Journal of Competition Law and Economics最新文献_第8页

HOW PASS-ON THEORY SHOULD BE APPLIED IN KOREAN ANTITRUST LITIGATION 在韩国的反垄断诉讼中应如何运用转嫁理论

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhw007

Se-In Lee

{"title":"HOW PASS-ON THEORY SHOULD BE APPLIED IN KOREAN ANTITRUST LITIGATION","authors":"Se-In Lee","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhw007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhw007","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I analyze and support the Korean Supreme Court's acceptance of pass-on theory in the recent flour price-fixing case decided in 2012. Since Korea belongs to the civil law system that aims at making actual damage compensation by private litigation, I agree with the court that a defendant should not be required to pay more than the actual damage suffered by plaintiffs. The Supreme Court stated that a defendant should establish a causal link between the alleged overcharge and any recovery made to plaintiffs through pass-on, but concluded that the required causal link was not established in the present flour price-fixing case. However, a notable feature of the judgment was that the Supreme Court allowed a reduction of the final damages awarded anyway, not on the basis of pass-on theory, but based on the notion of fairness. I support the Korean Supreme Court's decision to allow the pass-on defense to run, with burden of proof to establish it resting on the defendant. However, I suggest that the Korean courts should not calculate a reduction of damages according to the notion of fairness when a defendant cannot establish the pass-on causal link. It is time for the Korean courts to rely on a more concrete way of calculating damages than selecting some arbitrary numbers based on the notion of fairness.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132737821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

THE UNCERTAIN WELFARE EFFECTS OF RAILROAD COMPETITION AND RAILROAD REGULATION, 1870–1900 铁路竞争和铁路监管的不确定福利效应，1870-1900

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2016-03-28 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHW012

G. Priest

引用次数: 0

ARTICLE 101 TFEU AND MARKET INTEGRATION 第一百零一条联盟与市场一体化

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2016-03-15 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2747784

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo

{"title":"ARTICLE 101 TFEU AND MARKET INTEGRATION","authors":"Pablo Ibáñez Colomo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2747784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2747784","url":null,"abstract":"Market integration is an objective of Article 101 TFEU. As a result, agreements aimed at partitioning national markets are in principle restrictive of competition by object. The case law on this point has been consistent since Consten-Grundig. Making sense of it, however, remains a challenge. The purpose of this piece is to show, first, how the methodological approach followed by the Court of Justice changes when market integration considerations are at stake. Secondly, it explains why and when restrictions on cross-border trade have been found not to restrict competition by object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. An agreement aimed at partitioning national markets is not as such contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU if the analysis of the counterfactual reveals that it does not restrict inter-brand and/or intra-brand competition that would have existed in its absence. It is possible to think of three scenarios in this regard: (i) an agreement may be objectively necessary to achieve the aims sought by the parties; (ii) a clause may be objectively necessary for an agreement and (iii) competition is precluded by the underlying regulatory context (as is the case, in particular, when the exercise of intellectual property rights is at stake).","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129728308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

MODELING THE DURATION OF MERGER REVIEWS IN NEW ZEALAND 对新西兰合并审查持续时间的建模

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2016-03-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV038

Q. Yang, M. Pickford

引用次数: 2

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF CONSUMER RESPONSE IN REGULATED MARKETS 监管市场中消费者反应的经验证据

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2016-03-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV041

C. Price, Minyan Zhu

{"title":"EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF CONSUMER RESPONSE IN REGULATED MARKETS","authors":"C. Price, Minyan Zhu","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV041","url":null,"abstract":"The U.K. Competition and Markets Authority has opened two major investigations into the retail energy and banking sectors, and identifies weak consumer response as a potential theory of harm in both sectors. Consumers of many regulated services, including energy and banking, need to make active moves to switch suppliers, with profound consequences for how well the market functions. We identify differences in expected gains across demographic groups, particularly with respect to age and income, the associated changes in activity and implications for policy. We find that potential gains and anticipated switching time are associated with changes in consumer activity, but with differences between markets, demographic groups and individuals. Rather than concentrate on the average consumer response, we find variations across demographic groups, and that well informed vulnerable consumers are not necessarily less responsive than others, once we control for their expectations.We conclude that sector regulators and agencies who wish to encourage consumer action need to differentiate their policies: strategies to emphasize potential gains and reduce anticipated switching time are the most likely to increase consumer activity, but programs need to be tailored to particular markets and target groups if they are to be effective in stimulating consumer activity.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"18 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114035800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 35

DETERRING BIDDER COLLUSION: AUCTION DESIGN COMPLEMENTS ANTITRUST POLICY 阻止投标人串通：拍卖设计与反垄断政策相辅相成

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2016-03-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV037

Hong Wang, Hong-min Chen

引用次数: 2

ADDING DIMENSION TO MERGER ANALYSIS 向合并分析添加维度

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2016-03-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV039

Mark A. Jamison, J. Hauge

引用次数: 2

THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE ON DAMAGES ACTIONS: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO RECONCILE COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS AND LENIENCY INCENTIVES 欧洲关于损害赔偿诉讼的指令:错过了协调受害者赔偿与宽大激励的机会

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2016-03-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV033

Philipp Kirst, R. V. D. Bergh

引用次数: 9

Margin Squeeze: An Above-Cost Predatory Pricing Approach 利润挤压:一种高于成本的掠夺性定价方法

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2016-03-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV042

Germain Gaudin, Despoina Mantzari

引用次数: 85

ONE PIECE AT A TIME: SUCCESSIVE MONOPOLY AND TYING IN ANTITRUST 一次一件:连续的垄断和反垄断

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV034

Fred S. McChesney

{"title":"ONE PIECE AT A TIME: SUCCESSIVE MONOPOLY AND TYING IN ANTITRUST","authors":"Fred S. McChesney","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV034","url":null,"abstract":"As highlighted by the linkLine case, litigation alleging anticompetitive price squeezes due to a defendant's successive monopoly remains the recurring feature in antitrust that it has been since Alcoa. Some decisions, notably then-Judge Breyer's Town of Concord opinion, treat the matter as one of economics. Others, such as linkLine and similar appellate court decisions, resolve the matter on narrower legal grounds. This article revisits the Concord opinion's economics, correcting small errors in Judge Breyer's graphical analysis but reaffirming his principal economic point that successive monopoly ordinarily is procompetitive and may well benefit consumers. Decisions upholding price squeezes in a successive monopoly on purely legal grounds are therefore economically correct. The article then argues that the economics of successive monopoly offer an economically sound extrication from the morass in which tying law currently wallows. The economic differences between successive monopoly and tying are inconsequential. So the law governing the two practices (section 2 of the Sherman Act for successive monopoly, section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act for tying) should be reduced to a single set of standards. Parallels to the economics and law of exclusive dealing are also noted as part of the case for legal unification.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115828095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1