North Korean Review最新文献

{"title":"The Evolution of North Korea's Political System and Pyongyang's Potential for Conflict Management","authors":"Andrew Scobell","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.91","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionObservers tend to label the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a bizarre political system that can only be understood on its own terms. One respected analyst suggests that the DPRK might just be \"the strangest political system in existence.\"1 Some observers argue that North Korea is a dangerous rogue state that is heavily armed, unpredictable and dangerous.2 Others argue that North Korea, while strange at first glance, becomes more comprehensible and less threatening in the context of Korean history and culture.3 An analysis of the nature and evolution of the DPRK's political system may provide important clues as to the motivations, policy preferences, and the Pyongyang regime's potential for conflict management.At the outset it is important to ask: what is the nature and scope of the conflict? According to Niklas Swanstrom, Mikael Weissmann and Emma Bjornehed, a conflict entails \"perceived differences in issue positions between two or more parties at the same moment in time.\"4 The conflict on the Korean Peninsula is complex, multifaceted, concerns a number of different \"issue positions,\" and at least six parties. For the purposes of this article, however, I will just identify what appears to have become the critical issue in recent years: the disposition of North Korea's nuclear program. While the ongoing six-party talks involve North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, China and the United States, the issue of North Korea's nuclear program boils down to a deep-seated conflict between Pyongyang and Washington. Baldly put, on the one hand, the United States has adamantly insisted that Pyongyang's nuclear program be completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantled while on the other hand North Korea has been just as adamant in insisting that it has the right to a nuclear program.5According to C.R. Mitchell, a conflict involves at least three aspects: attitudes, situation, and behaviors.6 This paper focuses on change and continuity in Pyongyang's political system rather than directly on conflict prevention or conflict management because the author believes that this potential will not be tapped without major changes in North Korea's political system. The primary attitude of the North Korean regime is one of hard-core indoctrination and absolute information control, the primary situation in North Korea is extreme militarization, and the primary behavior of the Pyongyang regime is mobilization. The persistence of this attitude, this situation, and this behavior appears to seriously hinder the prospects for any meaningful conflict management and certainly precludes the possibility of conflict resolution.Totalitarianism and Post-TotalitarianismThis paper argues that North Korea's political system is best understood as an eroding totalitarian regime of the communist variety.7 The DPRK appears to meet the basic criteria for an orthodox communist regime: it has a Leninist party that monopolizes political power while espousing a M","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Impacts of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement on Inter-Korean Relations","authors":"S. H. Lee","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.40","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe KORUS FTA has various effects on intra-Korean relations. The KORUS FTA Document Annex 22-B describes \"the effect on intra-Korean relations\" as a precondition to be considered in discussing the rules of origin of products from Outward Processing Zones (OPZs). It is a very broad definition, but it is a good example to show that the KORUS FTA is closely linked to intra-Korean relations.There are two perspectives on the KORUS FTA and intra-Korean relations; one is positive and the other negative. Kim, a senior researcher at the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU), said in favor of the FTA that, \"the KORUS FTA can be a strong ground enough to give two Koreas a win-win game.\"1 He argued that the relationship between the two Koreas, as well as their economic cooperation, will jump up to a higher level through the FTA. On that level, South Korea will be able to strengthen its industrial competitiveness. North Korea will also have a role in developing the KIC, and may gain recognition from the United States for the regime's legitimacy. These will result in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and will lead to a peaceful process in solving the Korean problem. In this process, North Korea may expect to restore stability to its economy.However, one precondition is necessary to realize all of these nice processes. This is recognition from the United States that products made in Kaesung can be regarded as products made in Korea. Dong, team director at Samsung Economic Research Institute, also takes a similar perspective. He has a broader viewpoint than Kim's. He sees that the KORUS FTA has an effect not only on the security environment of the Korean Peninsula, but also on intra-Korean relations.In a perception that security has a direct influence on intra-Korean economic cooperation, he summarizes the effects of the FTA in three ways.2 First, the KORUS FTA will improve Korea-U.S. relations from a military basis to a combination of the economic and the military. Second, the KORUS FTA could bring about a fundamental change in intra-Korean relations and in policies on North Korea. Third, the KORUS FTA will stimulate cooperation between North East Asian countries. In this cooperation, North Korea will have a chance to develop its economy.There is a view, however, that the KORUS FTA could have negative effects on intra-Korean relations. Chung, ex-secretary to President Roh, said, \"President Roh is now going to fail his reform and if he goes on naively driving in KORUS FTA, he would face a difficult situation.