的识别策略是基于项目资格规则的明显不连续性,并使用来自项目记录、社会保障管理数据和后续调查的信息。首先,我们确定受益人通过将其注册就业水平降低约8个百分点来响应该计划的激励措施。其次,我们发现该计划导致了中等概率成为注册员工的个人正式就业的更大减少,这表明某种形式的分割——那些正式工作倾向较低的人对该计划的经济激励没有反应。第三,我们发现有证据表明,登记就业人数的下降在很大程度上是由于未登记就业人数的增加,而在较小程度上是由于向非就业的转变。第四,我们发现登记就业的参与弹性约为1.7,这意味着对该计划的行为反应造成的无谓损失约占登记劳动总收入的3.2%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信