Journal of Competition Law and Economics最新文献_第9页

DOES DEREGULATION ENCOURAGE ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR 放松管制会鼓励反竞争行为吗

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV035

María J. Alonso-Nuez, Jorge Rosell-Martínez, A. Muñoz-Porcar

引用次数: 4

SECTORAL REGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: THE U.K.'S CONCURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS—AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 部门监管与竞争政策:英国从经济的角度来看

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhv029

J. Stern

{"title":"SECTORAL REGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: THE U.K.'S CONCURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS—AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE","authors":"J. Stern","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhv029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhv029","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the U.K.'s concurrency arrangements under which sector regulators can apply aspects of competition law to their industries. It is frequently claimed that concurrency is a unique aspect of U.K. competition policy. However, this article argues that it arose during the 1980s as one aspect of an almost uniquely procompetitive regulatory framework for privatized telecommunications and other U.K. infrastructure industries. The article discusses the origins of these formal concurrency arrangements and their use in the U.K. since the 1980s. It also compares the U.K. with other EU and OECD countries over the role of ex post competition policy relative to ex ante regulation and the interactions between sector regulators and competition authorities. It emphasizes the role of “informal” concurrency as well as “formal” concurrency in the U.K. and other countries. The article concludes with a discussion of the likely prospects for the U.K. under the enhanced concurrency regime established in 2013 and makes some recommendations for the future. Developing and implementing effective methods to evaluate the net welfare benefits of the enhanced concurrency regime will be crucial both in their own right and in establishing a robust deterrence strategy against anticompetitive behavior in industries with sector regulators.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134178115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Deterrence Effects of Korean Antitrust Enforcement on Producer Prices and Profit Margins 韩国反垄断执法对生产者价格和利润率的威慑作用

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV028

Robert M. Feinberg, Minsoo Park

{"title":"Deterrence Effects of Korean Antitrust Enforcement on Producer Prices and Profit Margins","authors":"Robert M. Feinberg, Minsoo Park","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV028","url":null,"abstract":"Antitrust enforcement is well established in Korea, yet there has been little study of its effectiveness. John Connor, however, noted that “the Korean [Fair Trade Commission] has the best record of anti-cartel enforcement in Asia.”1 In this article, we examine several datasets to investigate whether antitrust enforcement in Korea, especially anti-cartel activity, has had a price-limiting impact over the past couple of decades. We compare the behavior of firms and industries that have been subject to antitrust investigation to those that have not. We examine the response of the firms and industries under antitrust investigation following the cases. The results presented here are consistent across two very different data sets of indicators for the Korean economy. The results suggest that long-term deterrence is unlikely to be observed from antitrust investigations, although the impact on short-term price and profit margin may be expected. However, the stronger effects observed suggest that firms in Korea have begun to pay more attention to the actions of the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) over the past decade since the more rigorous enforcement of antitrust.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131241974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

PRICE DISCRIMINATION, MERGER POLICY, AND THE COMPETITIVE CONSTRAINT OF LOW-VALUE CUSTOMERS IN AIRLINE MARKETS 价格歧视、合并政策与航空市场低价值顾客的竞争约束

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV031

T. Hazledine

引用次数: 6

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY MARKETS: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL AND OWNERSHIP UNBUNDLING 欧洲和北美能源市场的并购:法律和所有权分拆的实证分析

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV027

Stefan Bogner, Stephan M. Gasser, Margarethe Rammerstorfer

{"title":"MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY MARKETS: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL AND OWNERSHIP UNBUNDLING","authors":"Stefan Bogner, Stephan M. Gasser, Margarethe Rammerstorfer","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV027","url":null,"abstract":"Competition and antitrust law aims to prevent companies from engaging in anti-competitive behavior and to promote and protect market competition. In this context, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are under particular scrutiny, since they are often assumed to be motivated by possible market power increases, thus adversely affecting market efficiency. With a view to recent efforts within the European Union to increase the effectiveness of competition law in the energy sector (that is, legal and ownership unbundling as policy tools geared towards forcing corporations into demerging transactions), an event study approach is applied in this article to evaluate the market response to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions in EU and U.S. energy markets and to determine whether or not the hypothesis that M&As result in increased market power of the joined companies actually holds true. Findings indicate that increases in market power are not the main motive for energy market M&As. The results thus oppose the general adequacy of legal and ownership unbundling as veritable competition law instruments against market imperfections and failures, but indicate that unbundling can indeed be a viable policy solution if implemented on a case-by-case basis.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132542485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