\" Chung regards the FTA as a U.S. hegemonic strategy on North East Asia.3What is the KORUS FTA? The KORUS FTA will drive the Korean people into infinite competition in global markets. In the past, the global economy meant competition among nations. Today, however, it means competition among people, competition among enterprises, and competition among states, all mixed up simultaneously.First of all, from the legal perspective, the KORUS","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"U.S. Sanctions and Treasury Department Actions against North Korea from 1955 to October 2007","authors":"Karin J. Lee, J. Choi","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"OverviewThe history of U.S. sanctions against the DPRK can be divided into six stages. The U.S. maintained fairly comprehensive economic sanctions from the time of the Korean War until 1989, occasionally increasing the level of restriction during this period. Between 1989 and 1995 the export of goods from the U.S. commercial sector was permitted solely for the purpose of meeting \"basic human needs.\" A more extensive easing of sanctions accompanied the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994.In 2000, President Clinton eased many remaining trade and travel sanctions in response to the DPRK's 1999 voluntary halt in missile testing. Licensing and trade regulations on most items for civilian use were significantly relaxed at this time.Although the George W. Bush administration's approach to the DPRK differed considerably from that of the Clinton administration, no economic sanctions were re-imposed during President Bush's first term, although two North Korean companies were cited for WMD and missile proliferation (Rennack).In March 2005, North Korea declared that because \"the DPRK-U.S. dialogue\" on which the missile test moratorium was based had been \"totally suspended when the Bush administration took office in 2001,\" the DPRK is \"not bound to the moratorium on the missile launch at present.\" The DPRK then tested short range missiles first on May 1, 2005, and again on March 8, 2006. These short range tests, which did not break any international laws, garnered only limited public attention and condemnation from the United States and international community, and no U.S. economic sanctions were re-imposed.Instead, in this fifth phase, the U.S. administration focused on financial sanc- tions, including the assets of individual companies suspected of proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On June 28, 2005, the United States froze the assets under U.S. jurisdiction of three DPRK firms that it accused of engaging in WMD proliferation, and in October 2005 froze the assets of an additional eight firms (Rennack).In September 2005 the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia as a bank of \"primary money laundry concern.\" This action, coupled with a December 2005 Treasury Department advisory warning financial institutions against transactions with the DPRK, proved to have considerable impact on the DPRK's ability to do business, and may have had a greater impact than sanctions that had been lifted during the Clinton administration.In March 2006, the U.S. Department of Treasury accused a Swiss company of doing business with one of the sanctioned North Korean firms, and froze the assets of the Swiss company and its owner and banned U.S. entities from doing business with the firm or owner. In April 2006 the Department of Treasury issued an Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulation banning U.S. persons from owning or leasing North Korean-flagged vessels.On July 5, 2006, the DPRK test-launched an array of ballistic missiles, inclu","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Japanese-North Korean Relations after the Second Pyongyang Summit of 2004","authors":"H. N. Kim, Jack L. Hammersmith","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.74","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.74","url":null,"abstract":"The Second Pyongyang SummitAt the first Japanese-North Korean summit meeting in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il were able to reach agreements on a number of thorny issues which had constituted stumbling blocks in normalizing their relations. Regarding the question of Japan's compensation to North Korea for the suffering inflicted on Koreans during Japan's colonial rule, Pyongyang agreed to accept Tokyo's offer of economic assistance instead of demanding \"reparations\" as it had insisted previously. Another major issue in Japanese-North Korean normalization talks from 1991 to 2000 was the suspected abduction of a dozen Japanese nationals by North Korea from the late 1970s to the early 1980s; the purpose was apparently to utilize them as language instructors for training North Korean special agents. As the Japanese national police had collected substantial evidence concerning at least 11 such abductions, Tokyo demanded not only information concerning their whereabouts but also their repatriation to Japan. However, Pyongyang flatly denied any knowledge about these abductions until the summer of 2002. At the Pyongyang summit, Kim reversed Pyongyang's previous position of denial and acknowledged North Korea's responsibility for abducting thirteen Japanese nationals and offered an apology, pledging not to repeat such mistakes. According to Kim, out of thirteen, eight had died, while five were still alive. Regarding the nuclear weapons issue, Kim promised to comply with all international agreements. In addition, Kim also promised to extend Pyongyang's self-imposed moratorium on missile testing beyond 2003. When the Pyongyang Declaration (signed jointly by Koizumi and Kim) incorporating these agreements was announced, many reacted with optimism that Japan and North Korea would be able to normalize diplomatic relations quickly. However, such was not to be the case.Rather, Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization talks were stalemated shortly thereafter, largely due to the revelation of North Korea's secret uranium-based (HEU) nuclear weapons program in October 2002 and the backlash in Japanese public opinion on the abduction issue. North Korea refused to comply with Koizumi's persistent demand to abandon its nuclear weapons program by complying fully with international agreements, including the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002. The Japanese were also enraged by Kim's confession on the abduction of Japanese nationals, especially the shocking news of the death of the eight abductees while in North Korea's custody. As Pyongyang's explanations for the causes of these deaths aroused much suspicion about the credibility of Pyongyang's report,2 many Japanese demanded an accurate and convincing explanation for the circumstances surrounding the death of these abductees.Although Pyongyang returned five surviving Japanese abductees to Japan in October 2002, it was not until the summer of 2004 that Pyong","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Which Country Will Be the World Economic Leader in the Next Generation: The United States or China? and the North Korean Factor","authors":"Suk‐Hi Kim, T. Crick, Junhua Jia","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.56","url":null,"abstract":"Is There Another Wave of American Decline?The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, along with the unusually strong performance of both the U.S. economy and its stock market during the 1990s, elevated the United States to an unsurpassed level of economic, military, and cultural power. However, in the early 2000s, the United States has faced its sixth wave of decline since the 1950s, a phenomenon largely triggered by its external economic problems and the September 11, 2001, attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The first wave occurred in 1957 and 1958, when the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik, the first manned satellite. The second wave came at the end of the 1960s, when President Nixon began to prepare Americans for a multipolar world because American decline economically and militarily was inevitable. The third wave followed immediately after the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 and the dramatic increase in oil prices. The fourth wave took place in the later 1970s, because of the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, the continued development of Soviet nuclear forces, and the expansion of Soviet power in a half-dozen countries, such as Angola. The fifth wave happened in the late 1980s, largely due to U.S. foreign debt as well as financial threats from Japan.Every single empire and great nation of history has been destroyed or greatly diminished in world influence. Why should we assume that the United States, today's great nation, could defeat the pattern of history? If we assume an American decline for a moment, China seems likely to emerge as a great power, which might end the dominance of the United States in the game of influence on world affairs. We can base the current wave of decline on three bodies of evidence: (1) mounting U.S. budget and trade deficits, (2) economic and military threats from China, and (3) a growing world resistance to American unilateral actions. Let us examine, however, these three bodies of evidence, along with other arguments, before we willingly accept such a gloomy conclusion.Fading America and Emerging ChinaWorld economies strongly affect international politics. At present, about 200 economies interact on the world political and economic stages. This interaction raises important questions. Will the United States maintain not only military superiority but also its economic dominance in the world? Will any country challenge the United States as the superpower? If we assume an American decline for a moment, no other economic leader, with the possible exception of China, seems likely to emerge in the next generation. The question, however, is whether China can actually fulfill that potential. The Chinese leaders have long aspired to a great China- a country with a world-class economy, a strong military, and the restoration of full sovereignty over Taiwan and other disputed islands within its claimed territorial boundaries.Is the United States really passing its baton in the ","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The North Korean Economy","authors":"Byung-Yeon Kim","doi":"10.1017/9781316874882.