INFERRING ANTICOMPETITIVE PRICE EFFECTS FROM DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS: A CAVEAT 从差异中差异分析推断反竞争价格效应:警告

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV032

Shawn W. Ulrick, Seth B. Sacher

引用次数: 5

COMPETITION LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE DUTCH AGREEMENT ON COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS 竞争法与环境保护:荷兰燃煤电厂协议

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV017

E. Kloosterhuis, M. Mulder

{"title":"COMPETITION LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE DUTCH AGREEMENT ON COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS","authors":"E. Kloosterhuis, M. Mulder","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV017","url":null,"abstract":"Agreements between firms to jointly reduce production capacity generally violate competition law, unless specific conditions are met. These conditions imply that the agreements need to realize benefits for consumers that could not otherwise be realised. Together, we call them “efficiency defence.” Initiated by a societal debate in the Netherlands, we analyze how environmental benefits can be included in this framework. We apply this analysis to a proposed agreement among electricity producers to jointly advance the closure of a number of coal-fired power plants. Using shadow prices as developed in environmental economics, we assess the environmental benefits of this proposed agreement. We conclude that the environmental benefits for the consumers involved are significantly smaller than the loss of consumer welfare resulting from the increase in the electricity price caused by the closure of power plants. Hence, such an agreement would infringe competition law. This case, however, shows that it is feasible to incorporate environmental effects into an efficiency defence of an anticompetitive agreement made for the purpose of sustainability.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121120893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

ENTREPRENEURIAL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 企业流量管理和互联网工程任务组

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-09-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV018

G. Knieps

{"title":"ENTREPRENEURIAL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE","authors":"G. Knieps","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV018","url":null,"abstract":"The changing role of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard setting process, from designing and implementing the best effort transmission control protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) as a universal standard towards a platform for dealing with the increasing need for variety in the design of a Quality of Service (QoS) differentiated traffic management architecture, is demonstrated. The IETF's contributions to flexible open transmission architecture, able to provide the required traffic qualities for the different applications, constitute the relevant pillars of a Generalized Differentiated Service (DiffServ) architecture. Further, the role of entrepreneurial traffic management within the Generalized DiffServ architecture, and the division of labor between the IETF and entrepreneurial traffic management, is analyzed. Within the “umbrella” architecture of Generalized DiffServ with the potential to combine basic elements of QoS differentiated traffic architectures, a flexible framework for entrepreneurial traffic quality differentiation strategies is evolving. Its basic characteristic is market-driven network neutrality with all applications bearing the opportunity costs of their required traffic capacities. Consequently, an artificial market split between best effort TCP/IP and managed services would conflict with the integrated service approach of the IETF. Finally, the implementation of Generalized DiffServ via Next Generation Networks is considered.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125951044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS ON E-COMMERCE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION 电子商务的纵向限制和选择性分销

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-09-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV022

Paolo Buccirossi

{"title":"VERTICAL RESTRAINTS ON E-COMMERCE AND SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION","authors":"Paolo Buccirossi","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV022","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses whether, when manufacturers choose to adopt a selective distribution system, vertical restraints imposed on electronic commerce (e-commerce) may work in the interest of consumers or have anticompetitive consequences that require an antitrust intervention. The paper presents the basic economic concepts that apply to vertical restraints, and identifies the efficiency reasons and the anticompetitive effects that may motivate their adoption. Then, the relevant economic literature is surveyed in order to understand how e-commerce influences retail competition, taking into account its impact on search costs, distribution costs, and information asymmetry. The paper examines the legal treatment of vertical restraints on e-commerce in the case of selective distribution; it summarizes the position expressed by the European Commission in the Block Exemption Regulation and the accompanying guidelines, and then discusses some cases decided by National Competition Authorities, National Courts, and the European Courts. From this overview emerges the risk that the antitrust analysis of vertical restraints on e-commerce in selective distribution systems may be guided by presumptions that do not have solid economic grounds. The paper argues that it is unwise to adopt a formal approach for the legal assessment of these vertical restraints and calls for a more economic effect-based approach.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"os-50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127789513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17

AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TOWARDS FINE VALUE OPTIMIZATION FOR ANTIMONOPOLY VIOLATIONS 反垄断罚款价值优化的经济学方法

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-09-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV012

Sergey Petrov, A. Shmakov

引用次数: 0