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316874882.003","url":null,"abstract":"The North Korean Economy By Nicholas Eberstadt. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions Publishers, 2007, 329 pp, (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-7658-0360-3As the editor of North Korean Review, I know that there are two American economists with the knowledge and experience required to solve the puzzle of this secretive country's economy and the military implications of its economic policies: Marcus Noland of the Institute for International Economics and Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute. Whether or not readers agree with this book's diagnoses and suggested remedies on North Korean economy, they can surely benefit from considering the clear and energetic presentations in Nicholas Eberstadt's book. In my opinion, anyone who has some interest in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and Korea) should read The North Korean Economy.This book consists of ten chapters. Chapter i, \"Reform, Muddling Through, or Collapse,\" concludes that numerous small attempts by state planners to liberalize the ailing economy have been completely inadequate to pull the economy out of its nosedive. Eberstadt insists that policy makers must be prepared for the possibility that North Korea will continue to strive to amass an ever-growing nuclear arsenal, even as it gives assurances to the contrary.Chapter 2, \"Our Own Style of Statistics: Availability and Reliability of Official Quantitative Data,\" states that in an age of globalization, North Korean statistical authorities stand in virtually complete isolation from all international counterparts. Apparently, there is scant evidence of any improvement in North Korean statistical output over the years since September 1998, when Kim Jung Il formally assumed state power.Chapter 3, \"International Trade in Capital Goods, 1970 to 1995,\" examines the North Korean international trade in \"capital goods\"; that is to say, machinery, equipment, the manufactured parts used as capital stock in the production process. Eberstadt thinks that the ratio of capital goods to gross domestic capital formation in the North Korean economy during the 1980s and 1990s may have been lowest in the world.Chapter 4, \"Interlocking Crisis in Food, Energy, and Transport Equipment: Indications from Mirror Statistics,\" analyzes North Korea's trends in three sectors of strategic significance to the entire North Korean economy: food, energy, and transport. This chapter states that Pyongyang appears to be pursuing an \"aid-based\" solution to its food and energy crises, the same one that has been used by the country for half a century.Chapter 5, \"Socioeconomic Development in Divided Korea: A Tale of Two Strategies,\" presents a comparative economic analysis of the two Koreas. Ever since the Korean War, the two rival governments have pursued two different strategies in their economic policies: a highly centralized economic system by North Korea and a government-directed capitalism by South Korea. Some fifty years after the Korean War, South Korea defeated North Ko","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/9781316874882.003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56931112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Do We Not Understand the DPRK","authors":"Alon Levkowitz","doi":"10.3172/NKR.3.2.94","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.3.2.94","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionOn October 27, 2006, The New York Times published an article by Mark Mazzetti, entitled \"In '97, U.S. Panel Predicted a North Korea Collapse in 5 Years\" (Mazzetti and Shanker, 2006). Nine years had passed and the DPRK had not collapsed. Why had American experts estimated that North Korea would collapse by 2002 and why did this not happen? One of the reasons proffered was that they had not correctly anticipated the changes in South Korean policy towards the DPRK. If one looks at the reports prior to the North Korean missile test held on 4 July 2006 and the DPRK's nuclear test held on 9 October 2006, the same problem is evident when some of the experts estimated that the DPRK would not conduct these tests. The DPRK did not \"follow these analyses.\" The DPRK is not the only case study in which social science predictions have failed. One can look at the predictions preceding elections in countries worldwide and discover that the results are in some cases completely different from the original forecasts. Forecasts concerning Iraq's attack on Kuwait or the Chinese intervention in the Korean War are examples of how social science researchers can err. When we want to explain why analysts miscalculated the results and did not correctly predict what would happen in the DPRK or in other places, we can find different reasons that are general causes that any social science research faces, but we can also find specific reasons that are linked to the DPRK.This brief commentary does not wish to blame or offend anyone, but to try to discover the reasons why some (but not all) of us tend to make mistakes when we attempt to predict what the DPRK will do. In order not to upset anyone, I will make general observations on this issue, without referring to a specific report.AnalogiesWhen we explain political phenomena we usually make analogies to other case studies. The analogies belong to political science methods of comparing and finding cases that resemble the relevant case study. When analyzing North Korea, the analogy that researchers use is Eastern Europe and other communist states such as Romania and East Germany. In the case of Romania, the political, social, and economic turmoil led to the coup against President Nicolae Ceausescu. Several forecasts have asserted that the political, economic, and social environment in the DPRK might lead to a coup similar to that in Romania. According to this analogy, the regime in Pyongyang should have been overthrown years ago, but the fact that Kim Jong-il is still in power illustrates that there are immense differences between these two states and calls the validity of this analogy into question. As the second analogy, the German case study provides a model for peaceful unification. But the differences between the two countries should be taken into consideration. For example, nationalism plays a much more important role in Korea, and the population and economic differences between the two Germanys and the two Kore","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69761921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed","authors":"C. Quiñones","doi":"10.3172/NKR.3.2.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.3.2.24","url":null,"abstract":"Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed?The new nuclear deal hammered out in Beijing in mid-February 2007 is a very tentative and limited first step toward ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, it creates numerous new problems without solving any fundamental issues. Prospects for its eventual success could prove worrisome.On the plus side, the accord is a step away from confrontation toward preserving peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The Bush Administration, after four years of exchanging heated rhetoric with Pyongyang and reliance on ineffective coercive tactics like economic sanctions, has finally decided to negotiate with Pyongyang. Frankly, this has always been the only way to achieve a \"peaceful diplomatic solution\" to the North Korean nuclear issue. Simply put, at long last negotiations have finally just begun.But the accord's negative aspects outweigh its positive points. It is not a new \"Agreed Framework.\" This is a tentative deal. If North Korea does not like the direction of future negotiations, it can pull out at any time and restart its nuclear reactor. The Agreed Framework was not a tentative deal. It was a package deal-all or nothing. The 1994 accord \"froze\" all nuclear activities and put all North Korean nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. The new deal says that the \"DPRK will discuss with other parties\" the scope of nuclear activities to be covered. Also the details IAEA monitoring are to be \"agreed between IAEA and DPRK.\" The Agreed Framework resolved such issues prior to its finalization.In other words, the new agreement reverses the process that led to the Agreed Framework. Numerous working level discussions were held in New York and elsewhere to resolve the details of implementation prior to the agreement's conclusion. Under this new deal, North Korea can control the entire process because it can threaten to unfreeze its nuclear activities anytime that it is unhappy with one or more of the working group negotiations.Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has incorrectly claimed that the new deal is better than the old one because it is \"multilateral.\" He simply does not know his history. The Agreed Framework was multilateral. Prior to its finalization, the United States forged an international consensus supportive of the accord by consulting daily for eighteen months with Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow, not to mention many other governments. Also, the Agreed Framework was designed to support the multilateral IAEA, an agency of the United Nations. The Bush Administration has openly and repeatedly belittled the effectiveness of the IAEA and its director, even calling for his replacement.The new accord's shortcomings suggest that the Bush Administration was desperate to continue the Six Party Talks at any price. Over-extended militarily in the Middle East, the Bush Administration cannot afford instability on the Korean Peninsula. …","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69761961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Beijing Deal Is Not the Agreed Framework","authors":"P. Hayes","doi":"10.3172/NKR.3.2.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.3.2.19","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe latest round of the Six Party Talks resulted in a joint statement to implement a phase of \"Initial Actions\" including:* The DPRK will freeze plutonium production and processing at Yongbyon and will let IAEA inspectors back into the country to monitor and verify this freeze* Five working groups will be set up on U.S.-DPRK relations, U.S.-Japan relations, energy and economic aid, Armistice and security issues, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula* Provision of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil equivalent of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK within 60 days.The six parties also agreed to undertake the \"next phase,\" defined as: \"provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant-economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.\"U.S. Cave-in?The Beijing Deal has been attacked already as a sell-out and reminiscent of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework under which the DPRK froze its nuclear fuel cycle and got two light reactors and half a million tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the reactors were complete. The old Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002 when the United States accused the DPRK of pursuing uranium enrichment outside of the Agreed Framework. The ultra-hard line critics have got it wrong, again.The Agreed Framework provided two reactors at a cost of about $4 billion to the DPRK on a 2 percent per year confessional financing basis. In present value for the capital and operating costs, and assuming the power would have been exported to South Korea on a commercial basis (the North Korean grid being incapable of operating these reactors), the total \"annualized\" cost the reactors would have been about $300 million per year for the DPRK.The export earnings from the ROK would have been about $700 million per year from the two DPRK reactors exporting power to the ROK grid. The DPRK would thereby have earned about $368 million per year in profit. To this, we add an additional $150 million per year for ∂ a million tons of heavy fuel oil that would have gone to the DPRK each year until the reactors were complete under the old deal.The total net present value that the DPRK stood to gain in the Agreed Framework was about $4.6 billion (this would have been spread over 30 years from the time the reactors began operating). The economics were important in the Agreed Framework, although it foundered primarily on the failure of both parties to implement their commitments to normalize political and security relations.What do they get in the Beijing Deal? A measly 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil in the next 60 days, provided they freeze their plutonium facilities and the talks in the working groups go well over this time frame. When they have fully \"disab","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69761945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Market Reforms in North Korea: Are They for Real?","authors":"Jong-sung You","doi":"10.3172/NKR.3.2.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.3.2.27","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionNorth Korea has been in the headlines with increasing frequency lately thanks mainly to the nuclear standoff with the United States, natural disasters, or famines. Although overshadowed by these events, what is quietly taking place in North Korea and is of much greater long-term importance to the people of North Korea are the economic reforms that have been under way since July 1, 2002.Opinions are divided on the prospects for the reforms' success. Some believe that the current reforms are merely a desperate attempt on the part of the current regime to salvage the central planning that has been rendered unworkable due to the economic collapse brought about by the withdrawal of economic aid and favorable trade terms by the former Soviet Union, followed by a string of natural disasters in the 1990s. They believe that the regime will revert back to the predominantly commanddriven economy once the economy recovers from its current illness (Klingner, 2004). Others believe that the current reforms are similar in essence to the Liberman-style reforms attempted unsuccessfully in the Soviet Union and its Central and East European satellite countries in the 1960s and 1970s, and hence are not likely to work in North Korea. Seliger (2005), for example, points out that the present economic structure of North Korea in terms of degree of industrialization is closer to those of the Soviet Union and its European satellites of the 1960s and 1970s than that of China of the 1970s or Vietnam of the 1980s, and the Chinese and Vietnamese reform experiences are not an appropriate comparison. Seliger also points out correctly that the agricultural reform in North Korea does not go as far as the Chinese model. Others, including myself, are more optimistic about the chances of success of the current North Korean economic reforms, although the optimism must in all practicality be based on the premise that the current nuclear standoff with the United States will be satisfactorily resolved.I attempt in this paper to analyze and assess the significance of current economic reforms in North Korea and their prospects for success in light of the country's history of an open-door policy and economic reform attempts, as well as the current geopolitical and economic climate of Northeast Asia. The conclusion I derive is that the prospects for success of the current economic reforms in North Korea are far better than the pessimists would like us to believe. The paper consists of five sections. The first section presents a historical overview of the North Korean macroeconomic performance and North Korea's open-door policy attempts prior to July 1, 2002. The second section is a brief description of the July 2002 economic reforms and the subsequent follow-up measures. Lessons from the economic reform experiences of other socialist economies are discussed in the third section. The fourth section addresses the prospects for success of the current North Korean economic reforms. T","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}